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The world of estates and future interests in North Carolina is a
fascinating one (at least to collectors of incunabula). Here is found al-
most the full panoply of common law freehold estates: the fee simple
absolute; the defeasible fees including the fee simple determinable, the
fee simple subject to condition subsequent, and the fee simple subject
to executory limitation;I and the life estate. Although our statutes con-
vert the fee tail into a fee simple,2 one must understand the feudal nice-
ties of the fee tail in order to know when the statutes will operate.
Fortunately, North Carolina has never recognized the fee simple condi-
tional,3 a medieval estate eliminated in England in 1285;1 the distinc-
t Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A. 1961, University of Illi-
nois; M.A. 1962, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1965, University of Illinois.
1. See McCall, Estates on Condition and on Special Limitation in North Carolina, 19 N.C.L.
REv. 334 (1941).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1976): "Every person seized of an estate in tail shall be deemed
to be seized of the same in fee simple."
3. Prior to 1285 a conveyance "to .4 and the heirs of his body" created in .4 a fee simple
conditional upon the birth of issue. If, after the birth of issue, A failed to convey the estate, it
passed on his death to his issue in fee simple conditional, with the same consequences. J. CRIB-
BET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 46 (2d ed. 1975).
4. Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285).
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tion of sanctioning that estate is reserved for our sister state to the
south.5
The feudal conveyancer would also find his full armamentarium
of future interests: reversions, possibilities of reverter and powers of
termination (rights of entry) for the grantor; remainders (indefeasibly
vested, vested subject to total divestiture, vested subject to partial di-
vestiture and contingent); and executory interests (springing and shift-
ing) for the grantee. Were Lord Coke to emerge, H.G. Wells-like, from
a time machine into a twentieth-century Tar Heel deeds vault, he
would not be unfamiliar with many of the doctrines and issues associ-
ated with our future interests. Worthier Title may have been abol-
ished,6 but Destructibility of Contingent Remainders lurks in the
cases.7  The Rule in Shelley's Case is alive and well and living in
Raleigh,8 and the Rule in Wild's Case, dating from 1599, is still with
us. 9 Various restrictive common law rules have led to meliorating
North Carolina statutes furthering the transferability of future inter-
5. 1 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 62 n.8 (2d ed. 1956); Note,
The Fee Simple Conditional in South Carolina, 18 S.C.L. REV. 476 (1966).
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-1-2 (1976). Compare id with Link, The Rule in Wld's Case in
North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REv. 751, 824 n.369 (1977). One question not addressed in this article
is whether the abolition applies to instruments other than wills (chapter 28A deals with decedents'
estates) and, if so, whether it applies retroactively.
The statutory presumption that "heirs" means "children" tends to limit the operation of the
doctrine. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6 (1976); c N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-6.1 (1976) ("next of kin"
presumed to mean "those persons who would take under the law of intestate succession").
On Worthier Title generally, see 41 N.C.L. REv. 317 (1963); 14 N.C.L. REv. 90 (1935).
7. Dictum in Blanchard v. Ward, 244 N.C. 142, 148-49, 92 S.E.2d 776, 781 (1956), suggests
that destructibility may still arise in North Carolina via the doctrine of merger. See Fourth 4nnual
Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 35 N.C.L. REV. 177, 237 (1957). See generally McCall, The
Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in North Carolina, 16 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1937).
There is a kind of statutory destructibility in North Carolina. The grantor of a deed or settlor
of a trust creating a contingent future interest in some person not in esse or not determined until
the happening of some future event may revoke the grant of the interest at any time prior to the
happening of the contingency vesting the future interest. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-6, -6.1 (1976); f.
id §§ 41-11, -11.1, -12 (generally allowing sale or mortgage of property subject to contingent
remainders, with proceeds of sale to be held for ascertainment of ultimate remaindermen).
8. E.g., Starnes v. Hill, 112 N.C. 1, 16 S.E. 1011 (1893); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-1.1 (1976).
The statute provides that in construing conveyances the court shall give effect to the intention of
the parties, but has an express proviso that the section shall not prevent the application of the Rule
in Shelley's Case.
The Rule in Shelley's Case has even been extended to personal property. Riegel v. Lyerly,
265 N.C. 204, 143 S.E.2d 65 (1965), noted in 68 W. VA. L. REV. 104 (1965). On Shelley's Case
generally, see Block, The Rule in Shelley's Case in North Carolina, 20 N.C.L. REV. 49 (1941);
Webster, 4 Relic North Carolina Can Do Without-The Rule in Shelley's Case, 45 N.C.L. REV. 3
(1966).
9. Link, supra note 6, at 819-21.
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ests,'° sanctioning the creation of future interests in personalty by inter
vivos instrument," and establishing a constructional preference for
definite failure of issue."z The Statute of Uses, in a form recognizable
by Henry VIII, lies entombed in the General Statutes.' 3
Many of the rules, doctrines and issues just listed are of somewhat
limited current significance. Destructibility of Contingent Remainders,
for example, customarily is restricted to legal (not equitable) remain-
ders (not executory interests) in real property (not personalty); its po-
tential scope is therefore limited. Even those old rules, such as the
Rules in Shelley's Case' 4 and Wild's Case,' 5 which are now applied to
equitable interests as well as legal ones and to personalty as well as
realty, apply only if the creator uses certain fatal language not ordina-
rily found in modem instruments. (At least one hopes that lawyers
avoid such pregnant language as "to A and his children" (invoking the
Rule in Wild's Case) or such notorious phrases as "to A for life, re-
mainder to his heirs" (invoking the Rule in Shelley's Case). Laymen
may blunder into such usages, but there are limits to the preventive
scope of the law.16)
On the other hand, the Rule Against Perpetuities, while derived
from centuries-old principles, remains a vital concept. It applies to le-
gal and equitable interests, to real property and personal property, to
family dispositions and, perhaps unexpectedly, to some commercial
transactions (for example, options, leases and condominiums). Fur-
ther, the kinds of gratuitous dispositions to which the Rule Against Per-
petuities applies include two of the most common dispositive tools in
modem estate planning: class gifts and powers of appointment. For
various reasons, it is often advisable for the draftsman of a will or trust
disposing of a modest or large estate to create class gifts' 7 and powers
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-2 (inheritability), 31-40 (devisability), 39-6.3 (alienability) (1976).
11. Id § 39-6.2 (overturning rule of Speight v. Speight, 208 N.C. 132, 179 S.E. 461 (1935),
noted in 14 N.C.L. REv. 196 (1935), which held that future interests in personal property, which
may be created by will, could not also be created by deed).
12. Id § 41-4.
13. Id § 41-7.
14. For the Rule in Shelley's Case to apply to equitable interests, both the preceding freehold
estate to the ancestor (e.g., the life estate to A) and the remainder to the ancestor's heirs or bodily
heirs must be equitable. If one is legal and the other equitable, the Rule does not apply. If both
are legal, of course, the Rule applies. See Webster, supra note 8, at 14-15.
15. See Link, supra note 6, at 783-85.
16. Because laymen persist in drawing their own wills, it has been suggested that, rather than
ignore the problem, the bar promulgate an official will form and instructions for using it. JUSTICE
(SocIETY) HOME-MADE WILLS (1971).
17. Except for very simple estates, the testator or settlor almost inevitably will want to create
interests in unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, requiring the use of a general class designation.
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of appointment.'8 The Rule applies to both, sometimes in a surpris-
ing' 9 or unexpected2" fashion. The Rule Against Perpetuities, then, is
not a cubbyhole for antiquarians; it is a strong, wide-ranging creature
based on enduring policies. Some general knowledge of the Rule is
important to almost every lawyer, to enable him to recognize perpetu-
ities problems, and a working knowledge of the intricacies of the Rule
is essential to the probate lawyer.
In view of the range and depth of available analyses of North Car-
olina estates and future interests issues, 2 1 it is surprising that the Rule
Against Perpetuities has not been the subject of comprehensive scru-
tiny.2 2 Perhaps the reputation of the Rule as "a technicality-ridden le-
gal nightmare" 23 or as a "trap and snare for the unwary"'24 has
discouraged inquiry. Despite this daunting prospect, the time seems
right for a look at the North Carolina Rule. While the last few decades
have witnessed widespread debate and occasional reform of "the
Rule' 25 in other states,26 the flow of North Carolina cases on perpetu-
18. Special powers preserve flexibility over the shares of the second generation of takers
under a will or trust: "To regulate events in 1980 the judgment of a mediocre mind on the spot is
incomparably preferable to the guess in 1960 of the greatest man who ever lived." W.B. LEACH &
J. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 241-42 (1961).
General testamentary powers often accompany gifts of life estates to surviving spouses in
order to qualify the share for the marital deduction while limiting the spouse's control over the
property.
19. For example, the "all-or-nothing rule" of Leake v. Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch.
1817), that a class gift is totally bad if the gift to any potential class member can vest too remotely.
See section III. infra.
20. For example, the validity of interests created by exercise of a general testamentary power
is determined by reading the appointment back into the instrument creating the power, and the
period of perpetuities runs from the date the power is created, not the date the appointment is
made. See section IV. infra.
21. As examples, consider the articles cited in notes 1, 6, 7 & 8 m.rura.
22. The Rule is treated in 1 S. MORDECAI, LAW LECTURES 588-89, 595-96 (2d ed. 1916); 2 id
1158, 1162, 1281-82; 7 STRONG'S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 3D Wills § 41 (1978); and 2 N. WIG-
GINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 287 (1964).
There is no shortage of outstanding general works. The classic is, of course, J.C. GRAY, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942). Valuable treatises include 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY pt. 24 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (authored by Professor Leach) [hereinafter cited as ALP];
T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 183-229
(1966); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY chs. 71-73 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1977); 3 L.
SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, ch. 39. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY chs. 26-28 (1944)
(the Reporter was Professor Powell). Professor Leach authored a number of law review articles on
the subject, to which this writer's debt will be apparent. They include Leach, Perpeluities in a
Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938); Perpetuities: The NutshellRevisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973
(1965); and The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1938).23. Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1349 (1954).
24. The source of this epithet lies buried in the author's subconscious.
25. Some indication of the impact of the Rule Against Perpetuities is given by its common
denomination simply as "the Rule."
26. The statutes are collected in 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, J 807A-827.
R ULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
ities questions continues unabated. The purpose of this article is to ex-
amine the Rule Against Perpetuities as it is applied in North Carolina,
with particular emphasis on those aspects of the Rule of greatest impor-
tance to the modem estate planner and draftsman. For the estate plan-
ner, the Rule's application to class gifts, to powers of appointment, and
to the duration of trusts is of primary concern. For the draftsman, the
single most important problem is one of prevision-anticipating when
the Rule may be involved-so the article will stress some of the unex-
pected applications of the Rule, particularly those involving commer-
cial transactions. Developing case law suggests that an attorney may be
negligent in drafting an instrument containing perpetuities errors,27 so
these matters are not purely of academic interest.
In delineating the North Carolina Rule, this article will compare
its application to that in other states, will ask whether our courts have
applied the Rule correctly, and will inquire whether reform is advisa-
ble, and, if so, which form it should take.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE RULE
The classic statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities is by Gray:
No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.28
Leach remarks that "Gray's formulation would be more realistic if it
were preceded by the words Generally speaking and if the word vest
were put in quotation marks."2 9
Of course, the Rule did not spring forth in this form from the brow
of the first judge to decide a perpetuities case. Rather, the Rule evolved
in a classic common law fashion--on a case-by-case basis over the
course of nearly two centuries-until it was reduced to the Holy Writ of
Gray's codification. Because the evolution of the Rule in North Caro-
lina followed roughly the same path as the English cases, the develop-
ment of the Rule in England will be described briefly.
A. Evolution of the Rule in England
It has been postulated that developments in real property law have
27. See section VI. infra.
28. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 201.
29. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 639 (1938).
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followed a Hegelian path of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.30 Conven-
tional analyses of the Rule Against Perpetuities treat it as the product
of a struggle between the attempts of past generations to tie up land
and the desires of present generations freely to dispose of it.31 Most
major developments of English land law can be analyzed in terms of a
struggle over free alienability of real property.32 The progression may
be represented schematically as follows: 33
Thesis (to restrain alienability)
1. Conveyance "to .4 and his heirs."
Result: This created an interest in A's heirs
that could not be defeated by A's convey-
ance.
2. Conveyance "to A and his bodily heirs."
Result: This created an interest in A's
descendants that was certain to pass to
them at his death.
3. Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285. 35
Result: Fee tail. This statute gave effect to
the fee tail. A could not bar his descend-
ants.
Antithesis (to further alienability)
la. D'Arundel's Case, 1225.3 4
Result: The words "and his heirs" were
interpreted as words of limitation, limiting
or describing A's estate. .4 took in fee
simple absolute, free from any obligation
to his heirs.
2a. Thirteenth Century Cases.
Result: Fee simple conditional. The con-
veyance was interpreted as creating a fee
simple conditional in 4; if the condition of
birth of issue were met, 4 had the power
to convey absolute ownership.
3a. Taltarum's Case, 36 1472.
Result: Common recovery. By going
through a largely fictional lawsuit, the
common recovery, A, the tenant in tail in
possession, could "dock the entail" and
convert his estate into a fee simple abso-
lute.
At this point, circa the sixteenth century, the number of alternative
moves and countermoves multiplied and the story became more com-
plex. 37 On the side of restraining alienation were variations on the ba-
30. E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (1974):
Hegel ... developed a theory of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Each develop-
ment (thesis) in human affairs developed opposition (antithesis), and from the clash of
these opposing forces came a new development (synthesis). Whether this is true at all
times in all places and in all contexts I do not know, but it certainly has been true of the
development of property law institutions.
31. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note, div. 4, pt. 1, at 2123-29 (1944).
32. E.g., E. RABIN, supra note 30.
33. See generally 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 759[l]; E. RABIN, supra note 30; RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 31.
34. Bracton's Notebook, Case 1054 (1225).
35. 13 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1285).
36. Y.B. Mich. 12 Edw. 4, 19, pl. 25 (1472).
37. Perpetuities aspects aside, the next move by those who would entail land was the strict
settlement, an ingenious device for tying up family estates. See W.B. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra
note 18, at 102-03. The ultimate fate of the legal fee tail in England was abolition by the reform
legislation of 1925.
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sic fee tail. One device to restrain alienation was by conveyance of
land in fee tail with the added condition that any attempt to dock the
entail (as by common recovery) would terminate the estate of the per-
son attempting disentailment. These conditions were struck down as
repugnant to the fee tail and were often described as "perpetuities,"
since, if given effect, the fee tail might last forever. Thus, the loathed
"perpetuity" first arose in the context of a present, inalienable estate in
land.38
At about the same time, English conveyancers began to tie up land
by using future interests instead of the present estate in fee tail. Con-
tingent remainders were used first, and the armamentarium was ex-
panded by the Statute of Uses in 153531 to include executory interests.
Contingent interests in unborn or unascertained remaindermen re-
strained alienability since, obviously, the property could not be sold if
the owners of some outstanding interests were unborn or unascer-
tained. ° The reaction to this technique was, for remainders, the doc-
trine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders, which furthered
alienability by allowing for destruction of contingent remainders by
natural or artificial means.41 It was supposed that executory interests
were also subject to destructibility, but in 1620 the case of Pells v.
Brown42 held that they could not be destroyed, despite a dissenting
view that the holding would lead to a "mischievous kind of
perpetuity. ' 43 Gray" and others45 believe that Pells v. Brown made the
38. Another attempt to avoid docking of the entail involved the creation of an equivalent of
the fee tail in a long term of years. The courts struck down this device by holding that a term of
years could not be entailed and that the attempt to do so gave the grantee the entire term. On
these fee tail variations, see generally 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 759[2]; RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY, supra note 31, at 2126-27; 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1212.
On the history of the Rule Against Perpetuities, see generally 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22,
759-760; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 31, at 2125-29; 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra
note 5, §§ 1201-1202, 1211-1213; Bostick, The Tennessee Rule Against Perpetuities:A Proposalfor
Statutory Reform, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1153, 1154-59 (1974); Schuyler, The Statute Concerning Per-
petuities, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 3, 4-5 (1970).
39. 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535). See generally C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY 173-215 (rev. ed. 1962).
40. Even if the remaindermen were ascertained, it is argued that the existence of a remainder
contingent upon an event (for example, "to 4 for life, and if UNC wins the NCAA basketball
championship, to B and his heirs, and if UNC does not win the NCAA basketball championship,
to C and his heirs") restrains alienability because it is unlikely that B and C will get together and
agree on the terms of a sale. Because the event is uncertain, B and Care not likely to agree on the
valuation of their respective interests. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEiI HAND 36-38
(1955).
41. See generally I L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 193-209.
42. 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620).
43. 79 Eng. Rep. at 506 (Doderidge, J., dissenting).
44. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 121.7.
45. E.g., Schuyler, supra note 38, at 5.
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Rule Against Perpetuities inevitable: something had to be invented to
control indestructible executory interests.
That invention took place in six landmark cases, 46 beginning with
the Duke of Norfolk's Case47 in 1682, ranging through Thellusson v.
Woodford41 in 1805, and ending with Cadell v. Palmer49 in 1833. The
Duke of Norfolk's Case is the most important and will be summarized
here. Simply stated, an estate for 200 years50 was given to Henry and
his issue, but if Thomas should die without issue during the life of
Henry, to Charles. At the time of the decision, it was not clear what a
perpetuity was or what period, if any, was permissible for a perpetuity.
The only prior cases on the notion were those holding an unbarrable
present estate tail invalid as tending to a perpetuity."' When future
interests were concerned, the law was unclear:1
2
The issue that divided the judges in this case was not whether perpe-
tuities should be allowed, but what perpetuities were, or more ex-
actly, whether this case presented a perpetuity. On one side it could
be argued that the contingency upon which the disposition of the
property turned was certain to happen within a short period of time,
so it was foolish to refer to the gift as a perpetuity. On the other side,
it might be argued that the type of interest created should be found
destructible; otherwise the all important preference for free alienabil-
ity would be compromised. This second argument was the tradi-
tional approach to perpetuities and convinced the common law
46. The cases are discussed in 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 760[2].
47. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
48. 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ch. 1805).
49. 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
50. With three exceptions, all of the perpetuities cases preceding the Duke of Nofolk's Case
involved estates for years. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 160, 161. The reasons for this conveyanc-
ing usage are described in Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand- Reflections on the
Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 19, 34-35 (1977).
51. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
52. To Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, a perpetuity was an unbarrable
entail:
A Perpetuity is the Settlement of an Estate or an Interest in Tail, with such Remain-
ders expectant upon it, as are in no Sort in the Power of the Tenant in Tail in Possession,
to dock by any Recovery or Assignment, but such Remainders must continue as perpet-
ual Clogs upon the Estate; such do fight against God, for they pretend to such a Stability
in human Affairs, as the Nature of them admits not of, and they are against the Reason
and the Policy of the Law, and therefore not to be endured.
But on the other Side, future Interests, springing Trusts, or Trusts executory, Re-
mainders that are to emerge and arise upon Contingencies, are quite out of the Rules
and Reasons of Perpetuities, nay, out of the Reason upon which the Policy of the Law is
founded in those Cases, especially, if they be not of remote or long Consideration: but
such as by a natural and easy Interpretation will speedily wear out, and so Things come
to their right Chanel again.
22 Eng. Rep. at 949-50.
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judges Lord Nottingham consulted. The first argument, however,
convinced the Chancellor, and was the one that has become the basis
for the modem Rule Against Perpetuities. The argument between
the two perceptions of what constituted a perpetuity runs through the
entire case.53
So, the case sustained an interest certain to vest or fail within one life in
being at the creation of the interest. Lord Nottingham's memorable
opinion stated a principle for testing the validity of executory interests,
but left the exact limits of the rule open to further development:
Object. They will perhaps say, where will you stop, if not at Child
and Bayi's Case?
Answ. Where? why everywhere, where there is not any Inconve-
nience, any Danger of a Perpetuity; and whenever you stop at the
Limitation of a Fee upon a Fee, there we will stop in the Limitation
of a Term of Years. No Man ever yet said, a Devise to a Man and
his Heirs, and if he die without Issue, living B. then to B. is a
naughty Remainder, that is Pells and Brown's Case.
Now the Ultimum Quod Sit, or the utmost limitation of a fee
upon a fee, is not yet plainly determined; but it will be soon found
out, if Men shall set their Wits on Work to contrive by Contingencies
to do that, which the Law has so long laboured against the Thing will
make it self evident, where it is inconvenient, and, God forbid, but
that Mischief should be obviated and prevented.
But what Time? And where are the Bounds of that Contin-
gency? You may limit, it seems, upon a Contingency to happen in a
Life: What if it be limited, if such a one die without Issue within
twenty-one Years, or 100 Years, or while Westminster-Hall stands?
Where will you stop, if you do not stop here? I will tell you where I
will stop: I will stop where-ever any visible Inconvenience doth ap-
pear; for the just Bounds of a Fee-simple upon a Fee-simple are not
yet determined, but the first Inconvenience that ariseth upon it will
regulate it.54
The case thus laid the foundation for the notions that (a) a perpetuity is
a future interest not certain to vest within a specified period and (b) the
permissible period is tied to lives in being at the creation of the inter-
est.55 Although the Rule grew out of the struggle over free alienability,
its final form was not cast precisely in the mold of alienability. 6
53. Haskins, supra note 50, at 37.
54. 22 Eng. Rep. at 953, 960.
55. It is not usually noticed that there were successive limitations to other younger brothers,
which Lord Nottingham held invalid without discussion. 22 Eng. Rep. at 931, 963. Under the
modem rule these interests would all appear to be good because the brothers would have taken, if
at all, within their own lives.
56. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 2-2.1. There was no suspension of the power of alienation
19791
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B. Evolution of the Rule in North Carolina: Gifts Over on "Death
Without Issue"
There have been two generations of North Carolina perpetuities
cases, reflecting inevitably the problems associated with common draft-
ing devices of the times. The first generation includes roughly two
score cases from the first half of the nineteenth century, almost all of
which involved attempted estates in fee tail and gifts over on death
without issue.5 7 These cases gave some shape to the emerging North
Carolina Rule Against Perpetuities and illustrate some fundamental
concepts of the Rule; they will therefore be discussed as a group.
Following the first generation was a gap of more than half a cen-
tury, broken by only a few perpetuities cases; one may surmise that the
perpetuities law relating to gifts over on death without issue had been
pretty well settled by the first generation cases, so few appeals were
taken during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Follow-
ing the first World War, however, a steady stream of perpetuities cases,
numbering nearly fifty, has flowed through our courts. 8 Most likely
this second generation of cases reflects the attempts of draftsmen to
facilitate the transfer of increased wealth of the state's citizens and to
keep that wealth out of the hands of the federal tax collector.5 9 In this
group of cases are found, for example, perpetuities problems associated
with trusts, class gifts and powers of appointment, three common tools
of the modem estate planner. The second generation cases will be in-
corporated into the discussion of the elements of the Rule in section II.
As background for the first generation cases, the reader may be
helped by a review of two common-law concepts, the estate in fee tail
and the indefinite failure of issue construction. The estate in fee tail
was created by a conveyance or devise "to A and his bodily heirs," or
some similar phrase such as "heirs of the body" or "issue."6 0 The es-
in the Duke of Norfolk's Case because the brothers could at any time have joined in a conveyance
of all interests in the term.
57. Beginning with Sutton v. Wood, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 399 (1801), and extending through
Blake v. Page, 60 N.C. (I Win.) 255 (1864).
58. Beginning with Springs v. Hopkins, 171 N.C. 486, 88 S.E. 774 (1916), and extending
through Dixon v. Rivers, 37 N.C. App. 168, 245 S.E.2d 572 (1978).
59. The federal estate tax, enacted as an emergency measure to help finance the Great War,
was passed in 1916. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, tit. 11, 39 Stat. 756; Act of Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 159,
tit. III, 39 Stat. 1000.
60. For an introductory discussion of the fee tail, see J. CRIBBET, supra note 3, at 45-50; C.
MOYNIHAN, smra note 40, at 37-43. The term "issue" in many jurisdictions is synonymous with
"bodily heirs" and embraces children, grandchildren and other lineal descendants. E.g., Turpin v.
Jarrett, 226 N.C. 135, 37 S.E.2d 124 (1946).
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tate would last as long as there were lineal descendants ("bodily heirs")
of A. In effect, A took a life estate (he could convey the land to a third
person, but the grantee acquired only an estate for A's life), followed
by a life estate in his bodily heirs, followed by a life estate in the bodily
heirs of A's bodily heirs, and so on.
If the grantor of the estate tail said nothing about what happened
when A's line of bodily heirs ran out, there was left, by implication, a
reversion in the grantor. On the other hand, the grantor could provide
for a gift over upon termination of the fee tail-for example, "to A and
his bodily heirs, then to B and his heirs." In this case A would take a
fee tail and B a vested remainder.6'
Actually, the practice of draftsmen was to introduce the remainder
following the estate tail by the language "but if A die without issue," so
that the conveyance customarily read "to A and his bodily heirs, but if
A die without issue, to B and his heirs." The remainder to B did not
necessarily take effect or fail at A's death; it took effect whenever A's
fee tail terminated, that is when A's line of lineal descendants ran out,
whenever that might occur. This is known as an indefinite failure of
issue (as opposed to a definite failure of issue, which would cause the
fee tail to terminate at A's death or some other fixed time).
Now suppose a conveyance "to A and his heirs, but ifA die with-
out issue, to B and his heirs." For various reasons, 62 one of them being
that the practice of English conveyancers was to use the phrase "but if
he die without issue" in limiting remainders after estates tail,63 the in-
definite failure of issue construction was put on the grantor's language.
It was read as if he had said, "to A, but if A's line of lineal descendants
runs out, whenever that may occur, to B." The result, via the back
door, was an estate that lasted as long as A had lineal descendants, viz.
a fee tail in A, followed by a remainder in B.
Finally, two North Carolina statutes are important to the perpetu-
ities analysis of the first generation cases. The first is the Act of 1784, 64
converting estates tail into estates in fee simple; the Act is currently
codified at G.S. 41_1:65
61. 1 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 142.
62. The possible reasons for the English common law preference for the indefinite failure of
issue construction are discussed in id § 522.
63. Id
64. Ch. 22, § 5, reprinted in 3 STATE RECoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA (W. Clark ed. 1905)
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1976)).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-1 (1976).
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Fee tail con erted into fee simple. Every person seized of an estate in
tail shall be deemed to be seized of the same in fee simple.
The second is the Act of 1827,66 reversing the common law presump-
tion of indefinite failure of issue in favor of a presumption of definite
failure of issue at the devisee's death. The second Act is currently codi-
fied at G.S. 41-4:67
Limitations on failure of Issue. - Every contingent limitation in any
deed or will, made to depend upon the dying of any person without
heir or heirs of the body, or without issue or issues of the body, or
without children, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, shall
be held and interpreted a limitation to take effect when such person
dies not having such heir, or issue, or child, or offspring, or descen-
dant, or other relative (as the case may be) living at the time of his
death, or born to him within ten lunar months thereafter, unless the
intention of such limitation be otherwise, and expressly and plainly
declared in the face of the deed or will creating it: Provided, that the
rule of construction contained in this section shall not extend to any
deed or will made and executed before the fifteenth of January, one
thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight.
Now for some cases.
A good place to begin is, logically, the beginning: Volume 1 of the
North Carolina Reports. In that compilation appears the following
case:
Case 1.68 T died in 179069 survived by three sons, A, B
and C. T's will devised a plantation to A, and "if either of
my two sons, A or B, should die without lawful issue begotten
of their bodies," T's son C "shall have the lands of the one so
first dying." A died in 179270 without ever having had issue;
A's will gave the residue of his estate to his wife. Held, the
wife took the plantation. The gift over to C was too remote,
since it was on an indefinite failure of issue.
66. Ch. 7, 1827-1828 N.C. Laws 13 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976)).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976).
68. The paradigm for Case I is Sutton v. Wood, I N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 399 (1801). Other
cases finding remote gifts over on an indefinite failure of issue include Sanders v. Hyatt, 8 N.C. (I
Hawks) 247 (1821) (rationale not too clear); Brown v. Brown, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 134 (1842); Hollo-
well v. Kornegay, 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 261 (1847); and Weatherly v. Armfield, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 25
(1847).
The limitation over has been held bad even when the devisee died before the testator. Bryant
v. DeBerry, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 356 (1805). Properly considered, this is not a perpetuities problem at
all, but rather one of failure of an interest (by lapse) and its effect, if any, on an executory interest
limited upon the failed interest. See W.B. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 18, at 440-41.
69. Actually, the opinion is not clear on when Tdied; his will was made in 1790, and the case
was decided in 1801. See Sutton v. Wood, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 399 (1801).
70. Again, the opinion is not clear on when A died; his will was made in 1792. Id at 400.
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Initially the gift over to C appears good. Applying the presumption of
indefinite failure of issue,7 ' the devise to A would be a fee tail, followed
by a remainder over to C. Although this remainder might first appear
to be too remote because A's line of issue (lineal descendants) could
last for several centuries before dying out, the ordinary remainder fol-
lowing a fee tail does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Two
reasons customarily support the validity of the remainder. First, Gray
explains validity on the theory that "[a] future estate [the remainder]
which, at all times until it vests, is in the control of the owner of the
preceding estate [the fee tail] is, for every purpose of conveyancing, a
present estate, and is therefore not obnoxious to the Rule Against Per-
petuities."72 In other words, because the owner of the fee tail could at
any time "dock the entail," that is execute a disentailing conveyance by
a fictional lawsuit such as the fine or the common recovery,73 and
thereby convert his fee tail into a fee simple absolute,74 eliminating the
remainder, the property had not been tied up by the grantor. A second
explanation for the validity of the remainder following the fee tail is
that the remainder is presently vested in interest (although not in pos-
session). "A remainder is vested if, at every moment during its contin-
uance, it becomes a present estate, whenever and however the
preceeding freehold estates determine. '75 In other words, its enjoy-
ment is subject to no condition precedent except termination of the
prior particular estate.76 According to the common law notion of
vestedness, it was not required that the prior estate be certain to termi-
nate: that was not a part of the definition. So the remainder following a
fee tail was presently vested and violated no rule against remoteness of
vesting.7
7
7 1. It was argued, unsuccessfully, that T had meant a definite failure of issue and intended
the gift over to take effect only if A/died without issue in the lifetime of B. Id at 404.
72. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 443. On the validity of limitations after estates tail, see
generally id §§ 211-212, 443-472.
73. On methods of barring estates tail, see I L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 14.
74. The theory here is akin to the rationale for beginning the perpetuities period at the death
of the creator of a revocable inter vivos trust. See section II.B.8. infra.
75. J.C. GRAY, stpra note 22, § 9.
76. Id § 970.
77. As stated in 1 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 142:
[A] remainder after an estate tail is vested if limited to an ascertained person without
words of condition. It is true, the tenant in tail may always have heirs of his body, and
thus the remainder may never take effect in possession. Moreover, if the tenant in tail
can bar his estate and pass a fee simple, the remainder will be extinguished. Neverthe-
less such conditions arise purely by implication and are not considered in determining
the vested character of the remainder.
See also J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 111(2), 970.
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Nevertheless, this fee tail-vested remainder analysis was not avail-
able in North Carolina, due to the Act of 1784, which converted estates
in tail into estates in fee simple. Thus the fee tail in A resulting from an
indefinite failure of issue construction was converted by the Act of 1784
into a fee simple.78 Note, however, that the statute did not necessarily
convert A's fee tail into a fee simple absolute. The statute was silent on
the question of the nature of A's fee simple, leaving open the possibility
of A's taking a defeasible fee simple; indeed, the court in Case 1 found
that A took a fee simple subject to an executory devise79 over to C on
indefinite failure of issue. For purposes of the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, executory interests are not "vested" until they become posses-
sory,80 so C's gift over on an indefinite failure of issue clearly violated
the Rule. Case 1 verifies that in North Carolina the Rule at least is one
against remoteness of vesting, and that the meaning of vesting for re-
Dictum in Sutton v. Wood, I N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 399, 401-02 (1801), that the remainder is
contingent appears incorrect.
78. The court might well have rejected the indefinite failure of issue construction on the
ground that the act abolishing fees tail destroyed the underlying rationale for the indefinite con-
struction. The court did not take this approach. See Sutton v. Wood, I N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 399,
403 (1801).
On the other hand, there is a separate line of cases straining to sustain the validity of the gift
over. These cases reasoned that the abolition of fees tail removed the reason for the strained
indefinite failure of issue construction; that the language "if he die without issue" ought therefore
to be received in its natural sense, as it was for personalty; and that therefore slight evidence of
contrary intention was sufficient to rebut the presumption of indefinite failure of issue. Such
words as "leaving" or "survivor" were regarded as sufficient to tie up the failure of issue to the life
of one in being. Jones v. Spaight, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 157 (1814); Zollicoffer v. Zollicoffer, 20
N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 574 (1839); Threadgill v. Ingram, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 577 (1841); and
Gregory v. Beasley, 36 N.C. (I Ired. Eq.) 25 (1840). Compare Cases 2 and 3 infra. Thus there
appear to be several conflicting lines of decisions. Some of the cases suggest that realty and per-
sonalty were to be treated differently, others that they were to be treated alike. And if they were to
be treated alike, some cases said the real property rules controlled both, while other cases said the
personal property rules governed both.
79. Since the prior estate in A was a fee simple, not a life estate or a fee tail, the interest in C
was an executory interest, not a remainder. In the common-law system, remainders followed only
"prior particular estates," which did not include defeasible fees. The only remaining category for
C's interest, if not a remainder, was an executory interest, here a shifting executory devise. See J.
RITCHIE, N. ALFORD & R. EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRusTs 765-71 (5th ed. 1977).
For an excellent discussion of the proposition that the Act of 1784 did not necessarily convert
the fee tail into a fee simple absolute, see Smith v. Brisson, 90 N.C. 284 (1884). Smith states
clearly that the reason A takes a fee simple absolute is not by operation of the Act of 1784 but
rather because of the remoteness of the gift over to C. Id at 287. Smith also confirms that C's
interest is an executory devise, taking effect under the Statute of Uses. Id at 290; accord, Sessoms
v. Sessoms, 144 N.C. 121, 56 S.E. 687 (1907).
For a true case of repugnancy, see Roane v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 628, 127 S.E. 626 (1925), in
which the devisee was given, in effect, an unrestricted power of disposition, and the gift over on
failure of issue was found to be repugnant to the fee.
80. Leach, supra note 29, at 648.
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mainders is vesting in interest and for executory interests is vesting in
possession.
Case 1 illustrates two other fundamentals of the Rule. One is what
Leach has termed the "might-have-been rule." In Case 1, A in fact
died without ever having had issue, only a few years after T and within
the life of C. If the gift over had been given effect, it would have taken
place well within the period of the Rule. Nevertheless, the court, did
not find it necessary to address this fact; it judged the validity of C's
interest by viewing the possibilities from the creation of the interest
(T's death) rather than in light of events as they actually occurred.
The other instructive aspect of Case 1 is its handling (or ignoring)
of the effect of invalidity of the gift over. The court struck C's remote
executory interest from the devise, leaving A with a fee simple absolute
that was devisable to his wife. The testator had indicated, however,
that if A died without issue, the plantation was to stay within the family
and go over to C. This intention could have been accomplished rather
roughly in one of two ways: (1) The court might have limited A to the
original quantum of his estate, a defeasible fee, leaving a power of ter-
mination (right of entry) in T's estate if A died without issue. This
interest would not violate the Rule,8 ' and would have passed by de-
scent 2 to T's heirs, presumably his three children. C would thus have
gotten a third of the plantation, and only a third would have gone to
A's wife. (2) The court might have applied "infectious invalidity" on
the theory that T's intentions would better be accomplished by striking
the entire devise of the plantation rather than excising only the cancer-
ous part. 3 Thus the plantation would have passed by descent to the
three children.
Of course, the court discussed neither of these alternatives. Its
mechanical approach to the effect of the invalid divesting gift is typical
of many perpetuities cases.
Case 2.84 Tdied in 1800 leaving a will that gave a female
slave and all her children, together with all T's lands and half
81. See section VI. infra.
82. This assumes that there was no clause in 7"s will broad enough to have carried the
interest.
83. See section II.B.2.b. infra.
84. The paradigm for case 2 is Davidson v. Davidson's Ex'rs, 8 N.C. (I Hawks) 163 (1820).
Accord, Bailey v. Davis, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 108 (1822); Rice v. Satterwhite, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.
Eq.) 69 (1835); Lister v. Skinner, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 57 (1843); Cox v. Marks, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 361
(1845); Ferrand v. Howard, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 381 (1844); Porter v. Ross, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.)
196 (1855).
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of his household furniture and personal estate, to his daughter
A, and if A "dies without having85 heirs,86 then87 . . .the
property bequeathed to her shall be divided into four equal
parts, between" T's brothers, B, C and D, and the children of
E. A survived T but died an infant without ever having had
issue. Held, A's estate took the property. The gift over was
on a remote indefinite failure of issue.
The principal question raised by this case is whether the presumption
of indefinite failure of issue applied in Case 1 to real property will be
extended in Case 2 to personal property.88 The indefinite construction,
which "outrages grammar, and what is worse, outrages common
sense," 89 had some justification for real property when fees tail were
commonly sought as a means of keeping estates within the family,90 but
85. It was argued that the word "having" would cause the limitation over to take effect at the
death of A, and that therefore the devise involved a definite failure of issue not violating the Rule.
The court did not find this inference strong enough to overcome the usual construction. Davidson
v. Davidson's Ex'rs, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 163, 182 (1820).
86. Note that the gift over was on death without heirs, not death without issue. It was con-
ceded by counsel that "heirs" as used by T meant "issue," because the limitation over was to
collaterals capable of taking as heirs of A, showing that the word "heirs" must have been confined
to "issue." Id at 165. For similar cases, see Sanders v. Hyatt, 8 N.C. (I Hawks) 247 (1821); Rice v.
Satterwhite, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 69 (1835).
87. It was also argued that the word "then" confined the failure of issue to A's death. The
court did not find that "then" was used as an adverb of time; rather it was merely a grammatical
connective. Davidson v. Davidson's Ex'rs, 8 N.C. (I Hawks) 163, 184 (1820).
88. The court treated the case as if it involved personal property only, notwithstanding that
the gift included realty as well as personalty. T did use the word "bequeathed," and the gift
included a female slave and "household furniture and personal estate." Id at 180-81. Slaves may
have been regarded as personal property in North Carolina. This view is reflected in the underly-
ing assumptions of the cases involving slaves as property. E.g., Cutlar v. Cutlar, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.)
154 (1801); Matthews v. Daniel, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 346 (1801). The assumption is explicit in some
early opinions applying the Rule in Shelley's Case, in which the distinction between lands, as real
property, and slaves, as personal property, was significant. See Nichols v. Cartwright, 6 N.C. (2
Mur.) 137 (1812); Ham v. Ham, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 598, 599-600 (1837); Floyd v. Thomp-
son, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 616, 618 (1839). See also Riegel v. Lyerly, 265 N.C. 204, 143
S.E.2d 65 (1965), for a review of these early cases. Some jurisdictions applied real property rules
to slaves, though they were always treated as having at least some characteristics of personalty.
The majority of slave states regarded slaves as personalty, and some enacted legislation establish-
ing this rule. See generally W. GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE 23-25 (Negro Universities
Press ed. 1968) (1st ed. n.p. 1853); 1 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 357; J.D. WHEELER, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY 36-41 (Negro Universities Press ed. 1968) (1st ed.
n.p. 1837). North Carolina had no determining statute, but went along with the majority rule.
See B. HOLT, THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA AND SLAVERY 11 (1970).
If T's gift indeed carried both realty and personalty, the case involves a further point: Does
the strength of the indefinite failure of issue construction vary according to the subject matter of
the gift? May the same words in a single will mean one thing as applied to realty and another
thing as applied to personalty? See note 94 infra, for the proposition that they may.
89. Davidson v. Davidson's Ex'rs, 8 N.C. (I Hawks) 163, 187 (1820).
90. See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
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made no sense for personal property-in which fees tail do not exist.9 '
The indefinite construction was especially inappropriate for chattels at
common law because, the fee tail not being available, the gift over in-
evitably would be remote. The court might therefore have rejected the
indefinite failure of issue construction for personal property,92 but it
did not do so. Rather, it felt bound to follow the indefinite construc-
tion, so that A took an "absolute interest" subject to defeasance on a
remote (indefinite failure of issue) event. The divesting clause was bad,
giving A an indefeasible absolute interest in the personal property.
Case 3.93 T died in 1820. His will bequeathed personal
property to his son A, and if A "dies, leaving no heir lawfully
begotten of his body," T gave the property to his wife, W, for
life, remainder to B and C. .4 survived T but died in his
91. The Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, which sanctioned the fee tail, did not apply to
personal property. I L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 354, 359. The result of an attempt to
create a fee tail in personal property was to create what is commonly called an "absolute interest"
in the personalty. Id
92. Some of the Case 2 decisions appear to be based on rationales other than remoteness
(perpetuities); but it is believed that remoteness is the true ground of decision.
One alternative reading is that the attempt to create a fee tail in the legatee of personal
property gives the legatee an indefeasible interest in the property, without regard to the limitation
over. Id § 359. In other words, the cases appear to be saying that there can be no future interests
in personalty analogous to executory interests or remainders. While now it is commonly accepted
that generally one can have the same present estates and future interests in personalty as in realty,
for several centuries only limited future interests were recognized in personalty. See generally id
§§ 351-371. It was accepted, however, that future interests could be created in trusts of personal
property. Id § 351. (Case 2, however, did not involve a trust.) Nevertheless, the possible nonex-
istence of gifts over in personalty does not seem to be the real basis of the Case 2 decisions because
cases only a few decades later recognized the validity of gifts over in chattels on definite failure of
issue. See notes 93-96 infra.. If executory interests did not exist in chattels, they could not have
been sanctioned in the definite failure of issue cases.
It might also be noted that some of the landmark English perpetuities cases involve gifts over
on failure of issue in chattels. Both the Duke of Norfolk's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ch. 1682), and
Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787), involve attempted fees tail in chattels real. Both of
those cases rest on the proposition that fees tail do not exist in estates for years, so that the gift
over cannot automatically be sustained as a remainder. Norfolk's Case sustained a gift over that
was certain to invest within one life in being, impliedly recognizing the existence of the executory
interest. Note, however, that the future interest was (a) equitable, not legal, and (b) in a chattel
real, not a chattel personal. Jee v. Audley struck down a remote executory interest in a chattel
personal on the ground of perpetuities rather than some other ground such as "repugnancy." The
subject of the gift was £1,000, apparently free of trust.
Another reason sometimes given in the Case 2 opinions is that the limitation over is "repug-
nant" to the first taker's interest. This reason is really no reason at all; it merely announces a
conclusion. The fundamental question is why the gift over is repugnant; the reason must be per-
petuities because the gifts over are otherwise sustained when the failure of issue is definite.
Finally it might be noted that there is language in the Case 2 paradigm, Davidson v. David-
son's Ex'rs, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 163 (1820), suggestive of the Rule Against Perpetuities: the words
"remote" and "it tended to a perpetuity" are used, and the Duke of Norfolk's Case is cited. Id at
181, 186, 187.
93. The paradigm for Case 3 is Miller v. Williams, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 500 (1837).
Accord, Gordon v. Holland, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 362 (1844).
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mother's lifetime without ever having had children. Held, the
gift over to the wife and B and C was good; the word "leav-
ing" confined the time of the vesting to the death of A.
This is one of several cases finding sufficient language to rebut the pre-
sumption of indefinite failure of issue. The holding that the word
"leaving" indicates a definite failure of issue for gifts of personalty94
follows the well-known English case of Forth v. Chapman.95 Other
words and phrases have had similar effect.96
94. The same word is not enough to rebut the indefinite construction when the subject of the
gift is realty, even when the phrase appears in the same will. Forth v. Chapman, 24 Eng. Rep. 559
(Ch. 1720). So the strength of the presumption appears to vary according to the nature of the
property given, with the indefinite presumption being more easily overcome in the case of
personalty.
95. 24 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ch. 1720) (estate for years). As one of several reasons for the construc-
tion, the court said:
[T]he reason why a devise of a freehold to one for life, and if he die without issue, then to
another, is determined to be an estate-tail, is in favour of the issue, that such may have it,
and the intent take place (vide ante, the case of Target v. Gaunt); but that there is the
plainest difference betwixt a devise of a freehold, and a devise of a term for years; for in
the devise of the latter to one, and if he die without issue, then to another, the words [if
he die without issue] cannot be supposed to have been inserted in favour of such issue,
since they cannot by any construction have it.
Id at 560. Compare Forth v. Chapman, 24 Eng. Rep. 559 (Ch. 1720), with Vinson v. Gardner, 185
N.C. 193, 116 S.E. 412 (1923) (real property). Dictum in Bailey v. Davis, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 108,
110 (1822), says that the distinction in Forth v. Chapman between realty and personalty was no
longer followed, but subsequent cases seem to reject that conclusion.
96. Other cases finding sufficient language to rebut the presumption of indefinite failure of
issue for personalty include Watson v. Ogburn, 22 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 353 (1839) ("at her
death") (semble); Baker v. Pender, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 351 (1858) ("at her decease"); Newkirk v.
Hawes, 58 N.C. (5 Jones Eq.) 265 (1859) ("at her decease"); Blake v. Page, 60 N.C. (Win.) 252
(1864) ("after her decease"-note that this is weaker than "at her decease"). Porter v. Ross, 55
N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 196 (1855), while finding a remote gift over, classifies the cases as follows:
A work written by Mr. Wade Keyes, of Alabama, on chattels, has recently made its
appearance at our bar, where all the doctrine upon this subject is stated and the various
cases are lucidly arranged and commented on. At page 138 he arranges, into four
classes, the cases in which the general rule is controlled by the intention of the testator.
The first is, where the failure of issue is combined with an event personal to the donee; as
dying without issue and unmarried. The second, where words or phrases are used in the
context, which, of themselves, restrict the failure within the prescribed limit. The third
class is, where the subject of the gift, necessarily precludes the idea, that any other but a
restricted failure, was intended by the donor. The fourth is, where a restriction is raised
from the nature of the estate given over by the limitation.
Under these various classes, are arranged the different cases cited by him. This
writer, under the second class, observes, that a bequest over to the survivor of two per-
sons, after the death of one of them without issue, furnishes the presumption that the
testator used the words in their limited sense, and the limitation is not too remote, for it
will be intended that the survivor was meant, individually and personally, to enjoy the
legacy.
Id at 197-98. The work cited by the court is W. KEYES, AN ESSAY ON THE LEARNING OF PAR-
TIAL, AND OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN CHATTELS PERSONAL (Montgomery, Ala. 1853).
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Case 4.97 T died in 1810,98 survived by three children,
James, Nancy and Sally. T's will gave certain property99 to
his daughter Nancy and her heirs,' °° and "in case [Nancy]
should die without heir properly begotten, . . . the property
should be equally divided between the children then living,
whether James. . .or Sally." All three children survived T;
of the children, James died first, then Nancy died without
ever having had issue. Held, Sally took the property. "The
words 'then living' tied up the limitation during the lives of the
three children."'' °
This case illustrates the impact of three little words in Gray's statement
of the Rule: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all. . ....
The measuring life here is Sally, not Nancy. Even if one presumes an
indefinite failure of issue in the gift to Nancy, the gift over to Sally will
take effect, f at all, within Sally's lifetime. This is because the words
"then living" make Sally's interest contingent upon her being alive
when the failure of issue takes place. That is, upon the failure of issue,
Sally will either be alive and therefore will take, or will be dead and
therefore will not take. Thus, Sally will take, if at all, within her own
life. The Rule does not require that the devisee in fact take, only that
the decision on taking be made within the period of the Rule;10 2 the gift
must only be certain to vest or fail within the period. If Sally dies
before the expiration of Nancy's line of descendants, Sally's interest
terminates, so she will take, if at all, within her own life. This theory
was not available in Cases 1 through 3, because there the gifts over
were not subject to a condition precedent that the remainderman be
alive in order to take; even if he were not alive, his estate would have
taken. 103
The preceding explanation of Case 4 squares with standard perpe-
tuities doctrine; however, it is not altogether clear that the "if at all"
rationale was in the mind of all the judges in the Case 4 decisions.
Some of the opinions seem to be saying that the significance of the
97. The paradigm for Case 4 is Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 566 (1841). Ac-
cord, Threadgill v. Ingram, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 577 (1841) (gift over to testator's "surviving chil-
dren"); Gregory v. Beasley, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 25 (1840) (similar).
98. Actually, Ts will was made in 1810, Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 566, 568
(1841); the opinion does not indicate when T died, but it must have been sometime before 1827.
99. The property consisted of a female slave, a bed and furniture. Id at 566. As to the
possible effect of the subject-matter of the gift, see Case 5 infra.
100. The words "and her heirs" of course were words of limitation, not words of purchase, andindicated that Nancy took the property in fee. E.g., J. CRIBBr, supra note 3, at 41-42.
101. Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 566, 570 (1841).
102. Baker v. Pender, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 351 (1858).
103. See, e.g., Hollowell v. Kornegay, 29 N.C. (7 Ired.) 261, 262 (1847).
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"then living" condition is that it indicates the testator meant a definite
failure of issue.' °4 This latter theory has not found currency elsewhere,
and indeed is based on the tenuous ground of rebutting a strong pre-
sumption. The first theory, which is not dependent on any slippery
finding of intention, seems more reliable.
Case 5.105 T died sometime before 1805 bequeathing a
male slave, a female slave 10 6 and a horse to her daughter A,
and if A "should depart this life without heir lawfully begot-
ten of her body," the slaves and the horse should belong to B.
A survived T but died without having had issue, and her ad-
ministrator claimed the property. Held, the limitation over
was too remote and the property vested absolutely in A.
Case 5 may be wrong, at least in part. The wrinkle in this case is the
property given by T: May its nature be examined in determining the
certainty of vesting? As to the male slave, if he had been treated as a
human being then he would have become the life in being and the gift
over would have taken effect, if at all, within his life. As to the female
slave, even if she had been treated as a life in being, the gift would not
have been saved. A bequest of a female slave included her increase
104. The trial judge "was of the opinion that the limitation in the will was not too remote, but
that the words, then living, whether James, Nancy, or Sally, tied up the contingency to the death of
the first taker without issue." Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 566, 567 (1841). The
opinion of the supreme court is not altogether clear.
We agree with the judge that, in this case, the limitation over to Sally, the survivor,
of the legacy given to Nancy, on her dying without issue, was not too remote; but that it
was a good executory devise. The meaning of the testator is plain, that on any one or
two of the children dying without issue, the survivor or survivors, then living, whether
James, Nancy, or Sally, should have the legacy which had been before given to the one
so dying. The contingent interest, if it ever could vest, must necessarily vest during the
period of a life or lives that were in being at the death of the testator. The words "then
living" tie up the limitation during the lives of the three children.
Id at 570. Compare Fortescue v. Satterthwaite, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 566 (1841), with Zollicoffer v.
Zollicoffer, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 574 (1839); Threadgill v. Ingram, 23 N.C. (I Ired.) 577
(1841), and Williams v. McComb, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 450 (1844). See also W. KEYEs, supra
note 96, at 139-41.
Porter v. Ross, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 196 (1855), a personal property case, appears incorrectly
decided. There the gift over on death without issue was to the testators six sons, "or the survivors
of them." The court, approaching the matter from the standpoint of construction, found no inten-
tion by the testator to limit the failure of issue to the first taker's death and held the gift over
remote. Nevertheless, the gifts should have been good on an "if at all" theory even if the failure of
issue was general, because the sons would take only if they survived the failure of issue. That the
court did not sustain the gift over may indicate that the "if at all" theory was not clearly perceived
in the first generation cases and that they were instead based on a tenuous construction of the
testator's intention.
105. The paradigm for Case 5 is Matthews' Adm'r v. Daniel, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 42 (1805).
106. Actually, the case involved only a'male slave and a horse. Id at 42. The female slave is
postulated because the result may turn on the sex of the slave. See note 107 and accompanying
text infra.
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(but a gift of a male slave did not)."°7 So the gift of the female slave
could not be tied to her life. As to the horse, it is settled that "lives in
being" means human, not animal lives. 10
8
Gray liked the male slave argument: "[I]t was easier to sneer at the
argument than to refute it. It seems unanswerable."' 1 9 There appears
to have been no way of saving the gift over of the female slave, hut the
gift of the horse should have been good; there is no policy reason not to
base the period of the Rule on lives of animals known to have a shorter
life span than human beings. Of course, even under the most favorable
view, one of the three gifts (that of the female slave) may have been
bad. But that does not mean all gifts should have been held bad. The
effect of invalidity of one gift on others is properly a question of con-
struction, not an automatic "infectious invalidity."'"
0
An alternative way of saving the gift over would be via construc-
tion. An extraordinary and lengthy Reporter's Note in 1 Murphey con-
tends that the court should have looked to the subject matter of the
bequest as a circumstance from which the intention of the testator
might have been inferred: since neither the horse nor the male slave
could have lived longer than the period of lives in being plus twenty-
107. One aspect of the practice of slavery gives a partial explanation for the assumption that a
slave, like any property, would last indefinitely. The settled rule, apparently, was that a female
slave's increase were part of her. Therefore, it could be assumed that a gift of a female slave
would last indefinitely, unless her increase were specifically excluded from the gift. See
Williamson v. Daniel, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 568 (1827). Furthermore, because the question of
ownership of the increase became the subject of occasional litigation, the practice of including the
expression "and her future increase" became standard. See generally J.D. WHEELER, supra note
88, at 23-36.
These assumptions did not necessarily extend to male slaves, however. In Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6
G. & J. 232 (Md. 1837), the court distinguished gifts of male and female slaves, on the ground that
a male slave's issue were not presumed to follow him. It was found that the testator could not
have intended a gift over on indenite failure of issue because the gift of a male slave would have
to vest, if at all, by the end of the slave's life. The distinction between gifts of male and female
slaves became the rule in Maryland. See, e.g., Hatton v. Weems, 12 G. & J. 83 (Md. 1841). The
North Carolina courts never adopted this theory.
108. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1223.
109. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 228.
In their casebook, Leach and Logan put the following related case:
L leased Blackacre to T for 50 years in 1900 for a lump sum consideration paid in
advance. Tdied in 1930 bequeathing the term to 4, but if liquor should ever be sold on
the premises, to B. Is B's interest valid?
W.B. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 18, at 685, Problem (1). B's interest is good. Since only 20
years remain on the term, all interests must vest in it within less than 21 years.
110. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1262. Gray cites a case that held a gift of male
and female slaves remote on the ground that the same rule of construction had to apply to both.
J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 228. But why, if the same construction had to be applied to both
slaves, was the invalid construction chosen in lieu of the valid one?
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one years, the testator must have meant a definite failure of issue."'t
Since the court did not find a definite failure of issue, the Reporter
concluded that the subject matter of the gift will not be looked to as a
circumstance from which the testator's intention may be inferred. Per-
haps the Reporter was too pessimistic; the intention-oriented argument
may not have been made to the court. Other authorities suggest that
the subject of the gift does bear on intention."12
Case 6.113 T made his will in 1834, devising a tract of
land to his sons William and Rufus, and "if any of my chil-
dren die without issue, leaving a wife or husband, it is my will
that such wife or husband shall be entitled to one half of the
property; the other half to be equally divided between my
other children or their heirs." Thad two sons and two daugh-
ters. Held, the limitation over was not too remote, because
the Act of 1827 interpreted the limitation as one to take effect
when the sons died, not having issue at the time of their
deaths.
This case simply illustrates the effect of the Act of 1827, which estab-
lished a presumption of definite failure of issue in order to avoid re-
moteness of the gift over on indefinite failure of issue at common
111. Matthews' Adm'r v. Daniel, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 42, 42 n.(a) (1805).
An interesting aspect of Biscoe v. Biscoe, 6 G. & J. 232 (Md. 1837), and the reporter's note to
Case 5 is the appearance of the "lives in being" and "if at all" concepts. Application of the vague
"too remote" concept, which North Carolina continued to follow for some time, might have fo-
cused the court's attention more on the terms of the bequest, rather than its subject matter. In
contrast, if one thinks of lives in being, one cannot help thinking of the slave's life. The "if at all"
requirement also encourages one to imagine where the gift itself will be when vesting must occur.
Thus, it is possible that the emergence of the concrete statement of the Rule affected the result by
influencing the court's assumptions in Biscoe.
112. J. C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 225-229.
113. The paradigm for Case 6 is Garland v. Watt, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 287 (1844). The first case
applying the Act of 1827 appears to be Tillman v. Sinclair, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 183 (1840). The Act
was an alternative ground of decision. The Act of 1827 was prospective. Brown v. Brown, 25
N.C. (3 Ired.) 134 (1842).
Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co. v. Finlayson, 286 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1961), contains an excellent
discussion of the history and purpose of the Act of 1827:
This statute was enacted in 1827 to meet the rule then generally prevailing in this
country that a gift over on "death without issue" in a deed or will meant an indefinite
failure of issue and hence was void for remoteness. To remedy this situation statutes
similar to that of North Carolina were passed in a number of states whereby the defect
was cured by directing that such a phrase in a deed or will should be interpreted as a
limitation to take effect when such person dies not having such heir, issue, or child living
at the time of his death.
Id at 253. See also Tillman v. Sinclair, 23 N.C. (1 Ired.) 183 (1840).
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law." 4  Occasionally, the 1827 Act has been overlooked' '5 or even ex-
tended to gifts over "if he die."'"
16
114. Some language in Case 6 suggests another approach to validity. The language "leaving a
wife or husband" arguably indicates a definite failure of issue because the death is tied to the life
of a spouse of William or Rufus. The leading English case on this score is Pells v. Brown, 79 Eng.
Rep. 504 (K.B. 1620), which involved a devise in the form "to Thomas and his heirs, but if
Thomas shall die without issue, living William, then to William and his heirs." Id at 505 (empha-
sis added). The court held that the reference "living William" rebutted the presumption of indefi-
nite failure of issue. Id In Case 6, however, the reference was not to a named spouse, and
William or Rufus, under the traditional view of Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787),
might have married someone not in being at 7"s death. Case 6 does cite Pells v. Brown and
Garland v. Watt, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 287, 290 (1844), but perhaps only on the nature of the gift over
(an executory devise). Other cases clearly have been based on the Act of 1827. E.g., Smith v.
Brisson, 90 N.C. 284 (1884) (deed) (excellent explanation); Sessoms v. Sessoms, 144 N.C. 121, 56
S.E. 687 (1907) (will of land and slaves; opinion does not distinguish between the two); Harrell v.
Hagan, 147 N.C. III, 60 S.E. 909 (1908) (semble); O'Neal v. Borders, 170 N.C. 483, 87 S.E. 340
(1915); Vinson v. Gardner, 185 N.C. 193, 116 S.E. 412 (1923); Turpin v. Jarrett, 226 N.C. 135, 37
S.E.2d 124 (1946) (deed). Occasionally, it is found that the testator used "issue" in the sense of
"children," obviating any perpetuities problem. White v. Alexander, 290 N.C. 75, 224 S.E.2d 617
(1976) (will; good discussion of the Act of 1827, now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976)).
115. E.g., Exparie McBee, 63 N.C. 332 (1869); Elledge v. Parrish, 224 N.C. 397,30 S.E.2d 314
(1944).
116. The question upon a testamentary limitation "to A and his heirs, but ifrA dies then to B
and his heirs" is not the same as one involving a gift over "ira dies without issue." The two cases,
nevertheless, are sometimes confused. It is not certain whether A will die without issue, but it is
certain that A will die, so how can one make any sense out of a gift in fee simple absolute to A
coupled with a clause divesting A's fee on an event certain to occur? Several approaches have
been taken, the most sensible one usually being that what Tmeant was "to A and his heirs, but if
A dies before I die, to B and his heirs." In other words, the gift over was a built-in antilapse
provision. This is known as a substitutional construction. See generally I L. SiMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 5, § 534.
The usual/case on the Act of 1827 deals with the question whether the time of determining
failure of issue is at the devisee's death or at some indefinite future time. There are a number of
cases, however, involving the question whether the failure of issue is to be determined at the
devisee's death or at some earlier time: litigants seek to rebut the Act's presumption and apply an
earlier time for determining death without issue. In effect, many of them try to substitute "death"
for "death without issue" in order to reach a substitutional construction. One of the leading cases
in this line is Hilliard v. Kearney, 45 N.C. (Busb. Eq.) 221 (1853). Hiliard involved a will exe-
cuted in or before 1775, and therefore decisions under the Act, which applies only to instruments
executed after January 15, 1828, did not provide the standard for construction. Richard White
bequeathed slaves to his wife for life, remainder to his five daughters, "and if either of them die
without an heir, her part to be equally divided among her other sisters." Id at 222. All of the
daughters survived the life tenant. One (Mary) died without children, apparently soon after the
life tenant, and her share was divided among the four survivors. Subsequently, two sisters (Sarah
and Nancy) died leaving children, then one (Elizabeth) died leaving her husband but no children.
The survivor, Drucilla, claimed all of Elizabeth's share; Elizabeth's husband claimed it as her
administrator; and the representatives of Nancy and Sarah claimed portions of it. The court de-
cided that in the context of the will the term "heirs" must mean "children," so that the question of
indefinite failure of issue did not arise.
The opinion discusses in detail three of six constructions that were suggested. The first con-
struction would have caused Elizabeth's share to pass to Drucilla; the second would have caused
the share to pass to Nancy's and Sarah's representatives. The other four constructions necessarily
resulted in Elizabeth's having had an absolute interest before her death.
Judge Pearson disposed of the first two constructions as being contrary both to the preferred
rules of construction and to the apparent intent of the testator. Under the first construction, the
will created successive survivorships, so that the shares of all those who died without leaving
children ultimately would pass to the last surviving sister. This result was rejected for several
reasons. It would require the use of the plural-the shares of the sisters who died without heir-
but the testator used the singular. No estate would vest absolutely until the taker's- death, and this
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The first generation cases approached the Rule in typical fashion.
It was treated as a rule against remoteness of vesting, with vesting de-
fined as vesting in interest for remainders and as vesting in possession
for executory interests. The Rule did not insist that the interests actu-
ally vest within the period of the Rule, only that they be certain to vest
or fail in time. The validity of interests was measured from the crea-
would be contrary to the judicial preference for early vesting, as well as being a possible economic
inconvenience when the gift was of slaves and their increase. It was also argued that this construc-
tion would prevent the property from passing to the sons. The language of the bequest, however,
does not indicate that this was the testator's intent, especially since there was no gift over provided
in case of the death without heir of all the daughters. Generally, this construction was found to be
contrary to the presumption that the daughters themselves were the primary objects of the testa-
tor's bounty.
The second construction argued that the ultimate takers would be the representatives of those
who died leaving children: the survivors would divide the shares of those who died without heir in
the meantime, but their interest would not be absolute, if at all, until their deaths. The testator's
intent was said to be to create a preference for those who died leaving children. This argument
was also rejected as being contrary to the preference for early vesting; furthermore, no intent to
prefer those who died leaving children appeared in the will.
The other constructions resulted in: (3) absolute vesting at testator's death; (4) absolute vest-
ing at life tenant's death; (5) absolute vesting when the first daughter dies without leaving a child;
and (6) absolute vesting in the last two survivors. The court does not discuss what would have
happened if one daughter had predeceased the testator, leaving children, but there is language to
indicate that there would be no gift over to children by implication and that one had to survive the
testator in order to take. The court also apparently failed to note that one sister had died without
children, having survived the testator and the life tenant. Her share in any case had long ago been
distributed to the other daughters, and none of her other heirs appeared to be interested in making
a claim on her share.
The holding states that Elizabeth's share vested in her absolutely "at the division." Id at 234.
Since this apparently occurred after Mary's death, it is arguably the fifth construction that Judge
Pearson was applying. Language in the opinion indicates, however, that Judge Pearson was ap-
plying the third construction: absolute vesting in takers living at the death of the testator. See id
at 232. This interpretation of the opinion was approved in Davis v. Parker, 69 N.C. 271 (1873),
and Murchison v. Whitted, 87 N.C. 465 (1882).
The fourth construction, absolute vesting on survival of the life tenant, would have been
equally applicable in Hilliard, and would appear to be the preferred construction under the rule
stated by Judge Pearson. He apparently overlooked this possibility. See Murchison v. Whitted,
87 N.C. at 470. The sixth construction is dismissed as being both inconvenient and unlikely.
Thus, the rule appears to be that the interest should vest in those who survive the testator at his
death, whether or not they die leaving heirs. A provision such as this one in Richard White's will
is thus regarded as an antilapse provision, rather than as a true survivorship condition. See id
This discussion was rendered largely academic by the adoption of § 41-4 because this rule of
construction does not apply to wills under that section. See Kirkman v. Smith, 175 N.C. 579, 94
S.E. 423 (1918). It is now provided by statute that a reference to a gift on the death of a taker
withcut children, etc., fixes the time of vesting at the death of that taker. The construction applied
in Hilllard was argued in Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co. v. Finlayson, 286 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1961),
and was firmly rejected. In abolishing the indefinite failure of issue construction, § 41-4 also es-
tablished a new rule for determining the time when the absolute interest will vest.
Cases preferring the Act of 1827 over a substitutional construction include Buchanan v.
Buchanan, 99 N.C. 308, 5 S.E. 430 (1888); Kornegay v. Morris, 122 N.C. 199, 29 S.E. 875 (1898)
(following Buchanan v. Buchanan); Rees v. Williams, 165 N.C. 201, 81 S.E. 286 (1914); Patterson
v. McCormick, 177 N.C. 448, 99 S.E. 401 (1919) (devise in question followed life estate, and it was
argued, unsuccessfully, that death of life tenant was time for determining substitution); House v.
House, 231 N.C. 218, 56 S.E.2d 695 (1949) (in accord with P/atterson v. McCormick).
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tion of the interests, with courts refusing to take into account the events
that actually took place. The constructional question of the effect of
invalidity of one interest on other valid interests was ignored. The
courts were willing to look to constructional questions before reaching
perpetuities, but the subject matter of the gift, and its bearing on perpe-
tuities, was ignored." 7
II. ELEMENTS OF THE RULE
A. Statement of the Rule in North Carolina
Article I, section 34 of the Constitution of North Carolina states:
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a
free state and shall not be allowed. 18
The same provision was found in the constitutions of 1868 and 1776,119
and similar provisions are included in the constitutions of several other
states. 20
The North Carolina constitutional ban on "perpetuities and mo-
nopolies" does not appear to have given any different meaning to the
Rule in this state, as compared with traditional formulations; 12 nor do
similar constitutional provisions in other states appear to have affected
the development of the Rule.' 22 The constitution is cited in an occa-
117. Dukeminier and Johanson state:
Although the indefinite failure of issue construction has been abolished in almost all
states and is of very little modem importance, the principles involved ... are still funda-
mental. "Indefinite failure of issue" is the equivalent of any remote event that may hap-
pen more than 21 years after the death of all living persons.
J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
992 (2d ed. 1978).
118. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32.
119. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 31; N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 23. Those
constitutions also included a provision that "[tihe General Assembly shall regulate entails in such
manner as to prevent perpetuities." N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 15; N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 43.
120. ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. 2, § 19; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. 1, § 24; FLA. CONST. of 1865,
art. 1, § 23 (current constitution of Florida omits any perpetuities provision); Nnv. CONST. of
1864, art. 15, § 4; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 37; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. 1, § 22; TEX. CONST. of
1876, art. 1, § 26; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. 2, § 36; WYO. CONST. of 1890, art. 1, § 30.
121. One might have expected the association of "perpetuities" with "monopolies" to have
colored the meaning of perpetuities. Nevertheless, the early cases regarded perpetuities as unbar-
rable estates tail, e.g., Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. (I Hawks) 96 (1820), and a similarity between
perpetuities and monopolies was found in that each resulted in a tying up of property so that no
one had the power to alienate it. See Yadkin Navigation Co. v. Benton, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 10
(1822). This section was said to protect the vested right ofjus disponendi and was followed by the
Act, passed in the same spirit, converting estates tail into fees simple. Hughes v. Hodges, 102 N.C.
236, 9 S.E. 437 (1889). See also Lane v. Davis, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 277 (1796); Minge v. Gilmour, 2
N.C. (I Hayw.) 279 (1796). Most of the cases arising under article I, § 34 deal with alleged mo-
nopolies, such as exclusive franchises and licenses. See annotations to N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34.
122. For example, the annotations to the Tennessee constitutional proscription of perpetuities
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sional perpetuities case,1 23 but generally it has not been an influencing
factor. 124
The verbal formulation of the Rule in North Carolina has fol-
lowed much the same path as in other jurisdictions. The first genera-
tion cases conceived of perpetuities as unbarrable estates tail, & la the
Duke of Norfolk's Case, and seemed to be applying the "inconve-
nience" concept of that case.' 25 By the mid-nineteenth century, the
cases had moved toward Gray's formulation. From time to time,
Mordecai was quoted, 26 and there was an occasional wistful look at
Powell's different formulation of the Rule, 127 but the second generation
cases generally stuck to Gray. 28
As typically stated, the Rule in North Carolina is:
No devise or grant of a future interest in property is valid unless the
title thereto must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years, plus
the period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at the time of
indicate that common law perpetuities are comprehended by that provision and also cite cases
using Gray's formula. E.g., Chattanooga v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co., 172 Tenn. 524, 112
S.W.2d 385 (1938). The annotations to the Texas Constitution also apply the traditional Gray
formulation. Giddings v. Smith, 15 Vt. 344 (1843), is unusual in that it regards entails as not
necessarily perpetuities.
123. E.g., North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 180, 203 S.E.2d 657, 658
(1974).
124. The North Carolina reception statute adopting the common law of England as of the date
of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1969), does not appear
to have affected the Rule or prevented the adoption of Gray's formulation (which first appeared in
1886). This is not unusual. See Link, supra note 6, 822-23. For the story of a creative use of a
Colorado reception statute to avoid Gray's "if at all" aspect of the Rule, see W.B. LEACH & J.
LOGAN, su.pra note 18, at 711.
125. See section I.B. supra.
126. E.g., Fuller v. Hedgpeth, 239 N.C. 370, 377, 80 S.E.2d 18, 23 (1954). Mordecai's formula-
tion ignores the "if at all" aspect of Gray's rule. 1 S. MORDECAI, supra note 22, at 588-89: "Every
estate must vest during a life or lives in being and twenty-one years-plus the usual period of
gestation-thereafter."
127. One court noted:
Professor Richard R. Powell in his work, Powell on Real Property .... has a very
good discussion of the rule. He points out that the rule against perpetuities is a product
of the struggle to preserve the alienability of property.
Professor Powell quotes the rule as stated by John Chipman Gray and criticizes it as
not being accurate. He contends for a different statement of the rule and his contention
has been adopted in the Restatement of Property as follows:
"Thus the rule against perpetuities promotes alienability by destroying future
interests which interfere therewith either by eliminating the power of alienation for
too long a time or by lessening the probability of alienation for too long a time. .."
Applying the rule as articulated in this State or as contended for by the Restatement, we
believe the result would be the same in this instance.
Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 350, 241 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1978) (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 370, Comment i (1944)).
128. E.g., id ('We believe that the courts of this State have adopted the rule as stated by John
Chipman Gray.").
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the creation of the interest. If there is a possibility such future inter-
est may not vest within the time prescribed, the gift or grant is void.
The rule refers solely to the vesting of estates and does not concern
itself with their possession or enjoyment.'29
For a time, the formulation was misstated as "not less than" rather
than "not later than," but the mistake did not affect the outcome of any
cases. 130 The second sentence of the formulation is somewhat inconsis-
tent with the "if at all" concept of the first sentence; the matter is dis-
cussed below in connection with the elements of the Rule. 131
. Elements of the Rule in North Carolina
1. "No devise or grant of a future interest in property"
a. In General
Apparently the Rule originally developed as a check on executory
interests in real property, because they were held to be free from the
doctrine of destructibility of contingent reminders.132 The rule now ap-
plies to remainders, as well as executory interests, even if the remainder
is subject to destructibility by the common law doctrine or by statute. 133
The Rule applies to interests in personal property as well as realty. 134
Equitable interests as well as legal ones are subject to the Rule, 135 even
129. Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 402-03, 113 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1960).
130. Phillips, Avoiding Some Common Problems ofConstruction in the Drafting of Disfpositive
Provisions of Wills, in INSTITUTE ON DRAFTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS App. VII-9 n.40 (North
Carolina Bar Association 1961) (citations omitted):
Indicative of the elusive quality of the Rule is the very difficulty encountered in stating it
accurately and comprehensively. . . . And of purely passing interest is the fact that the
North Carolina Supreme Court has in a series of cases, beginning apparently with Mc-
Queen v. Trust Co.. . . inadvertently misstated Gray's formulation by 180 degrees, stat-
ing it "not less than" rather than "not later than." This quite understandable reversal in
form of a formulation already replete with negatives was carried over into Fuller v.
Hedgpath, McPherson v. Bank, Finch v. Honeycutt ... thence into the advance sheet
report of Parker v. Parker .. . being corrected in the bound volume report of this case,
and later correctly stated in Clarke v. Clarke .... No substantive result was affected by
this inadvertence.
131. See section II.B.4. infra.
132. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
133. North Carolina may still recognize the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remain-
ders. See McCall, supra note 7. Dictum in the fairly recent case of Blanchard v. Ward, 244 N.C.
142, 148, 92 S.E.2d 776, 781 (1956), suggests the possibility of destructibility by merger. By stat-
ute, the grantor may revoke deeds of future interests made to persons not in esse, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-6 (1976), or may sell property subject to contingent remainders and reinvest the proceeds, Id
§ 41-11. Nevertheless, this state continues to apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to contingent
remainders. See also 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1255.
134. E.g., Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962) (stock).
135. E.g., cases collected in section V. infra.
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if the trustee has a power of sale.136 Class gifts, 137 powers of appoint-
ment, 38 and interests created by exercise of powers of appointment 39
are within the Rule. Fiduciary powers run some risk of being subjected
to the Rule. 40
Future interests.left in the creator of the interest, including rever-
sions, possibilities of reverter and powers of termination (rights of en-
try), usually are regarded as presently vested and therefore not subject
to the Rule.' 4' Commercial interests such as rights to repurchase, op-
tions to repurchase, leases to commence at an uncertain time in the
future, and options in gross have been struck down under the Rule, but
covenants for perpetual renewal of leases, options to purchase in les-
sees, easements, profits , prendre, expansible easements and pension
trusts for employees have escaped the guillotine. 142 In sum, the Rule
may apply to interests other than the conventional "future interests"
suggested by the typical definition. And the "property" referred to in
the definition includes personalty as well as realty and may even extend
to some contractual arrangements. 143
The definition refers to "devises and grants." Clearly the rule may
apply to gifts by will of realty (historically called "devises") or of per-
sonalty (historically called "bequests" or "legacies").'" It applies to
interests created by deed (grant), as well as to inter vivos trusts and
testamentary trusts. 145
b. Charitable Gifts
The blackletter is unequivocal: "[T]he rule against perpetuity does
not apply to charitable trusts."'" This view is codified in G.S. 36A-
49: 147
136. See McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1951). Only
Wisconsin frees from the Rule those trusts in which the trustee has the power to sell. Eg., In re
Walker's Will, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W.2d 94 (1950), noted in 49 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (1951); 35
MINN. L. REv. 617 (1951).
137. See section III. infra.
138. See section IV. infra.
139. Id
140. See notes 321-22 infra.
141. See Case 32 infra.
142. See section VI. infra.
143. Id
144. Eg., Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962).
145. Id; See section V. infra.
146. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. John Thomasson Constr. Co., 275 N.C. 399, 406, 168
S.E.2d 358, 363 (1969).
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-49 (Supp. 1977). This statute is merely declarative of the corn-
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Not voidfor indefiniteness; title in trustee, vacancies. - No gift, grant,
bequest or devise, whether in trust or otherwise, to religious, educa-
tional, charitable or benevolent uses or for the purpose of providing
for the care or maintenance of any part of any cemetery, public or
private, shall be invalid by reason of any indefiniteness or uncer-
tainty of the objects or beneficiaries of such trust, or because said
instrument confers upon the trustee or trustees discretionary powers
in the selection and designation of the objects or beneficiaries of such
trust or in carrying out the purpose thereof, or by reason of the same
in contravening any statute or rule against perpetuities.
Other authorities would suggest that this blanket exemption is stated
too broadly, 4 ' but no North Carolina case has invalidated a gift to
charity on the ground of perpetuities. The statute may mean literally
what it says.
There are almost as many North Carolina perpetuities cases on
charitable gifts as on any other aspect of the Rule, and those cases
pretty well run the gamut of possible issues. For starters, a perpetual
trust for a charity is valid.149 If the Rule Against Perpetuities does not
apply to the duration of a private express trust, 50 seemingly it should
not apply to the duration of a charitable trust. There is a difference,
however: in the private express trust, all the equitable interests of the
beneficiaries must vest within the period of the Rule, but in the case of
the charitable trust the interests do not vest in any particular benefi-
ciaries.' A better explanation of the exemption is that outright gifts to
charitable corporations are exempt from the Rule,'52 and the charitable
trust is not fundamentally different from the charitable corporation-in
each form one entity (corporation or trust) holds title for the benefit of
the public (charity). Even if the charitable trust is somehow different,
the public benefit of the charitable trust outweighs any perpetuities
detriment.
In other jurisdictions, when there is a gift to one charity subject to
a remote gift over to another charity, both gifts are good, at least when
mon law. Williams v. Williams, 215 N.C. 739, 741-42, 3 S.E.334, 337 (1939). Apparently three
other states, Michigan, Minnesota and South Carolina, have similar provisions. MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.1191 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.12 (West 1946); S.C. CODE § 21-27-50 (1976).
148. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 1 770[l]; 4A id § 584 (1979).
149. The foundation case is Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 96 (1820). Accord, State ex
rel Stanly v. McGowen, (2 Ired. Eq.) 9 (1841); State ex rel Wardens of the Poor v. Gerard, 37
N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 210 (1842); Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation v. Trustees of Wake Forest College,
227 N.C. 500, 42 S.E.2d 910 (1947).
150. See section V. infra.
151. Although in a sense the equitable interest does vest in the charitable purpose.
152. E.g., 3 L. Sames & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1279.
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the contingency on which the gift shifts is related to charity.153 The
reason is that a perpetual tying up of property for two charities should
be good if a perpetual tying up for one charity is good (and it is). 154
Although no North Carolina cases are squarely in point, undoubtedly
this state would follow the usual rule. 155
Given the basic exemption of present gifts for charitable trusts,
some variations are possible. The settlor, for example, may provide
that the trustee has no power to sell the trust corpus. Here the restraint
on alienation is aggravated, since the trustee cannot even sell the partic-
ular trust corpus and reinvest the proceeds of sale for the benefit of
charity. Nevertheless, the recent case of Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
John Thomasson Construction Co. ' 56 sustained the validity of the re-
striction on the power of sale. Aside from citing cases from other juris-
dictions, the court's only reason for reaching this result was that "since
North Carolina recognizes that a donor may create a perpetual charita-
ble trust, it would seem strange to deviate from the general rule so as to
prevent the donor from restraining sale of the corpus of such trust."'' 57
This reasoning is not convincing, but it is not unusual.'58 Significantly,
the court actually did authorize the sale of the trust corpus, pursuant to
the general power of courts of equity to permit sales of property settled
in trust for charity,159 so the validation of the restraint on alienation did
not have disastrous consequences.
Now, suppose that instead of allowing immediate use of the chari-
table gift, the settlor directs accumulation of the income for a specified
period of time, say ninety-nine years. Will the accumulation for char-
ity be good? Yes, according to Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro,160 al-
though it is not clear what standard, if any, will be imposed on
153. E.g., 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24A0.
154. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1280.
155. See Williams v. Williams, 215 N.C. 739, 3 S.E.2d 334 (1939); Z. Smith Reynolds Founda-
tion v. Trustees of Wake Forest College, 227 N.C. 500, 42 S.E.2d 910 (1947) (contract for pay-
ments from one charity over to another).
156. 275 N.C. 399, 168 S.E.2d 358 (1969), modifying 3 N.C. App. 157, 164 S.E.2d 519 (1968).
The court of appeals held only that the restriction on sale was invalid; the trust itself did not fall.
157. Id at 408, 168 S.E.2d at 364.
158. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 349, at 683 (rev. 2d ed. 1977).
159. In John Thomasson, the court of appeals relied on the decision in Hass v. Hass, 195 N.C.
734, 143 S.E. 541 (1928). The supreme court distinguished Hass as a case based on the proposi-
tion that the words preventing sale ("It is my will that my real estate be not sold .... ") were
merely precatory! These decisions overlooked two early cases sustaining perpetual trusts for char-
ity in which the trustee was forbidden to sell the trust corpus. One was the fountainhead charita-
ble case of Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 96 (1820), and the other was State ex rel.
Wardens of the Poor v. Gerard, 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 210 (1842).
160. 218 N.C. 686, 12 S.E.2d 253 (1940).
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accumulations for charity, because the court simply cited the statute
that charitable trusts are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Elsewhere it is said that accumulations for charity are subject to a test
of reasonableness,1 61 while accumulations of income for private benefi-
ciaries may not exceed the period of perpetuities.162 One would expect
some outer limit on accumulations for charity, although it has not yet
been reached.
Some caution is advisable in drafting accumulations for charity.
Penick involved a direct gift to charity, with provision for postponed
enjoyment pending accumulation of income. Suppose, however, that
the gift to chadrity was conditional upon the accumulated fund reaching
a specified amount. Leach suggests that such a gift would be bad.'
63
This example is just one aspect of the broader question whether a gift
to charity on a possibly remote condition precedent would be bad. In
other words, the inquiry now shifts away from present gifts to charity,
to gifts postponed until the happening of some condition precedent.
The North Carolina cases uniformly have sustained postponed
gifts to charity, despite some fairly clear cases of remote conditions pre-
cedent. In the accumulation of income situation, gifts were upheld in
the following cases: (1) Griffin v. Graham,'" in which the testator di-
rected that as soon as the funds arising from the profits of his estate
were deemed sufficient by his executors "a brick house shall be erected
.. .for the accommodation of indigent scholars . . . .And . . .as
soon as the house is finished and the funds arising from the profits of
my estate will admit, a proper schoolmaster shall be employed
1 ;165 and (2) State ex rel Stanl, v. McGowen, 166 in which the tes-
161. Eg., 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.42.
162. Eg., 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 1461-1468.
Actually, while there are several cases validating provisions for accumulation within the pe-
riod of the Rule, there are few cases involving provisions for accumulation for periods longer than
the Rule. It does not logically follow that if an accumulation for a period not longer than the Rule
is good, an accumulation for a longer period is necessarily bad.
Following the celebrated case of Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1798), aj'd,
32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (H.L. 1805), Parliament enacted its "Thellusson Act," 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 98
(1800), restricting the period of valid private accumulations. Several American states, fearing
dynastic trusts created by compound interest-crazed settlors, passed similar statutes. The fears
proved unjustified-most Americans just were not Thellusson-minded. Since the statutes re-
stricted certain federal tax advantages of accumulation trusts, most of the American Thellusson
Acts have now been repealed. See generally 3 L. SIMm & A. SMITH, supra § 1466. Apparently
North Carolina has never faced the problem.
163. 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.42. Whether invalidity would merely cut the accumulation
provision down to size or completely defeat it is not clear. Id
164. 8 N.C. (I Hawks) 96 (1820).
165. Id at 98.
166. 37 N.C. (2 Ired. Eq.) 9 (1841).
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tator directed that "the net proceeds [of the estate] are then to be kept
and put by my executors to the use of a free school."167 It is not clear
whether these holdings reflect a view that the gifts were presently
vested with only enjoyment postponed, or whether they represent a
general exemption of contingent charitable gifts from the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Given the favorable treatment of charities, the courts may
be inclined to construe ambiguous language as creating a presently
vested interest. 68
The most complete discussion in any North Carolina case of the
condition precedent problem came in Farnan v. First Union National
Bank.169 The court saved the gift by finding that the only condition
precedent (acceptance in writing by the trustee) had to be performed
within the period of the Rule and that other apparent conditions prece-
dent merely affected the time of enjoyment. The court's consideration
of the issue is some suggestion that the gift would have been bad if the
conditions had been remote, although Leach opines that the charitable
trust statute would save the gift.170
About the only charitable trust issue not found in the North Caro-
lina cases is the one that arises when an immediate gift to charity is
followed by a remote gift over to a noncharity. In cases of this type, the
remote gift over typically fails, leaving the charity with a valid inde-
feasible estate. '7 1
To summarize, perpetual trusts for charity are valid, even if they
forbid alienation of the trust corpus or direct accumulation of the in-
come for a fairly long period. A gift to one charity followed by a gift
over to another charity on a remote condition apparently is good, pro-
vided the contingency is related to charity. The status of gifts to charity
subject to remote conditions precedent is somewhat unclear. North
Carolina has never invalidated a charitable gift on perpetuities
grounds, and G.S. 36A-49, which exempts charities from the Rule, may
be a strong factor. Given the favorable treatment of charities, interests
that otherwise might fall afoul of the Rule may be construed as vested,
or cy pres may be applied. Charitable gifts are not invalidated merely
167. Id at 11.
168. See 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 1282-1285.
169. 263 N.C. 106, 139 S.E.2d 14 (1964). For a full statement of the case, see Case 30 infra.
170. 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.38. A possibly remote gift over to charity was not noticed in
North Carolina Nat'1 Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 203 S.E.2d 657 (1974).
171. E.g., 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1287.
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because the beneficiaries may be remotely ascertained; the focus is on
the legal interest in the trustee.
2. "Is valid"
If an interest is not valid it is, logically enough, invalid. That is,
the interest is invalid from the time of creation, and it is not cut down
to size. There is no cy pres to reform the interest, and to make it ap-
proximate as nearly as possible the creator's intention. 172
There is little consideration of the effect of invalidity of one inter-
est on other valid interests in the North Carolina cases.1 73 Generally,
the invalid interest is stricken, leaving the other interest to take effect as
if the invalid interest had never been written. 74 The case of the dynas-
tic-minded testator is an instructive example:
Case 7. 71 T, whose spelling was rather idiosyncratic, de-
vised his farm
to my Grand Sound John W. Clayton ... to have and to hold
his life time, thence to his Body ars if he has Eney and if not
then if my Grand Sound Silas . . .if he a living but if J.W.
Clayton Shold hay a body hir it Shall go to them down to the
Tenth Jenerration ....
John W. Clayton survived T and later died, leaving as heirs
nine children. Held, the provision in the will restricting the
land "down to the Tenth Jenerration" was void, but the prior
estate to which it was annexed was valid, giving the nine chil-
dren a fee simple.
Apparently, the court mechanically excised the invalid limitation, leav-
ing the gift to John W. Clayton's "Body ars if he has Eney," which
vested on John's death. A related case seems disposed to sever only the
remote part of a single phrase. 177
172. See, e.g., Case 8 infra.
173. The standard cases are discussed in Leach, supra note 29, at 656-57. Perhaps the most
important case is that of alternative contingencies: if two alternative contingencies are stated, one
of which is remote and the other is not, and the contingency occurs on which the valid limitation is
to take effect, the gift will be good. Id at 657.
174. E.g., 3 L. SIMas & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1262.
175. Clayton v. Burch, 239 N.C. 386, 80 S.E.2d 29 (1953) (semble).
176. Id at 387-88, 80 S.E.2d at 30.
177. In Jackson v. Powell, 225 N.C. 599, 35 S.E.2d 892 (1942), the testator modestly attempted
to entail his estate for a mere three generations: "The grantors hereof make this conveyance to the
grantees named above during their natural lifetime then to their bodily heirs to the third genera-
tion." ld at 599-600, 35 S.E.2d at 892. The court held the limitation to the third generation to be
a violation of the Rule, giving the grantees a fee simple under the Rule in Shelley's Case! The
court in effect struck only the words "to the third generation," leaving a gift in the form "to the
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When it is difficult to sever the remote interests from the
nonremote, the entire gift will fail:
Case 8.171 T's will provided:
Item 7. My will is that all the rest of my property of every
description, and my money, be kept by my executor, whomso-
ever I may appoint; it shall be kept as a fund. Should any of my
children or grandchildren come to suffering, in any other way,
save by idleness, drunkenness, or anything of the kind, so as to
become an object of charity, I want the said executor to give a
part of this to such child or granchild.
Held, whether the administration of the fund by the executor
was deemed a power or trust in him, the bequest was void
because the fund might have been needed for grandchildren
more than twenty-one years after the death of T's children.
Implicit in this case are gifts to: (1) testator's children, all of whom
necessarily were lives in being; (2) testator's grandchildren born before
his death; and (3) testator's grandchildren born after his death. The
court did not separate (1) and (2) from (3), or (1) from (2) and (3), even
though either of these alternatives would have saved part of the gift.
This automatic result is typical but regrettable.
179
A leading powers of appointment case severed a valid gift of one-
half of a remainder from an invalid gift of the other half:
Case 9. 10 By hig will, Tleft property in trust for his son,
William, and provided that "William, shall have the right to
dispose of the entire estate.., by will. . . .Should my son
die intestate . . . then such estate shall go to [William's sur-
viving] child or children." William's will gave "[a]ll the rest
and residue of my estate. . . including [the property subject
to the power]" in trust for his children. Upon each child's
reaching age twenty-five, one-half of the child's trust was to
be distributed in fee to the child, and the remaining one-half
was to be held in trust for the benefit of the child for life, with
the right to dispose of the remaining one-half share by will to
grantees for life, then to their bodily heirs," which would invoke Shelley's Case. This is an unu-
sual approach, suggesting that in a series of gifts the court might strike only the remote gifts,
leaving the prior ones intact. See generally 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 1261, 1263.
178. Moore v. Moore, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 132 (1860).
179. The usual argument against severability is that it cannot be known which plan the testa-
tor would have preferred; indeed he might have preferred a different plan (for example, distribu-
tion for a period of the lives of his children plus 21 years). Perhaps, but the question at least
deserves attention. (Note that total intestacy will result in equality among family branches with-
out regard for the testator's preferences.)
180. American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1947).
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the child's spouse, descendants or charity, and in default of
appointment to the child's issue, or if none, to William's
surviving issue. William was survived by two children, ages
thirteen and ten. Held, the gift of the remaining one-half to
William's children for life with power to appoint violated the
Rule, and the children took that share free of trust under the
gift in default.in T's will.
The court stated that the provisions were severable without indicating
its reasons. This result is in startling contrast to the class gift cases, in
which infectious invalidity seems to be the rule. This matter is dis-
cussed more fully in connection with class gifts in section 111.181 Fi-
nally, during the period when North Carolina took the view that trust
duration was within the Rule, a remotely long trust failed in foto; the
court would not limit its duration to a valid period. 182
3. "Unless the title thereto must vest"
a. In General
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule against remoteness of vest-
ing. It is not a rule against interests that last too long or against trusts
that endure too long, 8 3 although one has the lingering suspicion that a
court would find some way to strike down a flagrantly long-lasting gift
or trust even if all interests vested within the period of the Rule.'8 4
For perpetuities purposes, "vest" is used in its technical sense of
vesting in interest-a remainder is vested in this sense when its posses-
sion and enjoyment is subject to no condition precedent other than ter-
mination of the prior particular estate. 18- There is one important
qualification: for executory interests (as contrasted with remainders),
181. The question of severability was expressly noted in McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 17, 81 S.E.2d 386, 398 (1954); and North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C.
App. 178, 181, 203 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1974).
182. Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 104, 52 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1949).
183. Leach, supra note 29, at 639-40, 668; see section V. infra.
184. For example, (1) 0 conveys to .4 for life, remainder to A's children, to be paid at age 75,
or (2) 0 conveys to A for life, remainder to B, to be distributed to B 100 years after A's death.
185. W.B. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 18, at 253:
To say that an interest is vested may mean that, although it is still a future interest, it
has acquired that metaphysical and artificial status which under the feudal law made it
an estate rather than the possibility of becoming an estate-i.e., that it is vested in inter-
est. A remainder is vested in this sense when it is not subject to a condition precedent
other than the termination of the particular estate. Executory interests, it is said, do not
have the capacity for vesting in interest as remainders do; but this statement is supporta-
ble only on historical grounds having no relation to present practical considerations, nor
is it really observed by the courts in situations where it counts.
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vesting means vesting in possession.8 6 The concept of remote vesting
breaks down in certain applications of the Rule to commercial
interests.'8
7
The Rule Against Perpetuities is not a rule against suspension of
the power of alienation.' 88 It is not the same as the rule against re-
straints on alienation, although both are based at least in part on a
policy against withdrawal of property from commerce.' 8 9 The Rule
has been used by analogy to check the duration of accumulations of
income, although the issue seems not to have arisen in this state.' 90
b. Absolute Certainty of Vesting
The interest must be absolutely certain to vest (if at all), on any
possibility one can imagine, from the creation of the interest. It is not
enough that the interest is highly likely to vest in time, nor that it in fact
vests in time. The certainty must exist at the time the interest is cre-
ated.' 9' In other words, the test is what might have been, not what
actually happened.' 9
2
Leach has collected a set of bizarre, unanticipated English applica-
tions of the Rule, denominated the "fertile octogenarian," the "unborn
widow," and the "precocious toddler," in which, by disregarding the
facts of life, various interests were invalidated. 93 A couple in their sev-
enties was presumed capable of having children, a man in his sixties
was considered capable of courting and marrying a woman sixty years
his junior, and a child of five was deemed capable of producing off-
spring. None of these exact cases has been litigated in North Carolina,
although there are sparse indications that the fantastical presumptions
of the English cases would not be followed here. In McPherson v. First
& Citizens National Bank, 94 the trial court found from the evidence
186. Id; accord, Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 376, 128 S.E.2d
867, 872 (1963) (dictum); Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 405, 113 S.E.2d 899, 904 (1960) (dictum).
187. See section VI. infra.
188. Leach, supra note 29, at 640.
189. Id For a strong statement that a perpetuity is an estate settled so that there is no power of
alienation in the owner, see the leading case of Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 96, 131-32
(1820).
190. See note 162 supra.
191. Leach, supra note 29, at 642-43.
192. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 132 (1860).
193. Leach, supra note 29, at 643-44; Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 973, 992 (1965). Schuyler points out the absurd assumptions implicit in these cases in Schuy-
ler, supra note 38, at 12-16.
194. 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954).
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before it that a fifty-three year old man was physically incapable of
having further children. The supreme court reversed this finding be-
cause the case was not "sufficiently compelling" to warrant relaxation
of the common law presumption that so long as a man lives he is capa-
ble of procreation. 195 The court's ruling did not affect the perpetuities
issue, however. On the other hand, in Hicks v. Hicks,196 which was not
a perpetuities case, evidence was introduced that a seventy-three year
old woman had undergone surgery for removal of her ovaries, and her
gynecologist testified that it was impossible for her to bear children.
The supreme court sustained the trial court finding that the evidence
was sufficient to rebut the presumption of procreative ability. The
cases are distinguishable in the degree of proof at the trial level and the
sex of the person in question. But significantly, both indicate that the
common law presumption is rebuttable, in contrast to the rule of the
English fertile octogenarian case that no evidence would be heard on
the facts of life.' 97 Query whether evidence directed to procreative
abilities in general, rather than to the particular person in question,
would be admissible; it should be relevant.
Another farfetched case of invalidity is the "administration contin-
gency," in which the grantor foresees that some of the objects of his
bounty will die during a relatively short period of administration of an
estate or trust and so provides that the property will pass only to those
beneficiaries who are living when administration is completed or distri-
bution is made. Because it is mathematically possible that administra-
tion will take more than the period of perpetuities (which, in the
absence of a measuring life, is twenty-one years), the gift may fail. 98
195. The court noted:
Nor have we overlooked Finding of Fact No. 17, wherein the court below found
"that it is physically impossible for. . . James E. McPherson to have additional chil-
dren." On the basis of this finding, without further elaboration or supporting allegation,
the court decreed in effect that the living children of James E. McPherson are entitled to
all the benefits of the McPherson trust. This decree may not be treated as conclusive in
view of the presumption indulged by the law that so long as a man lives he is capable of
procreation .... Indeed, by the ancient rule of the common law, to which this Court
adheres (Shuford . Brady...) it is irrebuttably presumed that any person-man or
woman-may have issue so long as life lasts.... While in many jurisdictions, including
England, the question whether the possibility of issue is ever extinct, has been re-ex-
amined in the light of exact processes of medical science by which in given cases sterility
or impotency may be shown as matters of scientific certainty, nevertheless, thus far this
Court has not been presented with a situation sufficiently compelling to warrant relaxa-
tion of the common law rule.
Id at 19, 81 S.E.2d at 398 (citations omitted).
196. 259 N.C. 387, 130 S.E.2d 666 (1963).
197. Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
198. Leach, supra note 29, at 644.
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For example, suppose the following cases:
Case 10.199 In return for $200, H conveyed to G all the
timber cut on fifty acres of H's land. G was allowed "the full
term of five years within which to cut and remove the timber
hereby conveyed, said term to commence from the time [G]
begins to manufacture said timber into wood or lumber."
Thirteen years had elapsed without action by G. Held, the
contract created a lease for a term of years, which was void
for uncertainty as to when it will commence.
Case 11.20° T bequeathed the corpus of a trust to named
beneficiaries five years after the final decree of distribution of
the trust corpus from his executor to the trustee. Held, the gift
was bad.
Case 12. T devised Blackacre to X to have and to hold
twenty-five years from and after the date of probate of T's
will. There are no North Carolina cases in which the issues
raised by this hypothetical have been noticed.2 °1
Case 13. T bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust
to pay the debts, taxes and administration expenses of his es-
tate, then to hold the balance for A. This fact situation ex-
isted in two North Carolina cases, but the issue was not
noticed.2 oz
The invalidation of the contract in Case 10 was consistent with the per-
petuities idea that it was uncertain that cutting the timber would com-
mence within twenty-one years (there being no human lives to which
the commencement could relate), although the opinion belies that ra-
tionale. 0 3 Case 11 is the celebrated California malpractice case of Lu-
cas v. Hamm,2 °4 in which the gift was assumed to be bad because there
was a possibility that the decree of distribution might not be entered
199. Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. 46, 38 S.E. 26 (1901).
200. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962). Actually, the exact language of the will appears neither in the supreme court or
district court of appeal opinions, see 11 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Dt. Ct. App. 1961), and it was only as-
sumed that the postponement violated the Rule Against Perpetuities: See 14 STAN. L. REV. 580,
581 n.l (1962). Clearly it violated the California rule against suspension of the power of
alienation.
201. The fact situation existed in McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68
S.E.2d 831 (1951), but the issue was not noticed.
202. Hass v. Hass, 195 N.C. 734, 143 S.E.541 (1928), and Harrison v. Peoples Bank & Trust
Co., 8 N.C. App. 475, 174 S.E.2d 867 (1970).
203. See text accompanying notes 348-50 infra.
204. 56 Cal. 2d, 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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until more than sixteen years after the testator's death. Note that if the
gift had been to named beneficiaries if living five years after the decree
of distribution, it would have been good because the beneficiaries
would have taken, if at all, within their own lives. Apparently the gift
was an executory interest, so it could not have been saved on a theory
of being vested at the testator's death, with enjoyment merely
postponed.
The gift in Case 12 should be good. Even though the will may not
be probated within twenty-one years, until it is probated no estates at
all are created. The cases are split.2" 5 The gift in Case 13 should also
be good. Even though the debts may not be paid for more than twenty-
one years, the gift is simply one of the net estate, which is all the testa-
tor could give anyway.20 6
In sum, the draftsman should avoid these administration contin-
gency risks. Although there are various escape theories, such as that
the testator contemplated a reasonable time not to exceed the period of
the Rule, the North Carolina courts have not clearly indicated how
they will approach these farfetched applications.
c. Construction to Avoid Invalidiy
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule of property, not a rule of
construction.20 7 Originally this was held to mean that one could not
consider the testator's or grantor's intention.20 8 In other words, one
construes the instrument as if there were no Rule Against Perpetuities
and then, having arrived at the construction, one applies the Rule. On
the other hand, it is a fair inference that the testator or grantor intended
to do a legal act rather than an illegal one; if so, he must have intended
not to violate the Rule.2 9 Accordingly, "[i]f under one construction a
devise or bequest would become an illegal perpetuity while under an-
other construction it would be valid and operative, the latter mode must
be preferred.' '2 10 The strength of the two North Carolina cases stating
205. See 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.23.
206. Id
207. E.g., Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 406, 113 S.E.2d 899, 904 (1960).
208. The leading English case is Pearks v. Mosely, 5 App. Cas. 714 (H.L. 1880).
209. Compare Leach, supra note 29, at 658, with J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 629, 633.
210. Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 377, 128 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1963)
(emphasis added); accord, Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 161, 116 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1960); cf.
Elledge v. Parrish, 224 N.C. 397, 400, 30 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1944) ("In our opinion, the testatrix did
not intend a disposition of her property which would violate the rule against perpetuities or entail
the estate-not because of a conscious restraint from these prohibited practices, but because her
care was for the more immediate objects of her bounty."). In two early cases "or" was construed
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this view is difficult to assess. Both Clarke v. Clarke (Case 16 in section
III. on class gifts)2' and Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
(Case 29 in section V. on the duration of trusts) 21 2 sustained the limita-
tions in question, but other North Carolina cases that seemed ripe for
the approach have expressly rejected it.213 Further, the cases that have
acknowledged the principle do not consider how one decides whether
the testator's expression is really ambiguous. Although of uncertain ac-
ceptance and scope, therefore, the principle should be useful to counsel.
One very important case takes a sympathetic approach toward
validity:
Case J4.214 Tbequeathed stocks in trust for his wife and
two daughters for life, with provisions for accumulation of
part of the income. On the death of the wife and daughters,
part of the income was to be paid to his legal descendants, per
stirpes, "until such time as the Law of Perpetuity shall cause
this trust to be dissolved," at which time the trustee was to pay
the corpus to T's legal descendants, per stirpes. Held, the
trust was valid. To carry out T's intent, the corpus should be
distributed twenty-one years after the death of the last to die
of T's two daughters and three grandchildren living at T's
death.
The significance of this case is that the court might easily have invali-
dated the gift, but did not. The court might have said that it did not
know who were to be the measuring lives. Or it might have wondered
whether the testator meant for the court to wait and see. Or it might
have speculated on whether the testator meant only a twenty-one year
period in gross beyond the specified life estates. Nevertheless, the court
sustained the gift, suggesting that counsel should press the courts for
sympathetic rewriting of dubious gifts.
It should be noted that various constructional preferences may
support validity in individual cases: the presumption for early vest-
as "and" to avoid invalidity. Black v. McAulay, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 375 (1858); Montgomery v.
Vynns, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 667 (1839).
211. 253 N.C. 156, 116 S.E.2d 449 (1960).
212. 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963).
213. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960) (Case 15); Mercer v.
Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949) (Case 26).
214. Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962). See generally 3 L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 5, § 1227. The leading American case reaching a similar conclusion is Fitchie
v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908).
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ing, 2 15 the presumption against intestacy,216 and the sympathetic treat-ment of charitable gifts. 2 17
4. "If at all"
The Rule does not require that an interest be certain to vest within
the perpetuities period. It requires only that it be certain either to vest
or fail within the period of the Rule. If the decision on vesting is made
within lives and being plus twenty-one years, the donor's tying up of
the property is kept within limits, because at the end of the period it
will be known for certain who the owner is. Thus a devise "to my
children who shall attain twenty-one" is good, even though it is possi-
ble that no child of the testator may ever reach age twenty-one. In a
gift "to A for life, then to A's children for life, then to A's grandchil-
dren for life, remainder to X if he is then living," the gift to X should
be valid (notwithstanding the remote life estate to A's grandchildren)
because X will take, f at all, within his own life.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the significance of these three little
words is recognized in North Carolina. The second sentence of the
usual statement of the Rule in North Carolina ("If there is a possibility
such future interest may not vest within the time prescribed, the gift or
grant is void.") is inconsistent with the "if at all" concept, and few cases
raise the issue. The nearest example is Case 4 in the first generation
cases,21 8 and the vest or fail theory may not have been the ground of
the decision. Clearly the words must be part of the Rule, because with-
out them all contingent interests would be void.
5. "Not later than twenty-one years"
The period of twenty-one years originally was picked to allow in-
fants to reach their majority. In Cadell v. Palmer,219 however, the Eng-
lish court allowed a period in gross of twenty-one years unconnected
with any minority, and that view has persisted in the United States
despite criticism.220 The twenty-one year period cannot precede the
measuring lives.221 The recent general reduction in the age of majority
215. E.g., Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 403, 113 S.E.2d 899, 902-03 (1960); Springs v. Hop-
kins, 171 N.C. 486, 490, 88 S.E. 774, 776 (1916).
216. Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371,377, 128 S.E.2d 867, 872 (1963).
217. Williams v. Williams, 215 N.C. 739, 3 S.E.2d 334 (1939); see section I.B.l.b.supra.
218. See text accompanying notes 98-104 supra.
219. 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (H.L. 1833).
220. E.g., J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 186-188.
221. Leach, supra note 29, at 641.
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from twenty-one to eighteen has not affected the Rule;222 indeed, there
is some sentiment for extending the period to thirty or more years to
keep property out of the hands of young adults.223 Presumably North
Carolina would follow the usual period in gross approach, although
there is little precedent. One case indicates that a gift does not fail
merely because the interest is to vest immediately at the expiration of
the period of the Rule rather than at some point within the period.224
6. "Plus the period of gestation"
This part of the Rule is sometimes stated as "ten lunar months, '225
but regardless of how stated, only actual periods of gestation are al-
lowed (in contrast to the twenty-one year period in gross unconnected
with any minority).226 It is possible to have children en ventre at the
beginning of a period as well as the end.2 27
7. "After some life or lives in being"
One of the most difficult aspects of the Rule is selecting the mea-
suring lives when none are specified in the instrument. They are those
lives, the termination of which may have some effect on vesting.228
"The measuring lives need not be mentioned in the instrument, need
not be holders of previous estates, and need not be connected in any
way with the property or the persons designated to take it." '229 For ex-
ample, a gift to the testator's grandchildren who shall attain the age of
twenty-one is good, because all grandchildren must reach age twenty-
one within twenty-one years after the death of the testator's (unmen-
tioned) children, who must be lives in being.23° The lives must be
human lives, 231 although one would hope for sympathetic treatment of
222. Soled, Effect of Reduction of/he Age of Majoriy on the Permissible Period ofthe Rule
Against Perpetuities, 34 MD. L. REv. 245 (1974).
223. Schuyler, supra note 38, at 19-20.
224. Farnan v. First Union Natl Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 111, 139 S.E.2d 14, 17-18 (1964).
225. E.g., American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 463, 46 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1947).
The Intestate Succession Act makes heirs of those descendants born within 10 lunar months after
the death of the intestate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (1976).
226. Farnan v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 110, 139 S.E.2d 14, 17-18 (1964); Stel-
lings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 323, 126 S.E.2d 140, 156 (1962).
227. See Leach, supra note 29, at 642.
228. Note, Understanding the Measuring Life in the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1974 WASH.
U.L.Q. 265.
229. Leach, supra note 29, at 641.
230. Id
231. J. MORRIS & W.B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 323 (2d ed. 1962).
768 [Vol. 57
R ULE A GA INST PERPETUITIES
a gift measured by the life of an animal having a lifetime shorter than
humans.
If the measuring lives are specified in the instrument, the question
becomes how many and whose lives may be selected. Again one may
select persons who are not takers of any interest, but the number of
lives may not be so numerous that it becomes unreasonably difficult to
ascertain their termination.232 The outside limit of validity was the
"Royal Lives Clause" of In re Villar:z33 "to my descendants who shall
be living 21 years after the death of all lineal descendants of Queen
Victoria now [1926] living." Some fairly large classes of measuring
lives have been sustained in North Carolina: at least twenty-four per-
sons, including brothers, a sister, nieces, nephews, great nieces and
great nephews were considered measuring lives in Case 3 1;234 three
nieces and one nephew were the measuring lives in Case 30;235 and two
daughters and three grandchildren were used in Case 14.236 Although
the measuring lives in these North Carolina cases were connected with
the disposition, under Villar they need not have been. This aspect of
the Rule has been criticized, because the donor may escape the purpose
of the Rule (controlling unreasonable family settlements) by selecting
as measuring lives a number of healthy babies unrelated to his
family.237
For purposes of the Rule, the possibility of adoption is disre-
garded. Adoption was unknown to the common law at the time of de-
velopment of the Rule, and if the possibility of adopting a beneficiary
not in being at the creation of the interest were cognizable, most gifts
would violate the Rule. This disregard is similar to the proposition that
a power of appointment is not invalid ab initio merely because the do-
nee might exercise the power to create remote interests.
232. Leach, supra note 29, at 642.
233. [19291 1 Ch. 243. The same clause in a 1979 English will might be bad, because Queen
Victoria's line would be difficult to trace and presumably would include many lives.
234. Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397 (1978). The
court treated the term "last survivor" kindly. Had it been disposed to invalidate the gift, it could
have read "last survivor" as meaning the last to die of all lineal descendants of the named
beneficiaries.
235. Farnan v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 139 S.E.2d 14 (1964).
236. Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962).
237. E.g., Schuyler, supra note 38, at 9.
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8. "At the time of creation of the interest."
For wills the clock starts at the testator's death.23 For deeds the
operative date is the delivery of the deed.239 Irrevocable trusts are mea-
sured from the date of creation of the trust, 40 but the clock should not
begin to run on revocable trusts until the settlor's death: as long as the
settlor is living and has the power to revoke, the trust corpus has not
been tied up.241
III. CLASS GIFTs
Along with powers of appointment, class gifts are among the most
powerful tools of the modem estate planner. Save for the simplest of
estates, almost every plan will create future interests in unborn or unas-
certained beneficiaries who cannot be named specifically but can only
be described by reference to their membership in some group. 42 This
may facilitate generation-skipping 4 3 or tend to keep the property in
the family as long as possible. Even when the client is elderly and the
immediate objects of his bounty are ascertained and therefore named
individually, it is not uncommon to provide a gift over to a class to
guard against intestacy in the event of an untoward sequence of deaths.
The application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to class gifts is, there-
fore, a compelling subject for the estate planner.
The perpetuities doctrines for class gifts fall into several traditional
categories, and the North Carolina perpetuities cases appear to line up
with the patterns recognized elsewhere. A trio of opinions from the pen
of Justice Clifton L. Moore is essential to the understanding of class
gifts and perpetuities. The first case illustrates the basic class gift rule.
Case 15.24 4 T devised realty to his son in trust245 to pay
238. Eg, Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 323, 126 S.E.2d 140, 156 (1962); North Carolina
Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 180, 203 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1974).
239. E.g., 3 L. SIMS & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1226.
240. Leach, supra note 29, at 642.
241. Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958).
242. A.J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 439-40 (3d ed. 1961).
243. Generation skipping refers to the practice of conferring substantial benefits (e.g., life es-
tates plus special powers of appointment) on successive generations without attendant taxation. If
O devised property to his children for life, then to his grandchildren for life, remainder to his
great-grandchildren (assuming no perpetuities violation), no transfer taxes would be imposed on
the children or grandchildren. They had only life estates, which were valueless at their deaths.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 imposes a tax on generation-skipping transfers. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622.
244. Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960), noted in 40 N.C.L. REV. 151
(1961).
245. The son could not have been used as the measuring life because the trust was not per-
sonal to him as trustee; at the time of the action a bank had been appointed as successor trustee.
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the college expenses of the son's children in such amounts as
the son deemed necessary. When the son's youngest child
"shall arrive at the age of twenty-eight (28)," the son was to
convey the land to the children, "and if any child. . . shall in
the meantime have died leaving issue surviving, such issue
shall stand for, and represent his [parent], and receive the
share that his [parent] would have received. 246 At 7"s death,
the son had four children (the youngest being two years old);
two children were born later (the youngest being eighteen at
the time of the case), and the son was still living. Held, the
gift violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.247 The gift did not
vest until the youngest child of the son reached twenty-eight,
which might be more than twenty-one years after the deaths
of the son and his four children living at T's death.
This case illustrates the so-called "all-or-nothing rule" of Leake v.
Robinson.24 That is, a class gift must stand or fall as a unit; if the
interest of any member of the class is remote, the entire gift falls. Both
maximum and minimum membership in the class must be determined
within the period of the Rule.249 In Case 15, the gift to the four Qhil-
dren of the son in being at T's death, considered separately, is good;
they will reach age twenty-eight, if at all, within their own lives. But
the youngest child to reach twenty-eight might be an after-born, and
that possibility invalidates the entire gift.250
Apparently no North Carolina case squarely states the all-or-noth-
ing rule in so many words; nevertheless, the result of several cases
points clearly in that direction.2 1 The merits (or demerits) of this rule
246. Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 401, 113 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1960).
247. Apparently, the gift of income was held bad, as well as the gift of the remainder. The
income gift was not vested in any child.
248. 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
249. Another case seeming to adopt the rule of Leake v. Robinson is Moore v. Moore, 59 N.C.
(6 Jones Eq.) 132 (1860), in which the testator willed the residue of his estate to his executor, to
keep it as a fund and with the further direction that should any of the testator's children or
grandchildren "come to suffering. . .I want the said executor to give a part of this to such child
or grandchild." Id. at 132. The gift was struck down because a grandchild might come to suffer-
ing more than 21 years after the deaths of the testator's children. Considered separately, the gift to
the testator's children would have been good because they were, perforce, lives in being at their
parent's (the testator's) death. Note, too, that had the power to make distribution been restricted
to the named executor, the gift would have been good because the executor himself would have
been the measuring life. See text accompanying note 276 infra.
250. E.g., Leach, supra note 29, at 648-49.
251. In addition to Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960), and Moore v.
Moore, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 132 (1860), see Palmer v. Ketner, 29 N.C. App. 187, 223 S.E.2d 913
(1976); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 203 S.E.2d 657 (1974); and Harri-
son v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 8 N.C. App. 475, 174 S.E.2d 867 (1970). Save one, all American
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will be considered after discussion of some variations on the basic class
gift rule.
Because the Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule against remoteness
of vesting, the crucial question in many cases is: When does the vesting
take place?
Case 16.252 T bequeathed fifty percent of his War Bonds
"and their accumulation" to the "heirs" of his son, Norman,
"to be used for college education only." Any amount left over
was to be divided equally among T's named "children" (in-
cluding Norman). T was survived by Norman, who had six
minor children at T's death. Held, the bequest was good. T
used the word "heirs" to mean "children." The gift to Nor-
man's children vested at Y's death, to the exclusion of after-
born children.
Case 16 illustrates two important constructional techniques open to the
court to avoid invalidity. First, in construing the class term "heirs" as
meaning "children," 253 the court avoided the invalidity that would
have resulted had it construed "heirs" as meaning an indefinite succes-
sion of takers from generation to generation.2 5 4 Second, by applying
jurisdictions that have considered the question have adopted the rule of Leake v. Robinson. 6
ALP, supra note 22, § 24.26. The one celebrated exception is Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140
So. 2d 843 (1962).
252. Clarke.v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 116 S.E.2d 449 (1960).
253. The court relied on N.C. GEM. STAT. § 41-6 (1976), which provides that "[a] limitation by
...will. . . to the heirs of a living person, shall be construed to be to the children of such person,
unless a contrary intention appear by the ... will." The court did not note that the testator used
the term "children" elsewhere in the will, suggesting that when he meant "children" he knew how
to say it. See Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 157-58, 116 S.E.2d 449, 450-51 (1960). On the other
hand, the gift over to the testator's children (including Norman) suggests that the testator did not
mean Norman's "heirs" to be read as those who would take Norman's property upon his death.
254. In Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963), the
testatrix' will provided that if her son "should die leaving issue then his issue shall receive the
income from my estate as he did. But if he should leave no issue then ... [to] my brothers and
sisters that is [sic] living." Id. at 374, 128 S.E.2d at 870. The trial court held that the word "issue"
was used to mean "a perpetual succession of lineal descendants" of the son, and that therefore the
will violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. at 375, 128 S.E.2d at 870-71. Noting the absence
of remote issue of the son when the will was made, and the provisions of an earlier will, the North
Caorlina Supreme Court reversed, holding that "issue" meant only the issue of the son living at
his death. Curiously, the court did not take note of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1976), which
presumes that a gift over on death without issue is a limitation to take effect when the person dies
without issue living at the time of his death. Cf. O'Neal v. Borders, 170 N.C. 483, 87 S.E. 340
(1915) (relying on § 41-4 to find a definite failure of issue). See generally 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH,
supra note 5, § 579.
In Palmer v. Ketner, 29 N.C. App. 187, 223 S.E.2d 913 (1976), the testator gave life estates in
trust for his wife and youngest sister,
[p]rovided that after all the heirs of my youngest sister have reached their majority, and
after this trust has run at least twenty-five year (It is to stay in force more than twenty-
five years if all the heirs of my youngest sister have not reached their majority) then the
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class closing rules to limit the takers to those children of Norman living
at the testator's death, the court avoided the possibility of invalidity
created by allowing after-born children to take.255 The all-or-nothing
rule requires that both maximum and minimum membership be deter-
mined within the period of the Rule. The court closed the class (maxi-
mum membership) at Norman's death, citing the usual rule that an
immediate (as contrasted to a postponed) gift to a class closes at T's
death when there are class members in being who are entitled to take at
that time.2 56 Minimum membership (survivorship) then was no prob-
lem because the children would take, if at all, within their own lives.25 7
At this point, another case is important to constructional issues.
Case 17 258 T left the residue of his estate in trust for his
wife for life, then to his two named daughters for life, "and
upon their death their share is to be divided equally between
their children when they reach the age of twenty-five
years. '259  The daughters had five minor children at 7's
death. Held, the residuary gift was good. The remainder to
trustees who are acting at such a time shall liquidate the trust and pay to (teek) the heirs
(by- blee~d-k c,- my sisters Louisa Carpenter, Rena Henry and Leah Palmer per sterpes
equal shares share and share alike and not per sterpes ....
Id. at 189, 223 S.E.2d at 915. The court voided the remainder to the heirs of the three sisters on
the ground that their interest would not vest until termination of the trust, which might be 25 years
after the death of the youngest sister. Id at 191, 223 S.E.2d at 917 (citing Parker v. Parker, 252
N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960) (Case 15)). The court found some difficulty in reconciling Case
15 with Roberts v. Northwestern Bank, 271 N.C. 292, 156 S.E.2d 229 (1967), and it is curious that
a technical term such as "heirs" should be given so unusual a meaning. If "heirs" meant heirs in
the technical American sense, the remainder would vest on the deaths of the three sisters (all lives
in being), subject merely to postponed enjoyment.
255. Even if after-borns shared, the gift would be good if interests vested upon their birth
(within the measuring life of Norman), with enjoyment postponed only until they reached college.
The court did not consider this possible interpretation. See Case 17 infra.
256. E.g., 2 L. SIMmS & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 636. Thus when Tbequeaths personalty "to
the children of A," and A is living and has children at 2's death, the class closes at that time so
that the shares of A's children can be calculated.
257. Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 161, 116 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1960). The court's decision
seemed to overlook the corollary rule that the class will remain open until the time fixed for
distribution. E.g., 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 640, 643. Thus when T bequeaths
personalty "to Xfor life, then to the children of A," and Xand A are living and A has children at
2's death, the class does not close until X's death. That is, because of a presumed intent to benefit
as many children as possible, the class will remain open until the first class member can demand
distribution (in Case 16 when he reaches college). This raises the possibility that Norman's six
minor children might die before reaching college, and he might have an afterbor child who
would reach college more than 21 years after Norman's death.
Furthermore, T's gift of not just the War Bonds but also "their accumulation" to Norman's
heirs may suggest that the testator did not anticipate that vesting would take place at his death. If
the gift vested at his death, the beneficiaries would take the accumulation automatically.
258. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 122, 120 S.E.2d 588 (1961), notedin 64
W. VA. L. REv. 91 (1961).
259. Id. at 124, 120 S.E.2d at 590.
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the grandchildren vested at T's death, subject to open to let in
other grandchildren until the death of the daughters. The
provision directing division at age twenty-five did not post-
pone vesting but merely restrained partition.
In Case 17 the early class closing ploy was not available because the
gift of the remainder was postponed to let in the life estates in T's wife
and daughters; under standard presumptions the class would not close
until the deaths of the life tenants, 260 so the granchildren living at T's
death could not be used as the measuring lives. Nevertheless, the court
upheld the gift, this time on the theory that it was "patent" that T in-
tended that immediately upon the death of his daughters their children
should have the right of possession, although for reasons satisfactory to
him he did not want the land partitioned among his grandchildren un-
til they reached age twenty-five.26 ' The daughters became the measur-
ing lives, with the remainder vesting upon their deaths. Case 17 thus
illustrates the use of certain presumptions to construe interests as vested
rather than as contingent upon survivorship to a possibly remote date
in order to avoid invalidity.262
In sum, Cases 16 and 17 illustrate three constructional techniques
for avoiding perpetuities problems: (1) construing class terms narrowly
to exclude remote class members (Case 16); (2) applying class closing
(maximum membership) rules to exclude remote after-borns (Case 16);
and (3) applying the presumption in favor of early vesting to avoid
implied conditions of survivorship (minimum membership) (Case 17).
Techniques (2) and (3) are the two sides of the class gift coin. Careful
readers no doubt may wonder why neither of these techniques was used
to save the gift in Case 15. Indeed, the opinions in Cases 16 and 17
260. E.g., 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 640.
261. The court did not give reasons for its findings of intention. The standard rule of con-
struction is that a gift "when" a beneficiary reaches a specified age (as in Case 17) is contingent
upon the beneficiary reaching that age. Id § 586. Furthermore, under the now discredited "di-
vide and pay over rule," when the only words of gift are found in a direction "to divide" (as in
Case 17) or "to pay" at a future time, the gift is contingent. Id. § 593. The court did not deal with
these problems. It has been suggested that the explanation for the decision is that there was an
intermediate gift of income to the children, which under standard rules imports vesting. 64 W.
VA. L. REv. 91, 93 (1961); see 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 588. This writer has been
unable to find any gift of intermediate income in the report of Case 17.
262. If vesting had been postponed until the grandchildren reached 25, the gift to them would
have violated the Rule because some after-born grandchildren might not have reached 25 until
more than 21 years after their parent's death.
Somewhat similar findings of vested gifts with postponed enjoyment are made in Fuller v.
Hedgpeth, 239 N.C. 370, 30 S.E.2d 18 (1954), and Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C.
App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397 (1978).
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struggled with the same question,263 and one writer has argued for
validity of the gift in Case 15.264 For present purposes, suffice it to say
that any errors in the class gift perpetuities cases seem not to result
from any misunderstanding of standard perpetuities doctrine but rather
from doubtful application of class gift rules, which must be decided
before one reaches the question of perpetuities. Important class gift
rules to keep in mind in closing the class are the rule of convenience
that a class will close whenever any member of the class can demand
possession and enjoyment of his share,265 and the countervailing pre-
sumption that the donor intends to benefit as many class members as
possible.266 Important rules in determining minimum membership
(survivorship) are the three resolutions in Clobberie's Case:267 (1) that
a legacy "to be paid at" twenty-one is vested with enjoyment post-
poned; (2) that a legacy "at" twenty-one is contingent, that is, subject to
a condition precedent of reaching twenty-one; and (3) that a legacy
"at" twenty-one with "interest" is vested with enjoyment postponed
(the gift of interest importing vesting).268 Also significant on survivor-
ship may be the presumption in favor of early vesting.2 69 The deciding
factor, treated in another section of this article,2 0 may be whether in
determining vesting one may incline toward that construction which
avoids invalidity; Case 16 announced that view.
Given the general proposition that a class gift must stand or fall as
a unit (although various rules of construction for class gifts may ame-
263. According to Case 16, the reason that the devise in Case 15 did not vest in the grandchil-
dren living at the testator's death, closing the class at that time, is that another clause of the will
indicated that the gift included after-borns. Clarke v. Clarke, 253 N.C. 156, 161-62, 116 S.E.2d
449, 453 (1960).
According to Case 17, the reason that the devise in Case 15 did not vest immediately in
grandchildren upon birth, with enjoyment postponed until the youngest reached 28, is that there
was no language vesting the interest upon birth. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 255 N.C.
122, 128-29, 120 S.E.2d 588, 593-94 (1961). Yet there seems to be no such language in Case 17
either, and there was in Case 15 something of a gift of intermediate income, importing vesting.
264. 40 N.C.L. REv. 151 (1961).
265. 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 636, 640.
266. Id. § 636.
267. 86 Eng. Rep. 476 (K.B. 1677).
268. 2 L. SIMmS & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 586, 588.
269. Id. § 573. Just why the law should favor the vesting of estates has been difficult to ex-
plain. See Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting of Estates. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 467 (1965).
North Carolina has some peculiar decisions in the area of survivorship. See, e.g., Lawson v.
Lawson, 267 N.C. 643, 148 S.E.2d 546 (1966), notedin 45 N.C.L. REv. 264 (1966)(implying condi-
tion precedent of survivorship from existence of express condition precedent unrelated to survi-
vorship; case does not distinguish between wholly different conditions precedent). See 2 L. SIMms
& A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 594. On class gifts generally, see Long, Class Gpis in North Carolina,
22 N.C.L. REv. 297 (1944).
270. See section II.B.3.c. supra.
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liorate some hardships of that rule), there are two classic exceptions to
the all-or-nothing rule, one for a class composed of subclasses and one
for per capita gifts.
Case 18.271 T devised property to his wife for life, then
to his three named daughters for life with cross-remainders to
the surviving daughters, then to his grandchildren for life,
"with remainder over to the lawful issue of such grandchild or
grandchildren forever" and "in default of such issue" to char-
ity.272 T was survived by his wife, the three daughters and
one grandchild. No other grandchildren were ever born, and
the one grandchild in being at T's death was the last to die,
survived by his four children (T's great-grandchildren).
Held, the remainder to the great-grandchildren violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities.
In Case 18 it was contended that the gift was to a class of subclasses
(really a number of separate gifts) so that each subclass gift should be
considered separately.273 The court seemed to accept the availability of
the subclass theory in general, but noted that it requires that T verbally
separate the gift into subclasses; here there were no devises "which take
effect at different times upon the respective deaths of the life tenants,"
but only a single gift of the remainder.27 4 The strongest indication of
intention to create subclasses is a distribution per stirpes or by right of
representation, rather than per capita.27 5
Case 18 involved a kind of "vertical" severability, an attempted
separation of valid remainders from other invalid remainders. Another
271. North Carolina Nat'1 Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 203 S.E.2d 657 (1974). The life
estates to the daughters and grandchildren were good, the grandchildren's estates vesting at the
daughters' deaths.
272. Id. at 179, 203 S.E.2d at 658.
273. Id. at 181, 203 S.E.2d at 659. Even accepting the subclass argument, the gift to the chil-
dren of the one grandchild would seem to be remote. That grandchild's parent apparently was
one of T's surviving children. Viewed from the time of T's death, she could have had other
children who might have lived more than 21 years beyond her death and the death of her first
child, postponing the vesting of the ultimate remainder to a remote time. Of course, it turned out
that no other grandchildren were born, but that makes no difference except in a "wait-and-see"
jurisdiction.
274. Id. at 181-82, 203 S.E.2d at 659-60. The gift would have been treated as one to a class of
subclasses had it been to T's wife for life, then to his daughters for life, and upon the death of any
daughter to pay the income on the share from which the daughter had been receiving income to
the daughter's children for life, and upon the death of the daughter's children to distribute the
share to the daughter's grandchildren.
275. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1267. The foundation subclass case is Cattlin v.
Brown, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (Ch. 1853). To Case 18, compare Palmer v. Ketner, 29 N.C. App. 187,
223 S.E.2d 913 (1976) (remainder to heirs of three of testator's sisters "per sterpes [sic] equal
shares share and share alike and not per sterpes [sic]").
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case suggests a "horizontal" severability of valid life estates from inva-
lid remainders.276
Case 19.277 Article 8 of T's will bequeathed personal
property in trust to her son Benjamin for life, and after his
death the income to Benjamin's children equally, "with their
issue standing in the stead of deceased parents on a per stirpes
basis." After the death of Benjamin, any surviving child
"who shall then" have been age thirty or over was to be paid
his "proportionate share" of the trust corpus.27 For Benja-
min's "surviving children"279 who had not reached thirty at
Benjamin's death, as each one reached the age of thirty he
was to be paid his "proportionate share" of the trust. For
children who died before Benjamin or who died after Benja-
min but before reaching thirty, and without leaving issue sur-
viving them,28 ' their "share" of the corpus was to go in equal
parts to Benjamin's surviving children and, "on a per stirpes
basis," to the surviving issue of any deceased child of Benja-
min, this issue "to stand in the stead of the deceased parent as
to said parent's equal share." The shares of the surviving is-
sue of a deceased child were subject to retention in trust; "as
each one of said issue shall reach the age of twenty-five," he
was to receive his share of the remaining corpus.281 Finally,
the will stated that Benjamin had three children, but that any
additional children born to him "shall share equally with
these three." Apparently no other children had been born to
Benjamin; one of his daughters had a minor child. The trial
court held that the Article 8 trust violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities; on appeal it was contended that the trust was
good or, alternatively, that even if the limitations to the great-
grandchildren of T were remote, those limitations were sever-
276. See generally Comment, Separability and the Rule,4gainst Perpetuities, 77 DICK. L. REv.
277 (1973).
277. Harrison v. People Bank & Trust Co., 8 N.C. App. 475, 174 S.E.2d 867 (1970).
278. Id. at 478, 174 S.E.2d at 569.
279. It seemed to be taken for granted that "surviving" meant surviving Benjamin, not surviv-
ing 7'. In line with the presumption for early vesting, and in order to benefit as many class mem-
bers as possible, "surviving" is sometimes read as surviving the testator rather than surviving the
life tenant. 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 577 (citing North Carolina cases to the
contrary).
280. The testamentary trust seemed to have a gap for the situation in which a child of Benja-
min died before Benjamin or died before reaching 30, leaving issue. A gift to the child's issue
might be implied. Id. § 842 (citing North Carolina cases in accord).
281. Harrison v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 8 N.C. App. 475, 478, 174 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1970).
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able (horizontal severability) from the limitations to T's
grandchildren. Held, affirmed. The court did not reach the
severability argument because it regarded the limitation to
T's unborn grandchildren, or to those grandchildren who had
not attained the age of thirty by T's death, as invalid. Even if
all of Benjamin's living children had attained thirty at T's
death, the limitation over to children born after T's death
who attained age thirty was remote.282
Thus, Case 19 leaves open the horizontal severability question in North
Carolina; this article will return to that question at the end of this sec-
tion. Case 19 also reinforces the conclusion that North Carolina fol-
lows the all-or-nothing rule because apparently the entire trust was
voided. It seems to jeopardize, however, the Case 18 implication that
North Carolina will recognize, in an appropriate case, the class of sub-
classes exception, because the gift to Benjamin's children seemed ripe
for a severed shares approach.283 Finally, it raises a further question of
the effect on class gifts of a remote divesting condition.284
In sum, while the possibility of a class of subclasses or a severed
share exception is mentioned in some cases, no case has actually found
the exception to apply, and one (Case 19) seemed to overlook it.285 The
282. Apparently, the court struck down the entire Article 8, including the shares of Benjamin's
three children living at the death of T.
283. The class of Benjamin's children (T's grandchildren) would not be closed at T's death
because there was an intervening life estate in Benjamin and T expressly provided that all his
children were to share, although such provisions sometimes are twisted to mean less than they say.
(The phrase "if any additional child or children shall be born to him" could be read as meaning
"shall be born to him after the making of this will but before my death." See 2 L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, supra note 5, § 636.) However, all of Benjamin's children would be ascertained at his
death. The three living at T's death would take, if at all, within their own lives. The trust seems
to create separate gifts for each child of Benjamin, because it constantly refers to "the share" of
each child and repeatedly uses a per stirpetal plan of distribution. If the gift indeed is one to
subclasses (each child of Benjamin), even the gifts to Benjamin's children unborn at T's death
seemed good: the gift of aliquot shares of income to each child imports vesting. Although each
unborn child's share is subject to divestiture upon death before reaching 30, that is a remote
condition subsequent; the usual rule is that a vested gift subject to a remote condition subsequent
ripens into an indefeasibly vested gift when the cancerous remote condition subsequent is excised.
3 id. § 1263.
284. See text accompanying notes 293 & 294 infra.
285. Both horizontal and vertical severability were implicit in McPherson v. First & Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954), in which the settlor created an irrevocable inter
vivos trust to pay the income to his children for life, then to his grandchildren for life, and at the
death of the last living grandchild, remainder to the grandchildren's heirs per stirpes. At the
creation of the trust the settlor had four children, no others were born, and the trial court found
that it was physically impossible for him to have additional children.
The trial court held that the life estate to the grandchildren (apparently) and the remainder to
the grandchildren's heirs were remote, but that the life estates to the children were valid and
severable. On the face of it, this decision is sound: the settlor's children necessarily would be born
within the settlor's lifetime (vesting their life estates), but children could have been born to the
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status of the doctrine in this state is therefore uncertain.
The other classic exception to the all-or-nothing rule is for per cap-
ita gifts. This situation seems not to have arisen in North Carolina, but
the following case will illustrate it.
Case 20.286 T bequeathed $1,000 "to each child of A
who shall attain the age of thirty." At T's death A had one
child, B, age one, and later another child, C, was born. Both
B and C attained age thirty. Held, the gift to B was good and
the gift to C was bad. The gifts to B and C were treated sepa-
rately, and B (a life in being) would take, if at all, within his
own life.
Finally, class gifts subject to remote conditions precedent should
be distinguished from cases in which the class is bound to be ascer-
tained within the period of the Rule but is subject to a divesting clause
in favor of a group that may not be ascertained within the period of the
Rule.2" 7 For example:
Case 21.288 The settlor conveyed realty in trust to her
daughter-in-law for life, then for the children of her son until
the youngest child "shall arrive at" the age of twenty-one, and
upon arrival of the youngest child at twenty-one, to the chil-
dren in fee; and in the event of the death of any child without
issue,289 "his share shall vest in the" surviving children; and in
settlor after creation of the irrevocable trust, remotely postponing the vesting of the life estates in
the grandchildren. Thus, the remainder clearly was remote. On severability, the trust referred to
the settlor's children as the "primary beneficiaries," and there were other indications of his intent
primarily to benefit them, so severability seemed appropriate.
The supreme court affirmed on remoteness but reversed on severability. The court held that
the trial court's award of the trust to the four children of the settlor was to the detriment of
possible unborn children of the settlor (even though he was incapable of further procreation!),
whose interests were not represented by a guardian ad litem or through the doctrine of virtual
representation (the living children being adverse). The case was remanded for consideration of
the rights of the settlor's unborn children.
Neither opinion recognized a latent class of subclasses argument, which would have saved the
life estates to the grandchildren (but not the remainder over). The settlor's entire plan was per
stirpes, with references to the "aliquot part" of each child and gifts to the grandchildren only of
the "aliquot part" of each child and gifts to the grandchildren only of the "aliquot part of his or
her parent." Thus each child of the settlor (and the child's descendants) was a separate subclass,
and the life estates over on the death of the four children in existence when the trust was made
should have been good. (Of course, this still would leave open the question of the effect of inva-
lidity of the remainders to the grandchildren's heirs).
286. The leading case is Storrs v. Benbow, 43 Eng. Rep. 153 (Ch. 1853). See, e.g., 3 L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1266.
287. 3 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1269; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 782[3].
288. Springs v. Hopkins, 171 N.C. 486, 88 S.E. 774 (1916).
289. Id. at 487-88, 88 S.E. at 775. The trust did not expressly provide for the case of death of a
child with issue.
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the event of the death of all of the children without issue in
the lifetime of the son, to the son for life, then to certain re-
maindermen.29 ° Children were born to the son after the de-
livery of the deed. 291 Held, the children took vested estates
upon the arrival of the youngest child at twenty-one, subject
to divestiture upon death without issue.292
Clearly the gift to the son's children is good because they all must reach
twenty-one within twenty-one years after the son's death. Not so clear
is the validity of the gifts over upon death of a child without issue. The
court apparently regarded the gifts over as valid, but they would seem
remote: an after-born child could die without issue more than twenty-
one years after the son. If the gift over is remote, it should not affect
the validity of the gift to the son's children, which class was fixed within
the period of the Rule. This concept was latent in Cases 15 and 19.
Case 15 noted, but did not reach, the issue, because the court held the
prior gift to the class remote,293 and Case 19 struck the gift to the class
without noting the condition subsequent point.294 Thus, the status of
class gifts subject to remote divesting conditions is uncertain in North
Carolina.
The North Carolina cases on class gifts may be summarized as
follows: (1) by implication they recognize the all-or-nothing rule that a
class gift must stand or fall as a unit for perpetuities cases; (2) they
apply class closing rules somewhat erratically in the perpetuities cases;
(3) they have not applied the wait-and-see approach despite good op-
portunities to do so;295 (4) they suggest the existence of a class of sub-
classes exception to the all-or-nothing rule (but lack a square holding
that it exists); (5) they have not addressed the per capita gift exception;
and (6) they have not dealt adequately with class gifts subject to re-
mote divesting clauses.
On the basic class gift rule and its exceptions, Leach has persua-
sively shown that the rule of Leake v. Robinson is unsound and incon-
290. Id. The trust did not expressly provide for the case of death of all the children without
issue after the son's death.
291. Id. at 490, 88 S.E. at 775. The settlor apparently retained a power to revoke the trust, so
the perpetuities clock should not have begun to run until the death of the settlor.
292. See Id. at 492, 88 S.E. at 777.
293. Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 405, 113 S.E.2d 899, 904 (1960). The point is discussed in
40 N.C.L. REv. 151, 156 (1961).
294. Harrison v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 8 N.C. App. 475, 174 S.E.2d 867 (1970).
295. See McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat'l Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954); North
Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 203 S.E.2d 657 (1974).
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sistent with its recognized exceptions.296 It is, in effect, an automatic
infectious invalidity, in contrast to the application of the Rule in non-
class gift contexts, wherein the effect of partial invalidity on other valid
interests is treated as a matter of construction. Under usual perpetu-
ities doctrines, in contrast to the Leake v. Robinson rule, when a vested
interest is subject to divestment upon a remote contingency, the divest-
ing gift is held invalid and the vested gift becomes indefeasible.297
Leach contends that the Leake v. Robinson situation presents a problem
of separability-that is, a question of construction regarding the effect
of partial invalidity.
Actually, two threads of argument are implicit in the usual criti-
cisms of the rule of Leake v. Robinson, one having to do with logical
inconsistency and the other with intention. The first thread treats the
all-or-nothing rule and its standard exceptions (subclasses and per cap-
ita gifts) as more or less automatic rules and argues that there is no
sufficient logical difference between the standard case and its excep-
tions; the difference in result therefore is not justified. This argument
leaves open the question of which result (automatic invalidity of the
entire class gift or separation of the valid gifts from the invalid) should
control in all cases; usually the assumed premise is that separation of
the valid and invalid gifts is preferable.
The second thread examines the rule from the standpoint of rules
of construction aiming for likely intention. Here it is contended that
the Leake v. Robinson rule leads to automatic infectious invalidity, in
contrast to nonclass gift perpetuities cases in which the effect of invalid-
ity of one interest on other valid interests is treated as a matter of con-
struction, to be examined on a case-by-case basis to ascertain likely
intention. Thus, for example, a remote condition subsequent in an in-
dividual gift usually leaves the basic gift good, but in the Leake v.
Robinson situation it invalidates the entire class gift.298
The question therefore boils down to this: Are the class gift rules to
be inflexible categories of good and bad, disregarding the creator's in-
tention, or are they to abandon set categories in favor of a de novo
296. Leach, The RuIe Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1938).
297. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 405, 113 S.E.2d 899, 904 (1960).
298. The horizontal severability case, Case 19, illustrates the confusion of these two theories.
Usually it is assumed that an invalid remainder over leaves the otherwise valid life estate good.
No label is put on the case-it is just assumed that the testator would have preferred to leave the
life estate untouched by invalidity of the remainder. Thus, the matter is treated as one of inten-
tion. But if the case is argued differently, under a label of "horizontal severability," the court may
incline toward invalidity of the life estate on an all-or-nothing theory unless it is convinced that
the testator verbally separated the gifts of life estate and remainder.
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search for the creator's intention in each case? Certainly there is much
to be said for the latter approach; even if the inflexible rule were the
generally preferable one of separating the good gifts from the bad (in
contrast to the harsh current rule of Leake v. Robinson), the creator's
intention would sometimes be frustrated.2 99 Furthermore, if the case is
in court anyway, why not go ahead and try best to approximate the
creator's plan? By hypothesis, the question of effect of invalidity will
not be reached until one first finds a violation of the Rule; to decide the
effect of invalidity question would not create any new litigation but
would only add an issue to an already disputed case, and that superad-
ded issue is really one that was implicit (though not always recognized)
from the start.3°
IV. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
Powers of appointment are immensely useful devices that enable
the property owner to control the general devolution of his property
while granting a younger generation the power to make specific redis-
tributions to reflect changes in the family, the property, or the econ-
omy. 30' In addition to achieving flexibility, a special power may be
299. Leach puts the following case:
Case 45. T bequeaths the residue of his estate in trust to pay the income to A for life,
then to pay the income to the children of A for their lives and upon the death of any
child of A to pay the principal upon which such child was receiving the income to the
issue of such child. A has two children: Clwho was born before the death of T, and C
who was born after the death of T. Plainly the life estates to both C1 and C2 are valid.
Equally plainly the remainder to the issue of C2 is invalid. The question concerns the
remainder to the issue of C1. The share which is to be divided between them will be
known at the death of A, since thereafter no children of A can be born; the fraction
which each of the issue of C I is to take in that share will be known at the death of C,;
therefore, the exact amount to be taken by each of the issue of C, will be known within
the life of the survivor of A and C both of whom were in being at T's death. The gift to
the issue of C1 is, of itself, valid. The fact that the contemporaneous gift to the issue of
C2 fails is immaterial.
Cases can readily be imagined in which the testator's intention would be more
closely approximated by voiding all of the remainders after the life estates to A's chil-
dren than by validating a portion of [those] remainders .... Suppose, for example, that
in Case 45 A is the testator's only child. If the remainder to the issue of C1 is held valid,
it seems likely that such issue will get, directly or indirectly, three-fourths of testator's
estate, whereas the issue of C2 will get one-fourth. Total invalidity of the ultimate re-
mainders would tend to cause a more even distribution among A's grandchildren. How-
ever, the reported opinions are curiously lacking in any consideration of this possibility.
6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.29 (footnotes omitted).
300. Arguably litigation of this issue would only add an uncertainty to cases in which the
parties agree, without litigation, that the Rule is violated. Nevertheless, because the supposed
hard and fast rule of Leake and its standard exceptions are shot through with ambiguities and
doubtful applications, rendering them unpredictable, it does not seem that much uncertainty
would be added to the brew by looking for likely intention.
301. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note, §§ 318-369, at 1808-09 (1940).
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employed to give a beneficiary substantial property benefits without ac-
companying tax detriments.30 2 A general power of appointment, most
often exercisable by will only, is often given to a surviving spouse in
conjunction with a life estate to qualify the property subject to the
power for the federal estate tax marital deduction, while giving the
spouse minimal control over the property. °3 There are not many
North Carolina cases applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to powers
of appointment, probably because the use of powers is a relatively new
development, spurred by the estate tax savings associated with certain
plans utilizing powers. Nevertheless, the few cases are classics.
Case 22 .30  T's will provided,
Item 7. My will is that all the rest of my property of every
description, and my money, be kept by my executor, whomso-
ever I may appoint; it shall be kept as a fund. Should any of my
children or grandchildren come to suffering, in any other way,
save by idleness, drunkenness, or anything of the kind, so as to
become an object of charity, I want the said executor to give a
part of this to such child or grandchild.305
Held, whether the administration of the fund by the exec-
302. A donee-beneficiary may be given the following benefits in a trust without causing the
donee to be treated as owner of the trust property for federal estate tax purposes:
(1) O's will transfers the legal title to the property to A as trustee. As trustee A has
the power of management. He can decide when to sell and in what to reinvest. If the
powers are broadly drafted, A can manage the property almost as if he owned it himself.
(2) O's will gives to A, not as trustee but as a benefciary, the following rights and
powers:
(a) the right to receive all the income;
(b) a special power of appointment exercisable by deed to appoint the trust property
to anyohe A pleases except himself, his creditors, his estate, and the creditors of
his estate;
(c) a power to consume the trust property measured "by an ascertainable standard
relating to the health, education, support or maintenance" of A;
(d) a power to withdraw each year $5,000 or five percent of the corpus, whichever is
greater,
(e) a special power of appointment exercisable by will to appoint the trust property
to anyone A pleases except himself, his creditors, his estate, and the creditors of
his estate.
(3) If 0 desires to make sure that .4 will be able to use the entire property if he
needs it, 0 can appoint an independent cotrustee and give this cotrustee the power to
pay A the entire principal or to terminate the trust.
None of the above powers given A, individually or collectively, causes A to be
treated as owner of the trust fund under the federal estate tax.
J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 117, at 828 (footnotes omitted); see Lowndes, Estate
Planning and Powers of Appointment, 30 N.C.L. REv. 225 (1952).
303. I.R.C. § 2056.
304. The paradigm for Case 22 is Moore v. Moore, 59 N.C. (6 Jones Eq.) 132 (1860)(Case 8 in
section II.B. supra).
305. Id. at 132.
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utor is deemed a power or trust in him, the bequest was void
because the fund might have been needed for grandchildren
more than twenty-one years after the death of T's children.
Two basic questions are possible in powers cases: (1) Is the power itself
good? (2) Assuming the power is good, are the interests created by any
exercise of the power good? Case 22 illustrates the first question-va-
lidity of the power itself. The classic view is that special powers of
appointment (that is, those exercisable in favor of some specified group
not including the donee or his estate or the creditors of either 3 6) are
bad if they are capable of being exercised beyond the period of the rule.
The clock starts when the donor creates the power.30 7 The underlying
theory is that, the power being confined to a limited group specified by
the donor, his tying up of the property begins the moment the power is
created. 30 8 The power is remote if it is capable of being exercised be-
yond the period, because exercise of a power is analogous to a shifting
executory interest, and executory interests are remote if they are not
certain to vest in possession within the period of the Rule. 309 The exec-
utor's power in Case 22 amounted in substance to a special power of
appointment-to give a part of the fund to a member of a limited
group specified by T (his children or grandchildren). It was void be-
cause it was capable of being exercised for the benefit of a grandchild
more than twenty-one years after the death of T's children. The court
struck down the entire gift, not just the remote gift to grandchildren.310
Two handy theories are sometimes available to save the gift, or
part of it, in situations like Case 22. If the power is personal to the
donee, the gift is good. If, for example, the power in Case 22 was exer-
cisable only by the executor appointed by T, and not by any successor
executor, the power would perforce be exercised, if at all, within the life
of the original executor: he would be the life in being.31 I This question
was not addressed in Case 22. A second theory, resulting in partial
validity of the gift, would treat the executor's power as comprising a
discrete series of powers exercisable on a periodic basis. If, for exam-
ple, the powers were exercisable annually, only the annual powers ca-
306. See generally 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 875.
307. 3 id. § 1273.
308. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 390, Comment a; § 392, Comment a (1944).
309. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 1236, 1273.
310. As to the effect of remoteness of one interest on another nonremote interest, see section
II.B.2.b. spra.
311. 3 L. SiMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1277; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 390, Com-
ment c (1944).
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pable of being exercised more than twenty-one years after the deaths of
all T's children would be remote.312
The approach to validity of general powers (those exercisable in
favor of anyone including the donee, his estate or the creditors of
either)3 13 depends upon whether the general power is exercisable by
deed (inter vivos) or by will (testamentary). The test for general powers
exercisable by deed is whether the power must be acquired, if at all,
within the period of the Rule; if so, the gift is good. The reason for this
rule is that a general power by deed, once acquired, is the equivalent of
ownership since the donee could appoint to himself.3 14  Thus, the
power is treated like most other interests for perpetuities purposes.
The most difficult case is the general testamentary power. In one
sense, it is like a general power exercisable by deed: at the moment of
death, the donee may appoint to his estate and freely dispose of the
property. Often the donee also has a life estate in the property, and
having a life estate plus the power to dispose of the property by will, he
312. 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.8, at 32-33.
313. The Internal Revenue Code has introduced a new uncertainty into the determination of
validity of powers. The common law divided powers into two classes, general and special. Gen-
eral powers were those exercisable in favor of anybody, including the donee or his estate or the
creditors of either. Special powers were those exercisable "only in favor of persons, not including
the donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 320(2)(a) (1940). The Internal Revenue Code defines a special power as any power not exercisa-
ble in favor of the donee, his estate or the creditors of either. See I.R.C. § 2041. Thus, for federal
estate tax purposes, a power to appoint to any person except the donee, his estate, or the creditors
of either would be a special power.' For property law purposes, the power would not qualify as a
special power, because it is not confined to a specific group not unreasonably large. The Restate-
ment labels this kind of power a "hybrid power," RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 320, Comment a
(1940); it also goes by trade names such as "world-wide special power."
For perpetuities purposes, should a hybrid power be treated as a general power or a special
power? There is little authority on the point. See 5 R. POWEL, supra note 22, 787; McCoid, The
Non-General Power of.4ppointment, 7 VAND. L. REv. 53, 62-67 (1953). Powell would treat the
power as a special one for perpetuities purposes, since the donee has substantially less than the full
equivalent of ownership. On the other hand, the donor of a hybrid power would probably have
given the donee a general power, but for adverse federal estate consequences in the donee's estate;
in a sense the donor is telling the donee to make up his own mind regarding appointees, free of
any group specifications imposed by the donor, so the power could well be treated as general.
Further, the hybrid power may ultimately prove to be a general power for federal estate tax pur-
poses. In State Street Trust Co. v. Kissel, 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E.2d 25 (1939), the donee was given
a general power to appoint by will, provided that no part of the fund was to be liable for the
donee's debts. The donee exercised the power (invoking the usual rule that creditors of the donee
of a general power may reach the appointive assets if the power is exercised), and the court held
the restriction on creditors to be void, so the power was general, exercised, and subject to creditors'
claims. Kissel may some day be relied upon to hold the restriction as to creditors in a hybrid
power to be ineffective, making the power a general one for federal estate tax purposes. At the
least, the Kissel risk suggests caution in the use of hybrid powers; rare is the case in which the
draftsman cannot specify an adequate group of permissible appointees, not unreasonably large,
making the power clearly a special one.
314. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1273.
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resembles an owner.31 5 On the other hand, the general testamentary
power is like a special power in that the holder cannot benefit himself
during his lifetime, and if he exercises the power by will, it is likely that
the appointment will be in favor of his family.316 This latter conception
has controlled; general testamentary powers are treated like special
powers and are void if capable of being exercised beyond the period of
the Rule.3 7
Case 23. T bequeathed property in trust for A for life,
then for the children of A for their lives (A having no children
at T's death) as follows:
(a) income to A's first child for life;
(b) income to A's second child for life, as the trustee de-
termines is needed for the child's support, education,
maintenance and welfare;
(c) income to A's third child for life, as the trustee may
in his discretion determine.
The trustee was also given a power to sell the trust prop-
erty and reinvest the proceeds of sale. There are no North
Carolina cases in which the issues raised by this hypothetical
have been noticed. The gift of income to A's first child and
the power of sale in the trustee should be good. There is little
authority on the gift of income according to a standard to the
second child. The gift of discretionary income to the third
child is bad.
This case involves a trust that may last beyond the period of the Rule,
since A's children might outlive him by more than twenty-one years.
The duration of the trust does not necessarily invalidate it,318 but the
powers of the trustee may be too remote. The discretionary power to
pay income to a child of A may amount to a special power of appoint-
ment, which is remote if it is capable of being exercised beyond the
period of the Rule. Clearly the gift of income to the first child is good;
it vests within A's lifetime and is not dependent on the trustee's discre-
tion; no power is involved. Equally clearly, the gift of discretionary
income to the third child is bad; it does amount to a special power and
can be exercised too remotely3 19 The gift of discretionary income
315. Id. § 1275.
316. Id.
317. Id. § 1273.
318. See section V. infra.
319. See text accompanying notes 306-09 supra. The question was latent but went unnoticed
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to the second child according to an ascertainable standard is a
provocative, unresolved case. 2° On the one hand, since the standard is
ascertainable, there appears to be no discretionary power in the trustee.
On the other hand, even if the exercise of the trustee's discretion is not
regarded as a power, the amount of the income is dependent on future
events that may be remote-the needs of the second child for support.
But these needs seem no more contingent than the amount of the in-
come to be earned in the future for the first child.
The power to sell in the trustee should be good,32' but sometimes
is held bad. 22 It facilitates the free circulation of property, and to
strike down administrative powers of a trustee that might last beyond
the period of the Rule would strip the trustee of all powers save those
granted by statute or court of equity.
Case 24.323 By his will, T left property in trust for his
son, William, and provided that "William, shall have the right
to dispose of the entire estate. . by will. . . .Should my
son die intestate . . . then such estate shall go to [William's
surviving] child or children. 324 William's will gave "[a]ll the
rest and residue of my estate. . . including [the property sub-
ject to the power]" in trust for his children.325 Upon each
child's reaching age twenty-five, one-half of the child's trust
was to be distributed in fee to the child, and the remaining
one-half was to be held in trust for the benefit of the child for
life, with the right to dispose of the remaining one-half share
by will to the child's spouse, descendants or charity, and in
default of appointment to the child's issue, or if none, to Wil-
liam's surviving issue. William was survived by two children,
ages thirteen and ten. Held, the gift of the remaining one-half
to William's children for life with power to appoint violated
the Rule, and the children took that share free of trust under
in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 142 S.E.2d 182 (1965); Wing v. Wacho-
via Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397, cert denied, 295 N.C. 95, 244 S.E.2d 263
(1978).
320. See Seaver v. Fitzgerald, 141 Mass. 401, 6 N.E. 73 (1886); T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL,
supra note 22,205 n.66. The issue was latent but unrecognized in Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101,
52 S.E.2d 229 (1949).
321. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1277.
322. Leach, supra note 29, at 664.
323. The paradigm for Case 24 is American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458,46 S.E.2d
104 (1948)(Case 9 in section II.B. supra).
324. Id. at 459-60, 46 S.E.2d at 105.
325. Id. at 460, 46 S.E.2d at 106.
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the gift in default in T's will.32 6
Case 24, is a veritable teacher's garden (or weed patch, depending on
one's point of view) of perpetuities and powers issues, many of which
went unnoticed by the court. Perhaps most significantly, the case in-
volves the validity of interests created by exercise of powers of appoint-
ment. The court held, with respect to the power in William, that the
Rule related back to the time the power was created, not to the date of
its exercise. This is the standard view for special powers-the appoint-
ment is read back into the creating instrument, and the period is com-
puted from creation of the power.327 The rationale is that, the power
being special, the donor has controlled the disposition and the donee is
in effect merely his agent.328 For general powers by deed, the approach
is different. The period is computed from the date of exercise of the
power,329 since the donee is in substance the owner of the property sub-
ject to the power.330 Of course, William's power was neither special
nor general by deed; it was a general testamentary power. The argu-
ments over whether to measure validity of interests created by exercise
of a general testamentary power by the special power rule or the gen-
eral power by deed rule are similar to those discussed in connection
with determining validity of the power itself. Case 24 follows the ma-
jority view in treating the general testamentary power like a special
power for purposes of determining validity of appointed interests, just
as most cases treat the general testamentary power like a special power
for purposes of determining the validity of the power itself.33' This is
one significant aspect of the case.
Now, if the interests appointed by William are read back into T's
will, were they remote? The disposition of the first half of T's estate to
William's children at age twenty-five was not challenged.332 Why?
326. Id. at 464, 46 S.E.2d at 108.
327. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1274.
328. Id. White v. White, 189 N.C. 236, 126 S.E. 612 (1925), although not a perpetuities case,
states that the appointee under a general testamentary power takes from the donor, not the donee.
329. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1274.
330. Id.
33 I. Id. § 1275. The perpetuities problems involved in the exercise of a general testamentary
power may arise even when the donee of the power believes he has not exercised it. Section 31-43
provides that a general gift by will operates as an execution of any powers of appointment the
testator may have, unless a contrary intention appears in the will. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43
(1976). The section applies only to general powers, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 267
N.C. 173, 148 S.E.2d 41 (1966), but apparently extends to general testamentary powers as well as
inter vivos ones. Perpetuities problems would appear to be fairly likely when a testamentary
power is exercised unknowingly. For general powers by deed, perpetuities problems are unlikely
because the clock does not start running until the death of the donee.
332. American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 462, 46 S.E.2d 104, 107 (1948).
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Apparently the bequest was contingent upon the childrens' attaining
age twenty-five,333 and William could have had more children after "s
death, who might not have reached twenty-five, if at all, within twenty-
one years after William's death; thus, the contingent interest looks re-
mote. The reason for validity must have been the "second-look doc-
trine," the doctrine that in determining the validity of interests created
by exercise of a power of appointment, one may take into account facts
existing at the time the power is exercised, even though the period runs
from creation of the power.334 The theory behind the doctrine is that
since one has to wait until the power is exercised to determine validity
of the appointed interests, one ought to be allowed to take into account
facts known at that time.335 In Case 24, a second look at the time of
William's death when the power was exercised reveals that William's
children were thirteen and ten years old; they would therefore attain
age twenty-five, if at all, within twelve and fifteen years, respectively, of
William's death, well within twenty-one years after some life in being
(William).336 Although the second look doctrine is not discussed, Case
24 is the best and only indication that the doctrine is followed in North
Carolina.
In passing it might be noted that a significant recent issue not
raised by any North Carolina cases is whether the second look doctrine
may be applied in determining the validity of gifts in default following
special powers or general testamentary powers. The sparse authority
indicates that the doctrine does apply to these gifts in default,337 the
rationale being that the donee's refusal to exercise his power amounts,
in effect, to an appointment to the takers in default, thus invoking the
second look.338 For gifts in default following general powers to appoint
333. The will provided:
The part or parts of this estate held for the benefit of any issue, per stirpes .... shall
upon the beneficiary of his or her trust reaching the age of 25 be divided into two
parts. . . . In the event that any of my issue shall die before reaching the age of 25 or
intestate after reaching such age ....
Id. at 460-61, 46 S.E.2d at 106. The court did not discuss why the bequest was contingent.
334. Leach, Perpeuities.: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973, 992 (1965).
335. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 392, Comment a (1944); 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra
note 5, § 1274.
336. Even if William's children had been less than four years old at his death, the gift would
have been good if his two children had been born before T's death (actually they were not). The
children themselves would then have been lives in being at the creation of the interest and would
have attained age 25, if at all, within their own lives.
337. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1276.
338. Id. Notwithstanding that the traditional conception of a gift in default to an unascer-
tained person is that the gift is immediately vested subject to divestiture upon later exercise of the
power by the donee. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 276 (1940).
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by deed, the doctrine is not necessary. The validity of the gift is mea-
sured from the date of nonexercise of the power (usually the donee's
death)339 since the property was not tied up in the donee's lifetime (the
donee having a general power).340 In effect, the nonexercise is an ap-
pointment to the takers in default, and the clock starts to run on general
powers by deed at the date of exercise.341
In addition to indicating that the validity of interests created by
exercise of a general testamentary power is measured from the date of
creation of the power, but with the help of a second look when needed,
Case 24 involves the validity of a power itself. In this respect it is
analogous to Case 22. The question is whether the special power of
appointment over the remaining one-half of the trust fund given to
William's children is remote. It is. Since the special power was created
by exercise of William's general testamentary power, William's ap-
pointment has to be read back into T's will. Thus treated, it gives a
special power to William's children, persons unborn at T's death, and
is void.342 In effect it is a special power created by T, capable of being
exercised beyond the period of perpetuities.
The special power in Case 24 was held remote, but not for the
reason just discussed. Rather, the court struck the entire gift of the
remaining one-half of the fund, including the life estate, the special
power, and the gift in default, on the theory that William had created a
trust of the remaining one-half capable of lasting beyond the period of
the Rule, regardless of when vesting must occur. The question whether
the Rule relates to the duration of trusts as well as to remoteness of
vesting is discussed in section V. For present purposes, suffice it to say
that the court was correct in concluding that the power was bad, al-
though for a reason not accepted by most courts.
Case 24 raises at least four other powers issues, none of them dis-
cussed by the court.343 Because these issues often accompany perpetu-
ities cases, and because of the current importance of powers to
draftsmen, they will be discussed here. These issues involve: creation
of further trusts, powers, and future interests; capture; marshalling; and
the reach of the gift in default. First, William exercised his power not
by appointing absolute interests but by creating a further trust, a life
339. 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1252.
340. Id. §§ 1251, 1274.
341. See text accompanying note 314 supra.
342. Leach, supra note 29, at 652.
343. One may only speculate on the reasons for inattention to these issues. It may have been a
failure of advocacy by counsel.
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estate and remainder, and a special power. May the donee of a power
create further trusts, powers and future interests? The answer may de-
pend on the nature of the power. 3" In Case 24, since the power was
general (although testamentary), the donee could have appointed to his
own estate for all purposes, so William's execution was within the
scope of the power. The conception of the power as property controls
here; for special powers the scope of the donee's execution is sometimes
more limited.3
45
Second, did William make an implied appointment of the remain-
ing one-half of the fund to his own estate, that is, did he "capture" the
property for his own estate? Case 24 held that, William's appointment
being a violation of the Rule, the property passed pursuant to the gift in
default. It was certainly open to argument, however, that William in
effect said, "I make an express appointment as here indicated, but
whether that is valid or not, I appoint the property to my own es-
tate. 346 Certainly two of the classic capture factors, either of which
usually is sufficient to show such an intention, were present. William
"blended" the appointive assets with his own property; he disposed of
all owned and appointed property as a unit, making no distinction be-
tween the sources. 347 Further, the appointment was made in trust; in
effect he essayed a two-step transaction: a valid appointment of the le-
gal title in trust and an invalid appointment of the equitable title out,
creating a resulting trust in favor of his own estate.348 Although this
trust factor is sometimes criticized as irrelevant to capture, usually it is
persuasive.349 Note, too, that William may have regarded himself as
the owner of the appointive assets, since he had a life estate plus a
general power of appointment over them. In sum, the court failed to
344. 2 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 976-977.
345. Id. Leach and Logan suggest the following clause:
In the exercise of any power of appointment created by this will, unless the contrary is
stated, the donee of such power may appoint life estates to one or more objects of the
power with remainders to others, appoint to grandchildren or more remote issue even
though the parents of such appointees are living, impose lawful conditions upon any
appointment provided no one other than an object of the power is benefited thereby,
impose lawful spendthrift restrictions upon any appointment, make appointments out-
right to an object or in trust for the object, create in any object a general power of
appointment or a special power to appoint among objects of the original power, appoint
by a will executed before my death. These powers of the donee of a power of appoint-
ment are in addition to, and not in restriction of, power he would otherwise have.
W.B. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 18, at 976.
346. 2 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 974. The capture doctrine is limited to general
powers. If the power were special, by definition the donee could not appoint to his estate.
347. Id. at 433.
348. Id. at 432.
349. Id. at 432-33.
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notice strong indications of an intent to make an implied appointment
to William's estate.
The reader may object, however, that capture would be nonsensi-
cal, since it would bring the property into William's estate, only to vio-
late the Rule again. Not so. The result of capture likely would be that
the appointive assets would pass as intestate property to William's heirs
(his two children) under the statute of descent. As a third choice, the
court might have applied the doctrine of marshalling to save William's
entire plan. Marshalling simply refers to the allocation of owned and
appointed property to the various provisions of the will so that maxi-
mum effectiveness is given to the testator's plan (which he must have
intended).350 In Case 24, the appointive assets could have been allo-
cated to satisfy the first half of the gift; there would be no perpetuities
violation because the gift would vest, if at all, within fifteen years of
William's death. William's own assets could have been allocated to the
remaining half of the gift; there would be no perpetuities violation
(whether remote vesting or trust duration) because the clock would not
start running until William's death when his children perforce were
lives in being. Of course, one cannot know the exact result of marshal-
ling without knowing the values of the respective funds, and the opin-
ion states no sums. Nevertheless, the court overlooked a useful device
for carrying out William's intention.
Finally, however, it might be objected that the capture-marshal-
ling line of argument is moot, because the donor, T, provided for a gift
in default in the event of an invalid appointment by William. There
are two answers to this objection. First, capture is a question of the
donee's intention, not the donor's; it is unlikely that the intention to
capture would be affected by the presence or absence of a gift in de-
fault.3 5 ' Second, the donor's gift in default was made upon the condi-
tion, "Should my son die intestate." William did not die intestate. His
will was properly executed and attested, notwithstanding a particular
disposition in it violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The court rea-
soned, however, that since William's appointment of the remaining half
violated the Rule, he died intestate with respect to the fund. This argu-
ment assumes the conclusion that there was no capture because, if there
were capture, William made a testamentary appointment to his own
estate. And, of course, William did die at least partially testate.
Whatever the merits of the court's argument, the drafting moral is
350. 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.8, at 32.
351. 2 L. SlMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 974, at 434.
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clear: the gift in default should anticipate possible violation of the Rule
by the donee and clearly bring the property under the gift in default, if
the donor so desires.352 The result of passing the property under T's
gift in default was not bad; the estate went to William's children, al-
though free of trust. Nevertheless, by a capture-marshalling rationale,
the court might have fully accomplished William's plan.353
To summarize, the small amount of precedent for powers in North
Carolina indicates that special powers are remote if they are capable of
being exercised beyond the period of the Rule (with the clock starting
at the creation of the power). Interests created by exercise of special
powers are judged from the creation of the power, although the second
look doctrine allows one to take into account facts existing at the time
of exercise. General testamentary powers are treated like special
powers.
V. THE DURATION OF TRUSTS
The gospel according to Gray ordains that the Rule Against Per-
petuities is a rule against remoteness of vesting; it is not a rule againstGr 354
interests that last too long. Thus, according to Gray, a perpetual
trust to pay the income to A and his heirs does not violate the Rule.355
An occasional heresy is heard, however, which Gray ascribes to a
failure to differentiate the rule against remoteness (perpetuities) from
the rules disallowing restraints on alienation. Both have the "same ulti-
mate end [forwarding the circulation of property], but they serve that
end by different means. 356 Some of the heresy is proclaimed in fairly
352. See also In re Price's Trust, 4 Misc. 2d 1026, 156 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1956); 5 ALP,
supra note 22, § 23.61; 22 S. CAL. L. REv. 270, 276 (1949). The Wachovia Will Manual uses the
language "[i]f this general power of appointment shall not be effectually exercised." WACHOVIA
BANK & TRUST, NORTH CAROLINA WILL MANUAL SERVICE IX-14 (N. Wiggins ed. 1977). The
NCNB Will and Trust Manual uses "in default of appointment." NORTH CAROLINA NATIONAL
BANK, WILL AND TRUST MANUAL F-3 (1978). Since Case 24 seems eager to give effect to the gift
over, explicit language may not be necessary, and indeed, clear-cut language is not easy to find. If
one said, "If this power is not validly exercised," there still is room to argue that capture is a valid
exercise by implication.
353. The court's attitude is somewhat at odds with its view on construction to avoid invalidity.
See section II.B.3.c. supra.
354. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, §§ 3, 235-249.9.
355. Id. §§ 3, 235-236. If the words "and his heirs" are words of limitation, A immediately
takes an equitable fee; an equitable fee is no more objectionable because it may last forever than is
a devise of a legal fee simple. If the words "and his heirs" are ones of purchase, A's heirs take a
vested interest upon A's death. Id. §§ 235-236. (This assumes an American meaning of heirs
rather than an English meaning of indefinite takers from generation to generation. See Webster,
supra note 8, § 27.) See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 381 (1944).
356. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 2.1.
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recent North Carolina cases.
Case 25117  See Case 24 in section IV on powers of
appointment.
Case 26. 35 T devised his real estate to his son-in-law,
J.H. Thompson, to hold in trust for T's daughter Vivian for
her life and in the event of her death to rent the property and
apply the rents, after the payment of taxes, for the "support,
sustenance, education and benefit" of Vivian's surviving chil-
dren. Vivian had two children at T's death and two more
were born to her later. She died survived by the four chil-
dren. Held, the trust was void because it might have lasted
beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years.
These two cases, decided in 1948 and 1949, indicate that the Rule
applies to trust duration as well as to vesting and that a trust that may
last beyond the period of the Rule is void. From the standpoint of the
precedent cited in support of their holdings, the two cases are not
strong;359 from the standpoint of the rationale enunciated, the cases are
357. American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948), noted in 27
N.C.L. REV. 158 (1948).
358. Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949), noted in 48 MICH. L. REV. 236
(1949).
359. An earlier case, Spring. v. Hopkins, 171 N.C. 486, 88 S.E. 774 (1916), was cited in both
cases as authority for the proposition that the Rule Against Perpetuities limits the duration of
private trusts. Springs does not support that proposition. Simplified, the case involved a deed of
real property to the wife of the grantor's son, William, for life, then in trust for William's children
until the youngest attained 21, then to the use of William's children and their heirs forever, and in
the event of death of any child without issue, his share to vest in the surviving children and their
heirs. The court found that the interest in William's children was vested subject to divestiture
upon death without issue (at any time, not just before William's death) and that there was no
violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities:
It was argued that our construction of the limitation would violate the rule against
perpetuities. But we do not think so, for the rule, as its very language implies, refers
solely to the vesting of estates, and does not concern itself with their possession or enjoy-
ment, nor does it require that interests should end within specified limits.
Id. at 494, 88 S.E. at 778. Thus, the court uses classic remoteness of vesting language, expressly
rejecting any concern with possession or enjoyment. It is, however, dictum, because the trust in
Springs did not last beyond the period of the Rule; the court held that the trust became passive,
and was executed by the Statute of Uses, when the youngest child attained 21. Id. at 491, 88 S.E.
at 776. This was necessarily within the perpetuities period because all of Wiliam's children would
necessarily reach age 21 within 21 years after the death of William, a life in being.
The gift over upon death of a child without issue appears to be remote (although not so held),
since a child of William could have died without issue more than 21 years after Williams death.
The child could not be a measuring life, since more children could have been born to William
after the delivery of the deed or the grantor's death. (Normally the clock starts upon delivery of a
deed, but the grantor retained a power to revoke, id. at 488-89, 88 S.E. at 775, so the clock did not
start until the grantor's death.) As to the effect of invalidity of this condition subsequent on prior
interests, see section II.B.2.b. supra.
Case 25 also cited Billingsley v. Bradley, 166 Md. 412, 171 A. 351 (1934), and Gray. Ameri-
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not persuasive;360 and from the standpoint of the facts of the cases, the
decisions are somewhat equivocal.3 6 1 This is not to suggest that the
cases necessarily were incorrectly decided, but merely to note certain
weaknesses in them as precedents. 362
The trust duration conception of the Rule apparently was short-
lived:
Case 27.363 T devised and bequeathed the residue of her
estate to her sister Margaret for life, and "after the death of
can Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 462-63, 46 S.E.2d 104, 107-08 (1948). For a time,
Maryland courts took the view that the Rule applied to trust duration, but later overruled those
decisions. See 48 MIcH. L. REv. 236 n.6 (1949). Gray does not support the court's conclusion in
Case 25.
Case 26 cited Billingsley v. Bradley, Springs v. Hopkins and Case 25. Mercer v. Mercer, 230
N.C. 101,.103, 52 S.E.2d 229, 230 (1949).
360. Case 25 simply announces its rule without stating a rationale. Case 26 tries to find a
rationale but gets the two ideas of remote vesting and suspension of alienation hopelessly
intertwined:
Much has been written on the subject of perpetuities. Repetition here would serve no
useful purpose. Suffice it to say that the common law rule against perpetuities is recog-
nized and enforced in this State.
This rule is not one of construction but a positive mandate of law to be obeyed
irrespective of the question of intention.... Its primary purpose is to restrict the per-
missible creation of future interests and prevent undue restraint upon or suspension of
the right of alienation. Whenever the future interest takes effect, or the right of aliena-
tion is suspended beyond the period stipulated in the rule, it is violative thereof....
While there are some cases contra, the great preponderance of authorities in the
United States is to the effect that the rule applies to private trusts. . . .The decisions of
this Court are in line with the majority view. "A trust for private purposes must termi-
nate within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and ten lunar months thereaf-
ter."...
The rule is thus applied for the reason a trust violative of the rule in duration effects
an undue postponement of the direct enjoyment of the property and works an unreason-
able restraint on alienation.
If the period of the trust is too long, the court does not reduce the limitation to lives
in being and twenty-one years, but declares the whole trust invalid.
Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 103-04, 52 S.E.2d 230, 230 (1949) (quoting American Trust Co. v.
Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 463, 46 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1948))(citations omitted).
Note, too, the court's incorrect statement that the gift would have been good if Vivian had
died without issue surviving her. Id at 104, 52 S.E. 2d at 230. Under the traditional rule, there is
no "wait and see"; the validity of interests is judged from the testator's death.
361. In both cases at least some of the interests struck down as lasting too long would have
been remote anyway under the more limited Gray remoteness of vesting approach. In Case 25 the
special power of appointment and the gift in default vested remotely, and in Case 26 the trustee's
power to distribute for support, sustenance, education and benefit may have been a remote special
power, unless the power was confined to J.H. Thompson, making him the measuring life. Also in
Case 26, there was no provision for final termination of the trust. If title vested in the heirs of the
grandchildren, the heirs' interests were too remote. (The court's statement that, if title vested in
the heirs of the testator the gift was bad, appears incorrect under the Gray approach: the testator's
heirs would be fixed at his death, even though possession of their interest was postponed to the
death of the grandchildren.)
362. The question whether the cases are sound from the standpoint of perpetuities policies is
discussed in the text at the end of this section.
363. McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
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* . .Margaret, . . or in the event she shall predecease me,"
to a bank and two individuals in trust. 3" The trustees were
directed: (1) to collect income and to pay taxes; (2) to give
financial assistance to a named grandnephew and grandniece
if either should decide to attend college;365 (3) to pay certain
sums to named beneficiaries; and (4) to divide the net income
quarterly and pay it to named nephews, nieces, a grand-
nephew and a grandniece in designated proportions.366 The
trust "shall continue for a period of twenty-five years from the
date of filing this, my last will and testament for probate in
the office of the Clerk. . .or from the date of the death of my
sister, Margaret. . .whichever may be the later date, '3 67 and
then the trust shall terminate and the trustees shall within one
year thereafter fully account and deliver all of the trust prop-
erty in fee to the same nephews, nieces, grandnephew and
grandniece who were to receive the income, and in the same
proportions. The trustees were given power to sell, lease, in-
vest and reinvest.3 6s Held, the Rule Against Perpetuities was
not violated. The interests of the nieces, nephews, grand-
nephew and grandniece vested immediately upon T's death,
subject only to postponed enjoyment. 69
Case 27 expressly rejected the language in Cases 25 and 26, and
adopted instead the usual Gray approach:
The plaintiffs rely on what is said in [American] Trust Co. v. William-
son. . . and Mercer v. Mercer ... respecting the rule against perpe-
tuities as applied to private trusts. Perhaps the language used in the
Williamson case and adopted in the Mercer case is not as full and
complete as it might have been. In any event, the language used
must be interpreted in the light of the facts in those cases and the
364. Id. at 738-39, 68 S.E.2d at 833. Any remote powers in the trustees could not be saved by
treating the powers as personal to the trustees, and thereby using the trustees as measuring lives,
because one of the trustees was a bank.
365. This power is not possibly remote, because it would necessarily be exercised, if at all,
within the lives of the named grandnephew and grandniece.
366. The court did not consider the possible application of the widely-criticized "divide and
pay over rule," which maintains that language such as "divide and pay over" implies a condition
precedent that the beneficiary be alive at the time of payment in order to take.
367. McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 739, 68 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1952).
As to whether the equitable interests were remote because subject to a condition precedent that
7"s will be filed, an event which might not occur within the period of the Rule, see section II.
B.3.b. supra.
368. McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 739, 68 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1952);
see text accompanying notes 321 & 322 supra.
369. McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 743, 68 S.E.2d 831, 835 (1952).
The trial court had held the trust invalid.
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authorities cited. In the Williamson case there was a power of ap-
pointment which, if exercised by the trustee, would be violative of
the rule against perpetuities, and in the Mercer case there was a fu-
ture interest which might not vest within the time prescribed by the
rule.
The rule may not be evaded by the creation of a private trust. It
"applies to the'time when the legal interest will vest in the trustees, as
well as to the time when the equitable or beneficial interest will vest
in the beneficiaries.". .. The question is not the length of the trust
but whether title vested within the required time ...
"Courts and writers sometimes state in a rather loose fashion
that every express private trust must be limited in duration to a pe-
riod not longer than lives in being when the trust starts and twenty-
one years thereafter. . .This is incorrect, except in a very few states
where trusts in general, or certain trusts, have been limited in their
duration by statute."..."0
"An interest is not obnoxious to the Rule against Perpetuities if
it begins within lives in being and twenty-one years, although it may
end beyond them. If it were otherwise, all fee-simple estates would
be bad. The law is the same with lesser estates." 3
7
'
Case 27 has been followed in three subsequent cases.3 72 Its view
has been held retroactive.373 However, the following case is puzzling.
Case 28 .3 4 Tdied in 1956 leaving a will which provided,
Therefore it is my will that my half of my & her (wife) es-
tate be given to my three children-Judy Greer Honeycutt,
Nancy Ann Honeycutt, and William Carson Honeycutt, to share
& share alike. After all taxes or other debts have been settled.375
It is my will that said property be held in trust by my wife & my
friend Kester Walton, Atty. for said children until & when the
year 1980-then V of residue be paid to my children or his or
370. Id. at 743, 68 S.E.2d at 836 (quoting G. BOGERT, supra note 158, § 218)(footnote added).
371. Id. (quoting J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 232). The interests are vested, not contingent,
apparently because of the gift of intermediate income. Accord, Carter v. Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62
S.E.2d 713 (1950). The power in the trustees to use income for other purposes (college education
of the grandnephew and grandniece) did not make the income beneficiaries' interests remote;
rather, the ultimate beneficiaries had interests that were vested subject to divestiture to meet the
college needs. McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 742-43, 68 S.E.2d 831,
835-36 (1952).
Judge Barnbill wrote the opinions in Cases 26 and 27.
372. Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963); Farnan
v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 139 S.E.2d 14 (1964); Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 95, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
373. Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 352, 241 S.E.2d 397, 401, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 95, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
374. Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957), notedin 36 N.C.L. REv. 467, 469
(1958).
375. As to whether the postponement until payment of debts and taxes creates any perpetuities
violation, see section II.B.3.b. supra.
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her children if any child of mine should die before reaching the
year 1980. Trustee may have two years to pay said V3 of estate to
said children or their heirs-- of balance of residue estate shall
be distributed in the year 1992 on the same conditions as out-
lined above. The balance of the estate is to be distributed in the
year 2005 on the same conditions as outlined above.
If any child becomes disabled mentally or habits causing
irresponsibility-a spendthrift-without heirs of his or her own
or adopted children. Then his or her part of the estate shall be
withheld at any one of the periods of distribution-and given to
him or her as needed.
If any of my issue have heirs or adopted children, and be-
come disabled mentally or by habits-then such children shall
take the benefits along with its father or mother.
It is my desire that my Trustees will look after my childrens
educational, moral and religious interests as well as their money
or material interests.3 76
Twas survived by three minor children, ages seven, three
and one. Held, the trust did not violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
The rationale of the court was not altogether clear. The court first used
the standard rationale that the equitable interests vested on the death of
T,3 7 7 subject only to postponed enjoyment, but then added,
376. Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 92-93, 97 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1957). In addition to the
perpetuities challenge, plaintiffs argued that the trust was a passive one executed by the Statute of
Uses. The court held that the trustee's duty to look after the childrens" interests made the trust
active.
377. The court stated:
The contention [that the trust violates the Rule] is not well founded here. For "it is
generally held, nothing else appearing in the will to the contrary, that where an estate is
devised to a trustee in an active trust for the sole benefit of persons named as benefi-
ciaries, with direction to divide up and deliver the estate at a stated time, this will have
the effect of vesting the interest immediately on the death of the testator. The interven-
tion of the estate of the trustee will not have the effect of postponing the gift itself, but
only its enjoyment."...
The gift in the instant case to the children vested in interest to them immediately
upon the death of the testator, although the full enjoyment was postponed to later dates.
When these conditions exist, a trust does not violate the Rule against Perpetuities.
Id. at 100, 97 S.E.2d at 485 (quoting Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714, 719, 9 S.E.2d 420, 423
(1940)).
Arguably, the interest in T's children was not vested at his death because the trust provided
for payment to T's grandchildren "if any child of mine should die before reaching the year 1980."
Of course, this provision could be treated as a condition subsequent rather than a condition prece-
dent. Even if it imposes a condition precedent, the gift to T's children still appears to be good,
because the children would take, if at all, within their own lives. The gift over to T's grandchil-
dren appears to be good, because it would vest it the death of T's children, subject only to post-
poned enjoyment (assuming there is no implied condition precedent of survivorship to the time of
distribution). Query: What disposition ifa child of Tdied before 1980 without leaving children?
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Even though the postponements here ultimately invade the Twenty-
first Century, reference to the ages of the children indicates that the
postponements are within the life or lives of the beneficiaries in being
and twenty-one years and ten lunar months thereafter, the limitation
of the Rule against Perpetuities.
378
A commentator suggested that this passage might have revived the
line of reasoning in American Tast Co. v. Williamson 379 (Case 25) and
Mercer v. Mercer 3s° (Case 26),3s1 but the court quickly put the damper
on that suggestion:
Case 29.382 T died in 1952 leaving a will as follows:
First,. . . I trust all of the balance of my property which I
shall own at the time of my death to Wachovia Bank and Trust
Company to be held in trust for my son William Harvey
Poindexter and be paid out to him in the manner herein after
stated.
2nd. To pay to my said son for his use all of the net income
from my estate for the purpose of giving him proper support and
if he should get disable to work and if the income is not suffi-
cient, I direct that so much of the principal be used as may be
deemed wise to properly support him.
Three (3) Personal property to be owned and used by him
as long as he should live and by his issue also. Then to go to my
brothers and sisters the same as the other property.
Fourth, if however my son should die leaving issue then his
issue shall receive the income from my estate as he did. But if
he should leave no issue then I will and direct that what remains
of my property. . . be divided between my brothers and sisters
that is living and have led a sober and good life in every way.
383
Twas survived by William and his two minor children. Held,
William took a life estate, not a fee, with remainder to his
378. Id. at 100, 97 S.E.2d at 485 (citing American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46
S.E.2d 104 (1948).
379. 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948).
380. 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 299 (1949).
381. Survey of Norh Carolina Case Law, 36 N.C.L. REv. 379, 467-68 (1958):
The significance of this language is not clear. However, it would seem to imply that
under a different factual situation the Court might strike down an otherwise valid trust
because full enjoyment of the fee is postponed for a period which might exceed that of
the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Court seems to be saying that because of the youth of
the children it has concluded that the distributions will probably be made within their
normal life spans and twenty-one years thereafter. Unanswered is the question of what
the Court would have said and done had the beneficiaries been so much older that it
appeared unlikely that the distributions would be made within their lives and twenty-one
years.
The eldest child would have been 56 at the time of the last distribution.
382. Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963).
383. Id. at 374, 128 S.E.2d at 870.
1979]
NORTH CAROLINA L,4W REVIEW [Vol. 57
issue living at his death.384 The trust terminated at the death
of William's issue who were living at his death. As so con-
strued, the trust did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The opinion in Case 29 squarely rejected the Williamson/Mercer
approach and said that Finch v. Honeycutt385 (Case 28) was not in con-
flict with McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co. 386 (Case 27).387 The
courts have continued to adhere to the Case 29 approach:
Case 30. 3" T left the residue of his estate to a bank in
trust to pay the income to named nieces and nephews for life,
and upon the death of the last niece or nephew to hold the
property in trust for twenty years, accumulating the income
for the benefit of a church:
At the expiration of said twenty years the Trustee shall as soon
as practicable after the . . . Church . . . has in writing ex-
pressed its willingness to accept and use the fund for the purpose
hereinafter stated, pay and distribute, free of trust, to the...
Church . . . upon the following stated conditions: The trust
384. The court found sufficient indications of T's intention to use "issue" in the sense of lineal
descendants living at William's death, not in the technical English sense of an indefinite succes-
sion of lineal descendants. If used in the latter sense, the Rule would have been violated. Id. at
377, 128 S.E.2d at 872.
385. 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957).
386. 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
387. In Case 29 the court stated:
Plaintiff also insists that the trust itself offends the rule against perpetuities in that it
will not in all events terminate within a life in being at the death of testatrix plus twenty-
one years and ten lunar months. It is true that there is a possibility that the trust will
extend beyond such period. It was formerly the law in this jurisdiction that a trust for
private purposes must terminate within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years and
ten lunar months thereafter. Mercer v. Mercer . . .; Trust Co. v. Williamson . . . .
Springs v. Hopkins .... But the principle is now established that the rule against perpe-
tuities "does not relate to and is not concerned with the postponement of the full enjoy-
ment of a vested estate. The time of the vesting of title is its sole subject matter....
The question is not the length of the trust but whether title vested within the required
time." Finch v. Honeycutt. . . is not in conflict with the McQueen decision as has been
suggested [36 N.C.L. REv. 379, 467]. In the case at bar the title vests in the beneficiaries
in any event no later than ten lunar months following the death of William Harvey
Poindexter, a life in being at the death of testatrix. The trust will terminate at the death
of the issue of William who are living or en ventre sa mere at his death. The equitable
and legal titles of said issue of William will not merge. In a passive trust the legal and
equitable titles are merged in the beneficiary by virtue of the statute of uses. . . . But if
the trust is active they do not merge. . . . The trust created by Mrs. Poindexter is an
active trust and it does not violate the rule against perpetuities. It will continue until the
purpose for which it was created ceases.
258 N.C. at 378-79, 128 S.E.2d at 873 (quoting McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234
N.C. 737, 743, 68 S.E.2d 831, 836 (1952))(citations omitted).
To quibble a bit, the holding in Finch certainly is not in conflict with McQueen. The question
is, what was the rationale in Finch and what did its curious paragraph citing Williams mean?
Why was Finch not in conflict with McQueen?
388. Farnan v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 263 N.C. 106, 139 S.E.2d 14 (1964).
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fund shall be matched. . . and the total amount. . . shall be
used to construct. . . a Church ....
If, however, the. . .Church... at any time within one
year after the expiration of the twenty year period. . . in writ-
ing declines to accept the said gift upon the said terms, or if at
the end of said one year, it has not affirmatively elected to accept
* . . the Trustee shall pay and distribute the said trust fund, free
of trust, to certain charitable institutions ..... 9
Held, the trust did not violate the Rule. "That the trustee is
allowed indefinite additional time ('as soon as practicable') to
pay and distribute the fund to the church after acceptance,
does not prevent the vesting of title upon acceptance.
390
Case 31.391 7 left the residue of his estate in trust, to
divide the annual income into twenty equal shares, paying
shares to various named relatives (all of whom were lives in
being) and sixteen shares to be divided among named and un-
named great nieces and great nephews:
(i) The income from the sixteen shares shall be equally
divided among my great nieces and nephews, now twelve (12) in
number, and those who hereafter may be born within twenty-
one (21) years after my death, they to share equally with the
others.
(j) The share of income allotted to each great-niece and
great-nephew shall be paid to the child's guardian, if there be
such, and disbursed by him or her for the benefit of the child.
The object of this provision is to simplify the handling of in-
come, which will be small. 39
The will provided that the trust was to continue in effect
"for, and during the joint and several lives of" his surviving
brothers and sisters, listed by name, his eleven nieces and
great nephews, then in being, listed by name, with the name
of the parent of each of the great nieces and great nephews. It
further provided that the trust should continue in effect
for and during the joint and several lives of any other nieces or
nephews or great nieces or great nephews born prior to, and
alive at the time of my death, and until the death of the last
survivor of my brothers and sister, and the last survivor of my
389. Id. at 108, 139 S.E.2d at 16.
390. Id. at 110, 139 $.E.2d at 18.
391. Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 241 S.E.2d 397, cert. denied, 295
N.C. 95, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978). Most of the facts are stated in an earlier opinion involving differ-
ent issues arising from the same will. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 142
$.E.2d 182 (1965).
392. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Andrews, 264 N.C. 531, 533, 142 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1965).
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nieces and nephews, and the last survivor of my great nieces and
nephews (alive at my death) as just above referred to, and no
longer.3
93
The trustee had a power to sell and reinvest. Held, all inter-
ests must vest within the permissible period,394 and even if the
trust could extend beyond the period of the rule,395 duration
of the trust was not controlling.396
In sum the recent cases both state and hold that the Rule is con-
cerned with vesting, not trust duration. Cases 25 and 26 seem to be
dead. Should one mourn their demise or dance on their grave?397
Modest celebration appears to be in order, after one examines the
question of trust duration in light of the policies behind the Rule. (The
cases, alas, do not approach the question from this angle, and the early
confusion of Cases 25 and 26 may reflect, in part, the difficulty of intro-
ducing the rule against remoteness of vesting into a situation in which
it seems a foreigner.) The principal policies served by the Rule are
furthering alienability and limiting dead hand control.398 Viewed from
the perspective of alienability, perpetual trusts do not pose a real dan-
ger in North Carolina. The trustee customarily is given an express
power to sell his legal interest, and when one is not expressly given, a
court of equity will grant a power of sale in the event of emergency.399
In the absence of a spendthrift clause, the beneficiary's equitable inter-
est apparently is alienable; although there is little precedent, North
393. Wing v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 349, 241 S.E.2d 397, 399, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 95, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978).
394. It is not clear from the opinion that all interests vested within the period of the Rule.
395. It was argued that duration could be measured by an after born niece or nephew. Wing
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 35 N.C. App. 346, 351, 241 S.E.2d 397, 401, cert. denied, 295 N.C.
95, 244 S.E.2d 263 (1978). Perhaps the argument (unstated in the opinion) was that "surviving"
meant an indefinite line of survivors, or that the class of nieces and nephews was not confined to
those living at T's death.
396. The court stated:
We are aware that Mercer v. Mercer. . . held that a trust must terminate within the
permissible period. In McQueen v. Trust Co.. . . the Court distinguished Mercer and in
Poindexter v. Trust Co., we believe that Mercer was overruled. Plaintiffs contend that
since Mercer was the law at a time that the trust under Mr. Andrews' will was being
administered, we cannot now rule that the limitation under his will does not violate the
rule. We do not accept this argument. Nowhere in either the McQueen or Poindexter
cases do we read that they were to have only prospective effect. We believe they declare
the common law of this State as to limitations in instruments now in effect.
Id. at 351-52, 241 S.E.2d 401.
397. See generally T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 22, at 225; G. BOGERT, supra note
158, § 218; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 1 772; I A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 62.10 (3d ed. 1967); RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 381 (1944).
398. See note 491 infra.
399. See notes 496-97 infra.
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Carolina probably would not follow the Clafin4° doctrine that pre-
vents trust termination when termination would defeat a material pur-
pose of the settlor.41 Spendthrift trusts are not a significant
consideration, because their limited statutory validation has been re-
duced to triviality by the effects of inflation.40 2 In sum, the benefici-
ary's interest must vest within the period of the Rule and, once vested,
it will be alienable. Since trustee and beneficiary may both sell, aliena-
tion is not unduly restrained. Even though the existence of the trust,40 3
or the fact of multiple beneficiaries,4°4 may make alienability less
likely, that does not seem a sufficient justification to invalidate the
trust.4 0 5 And, looked at in terms of dead hand control, the trustee's and
beneficiary's power to sell within the period of the Rule, ending forever
the settlor's control, justifies the exemption of trust duration from the
Rule.
The law elsewhere is in a formative state. In states recognizing
indestructible or Claflin trusts, there may be a rule limiting trust dura-
tion to the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 °6 The best ap-
proach would be not to regard this as a question of perpetuities, so that
the issue will be joined instead at the fundamental level of restraints on
alienation. If an indestructible trust is limited to the perpetuities pe-
riod, the effect of creating an overlong trust is unclear; the trust may be
destructible by the beneficiaries after the expiration of the period of the
Rule, or it may be destructible at any time,40 7 or it may (as in Cases 25
and 26) be destroyed by the court ab initio, a result that is harsh but
nevertheless consistent with the usual perpetuities approach.408
As a matter of good drafting, it is advisable not to run the risk of
400. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
401. There is no case directly on point. For intimations, see Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C.
644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943); Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N.C. 454, 163 S.E. 572 (1932); Mizell v.
Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 129 S.E. 453 (1927); Bank of Union v. Heath Cotton Co., 187 N.C. 54,
121, S.E. 24 (1924); Turnage v. Green, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 63 (1854); R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA
LAW OF TRUsTS 31-32 (6th ed. 1973). But see Fowler & Lee v. Webster, 173 N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157
(1917).
402. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1976) validates spendthrift trusts to the extent of $500 annual
income. Although the statute does not expressly invalidate all other spendthrift trusts, it is as-
sumed to do so. See Christopher, Spendthrift and Other Restraints in Trusts: North Carolina, 41
N.C.L. REV. 49, 66 (1962).
403. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1391.
404. I A. ScoTT, supra note 397, at 605.
405. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 722[3], at 623-25. See also G. BOGERT, supra note 158,
§ 218, at 561.
406. 3 L. SImEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1393.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 246.
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creating a trust to last beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years.40 9
Even though the trust may ultimately be sustained, the draftsman risks
litigation. Also, he may find the trustee stripped of distributive powers
on the ground that powers to pay principal or income amount to re-
motely exercisable special powers of appointment.410 The trustee's ad-
ministrative powers should not be invalid, but there is some risk
involved.411
VI. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS
It is often said that contracts are not subject to the Rule,4 2 but that
statement is too broad. It is often said that the Rule does not apply to
present interests,41 3 but that statement, too, is overbroad. Indeed, when
one attempts to sort out the applications of the Rule to interests other
than the traditional future interests associated with gratuitous transfers,
he quickly encounters a set of seemingly contradictory holdings. In
contrast to the usual perpetuities cases on gifts, wills and trusts, in
which a doctrinaire application of the Rule usually results in the "cor-
rect" answer, in the commercial interest cases a logical approach based
on the face of the Rule does not always yield a predictably correct re-
sult. Rather, one must look to some ad hoc reasons behind the black
letter of the rule. For example:
Case 32 4 1 B conveyed land to C for use as a park on
certain conditions. The habendum clause limited the park to
use by white persons only, and the deed further provided that
should the park fail to be used by white persons only, the
property should revert to B, his heirs or assigns; provided that
as a condition precedent to the reversion, B, his heirs or as-
signs, should pay C or its successors the sum of $3500. Held,
the deed created a fee simple determinable in C and a possi-
409. The Wachovia form book is somewhat less cautious, providing that "no trust (other than
a trust of a vested interest).., shall continue [beyond the period of the Rule]." WVACHOVIA BANK
& TRUST, supra note 352, at XVI-32.
410. 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.32.
411. Id. § 24.63.
412. E.g., 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 767B.
413. E.g., 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.55.
414. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956). The case is noted in a number of law reviews, but most of the
articles concentrate on the constitutional issue of whether judicial enforcement of the reverter
clause constituted discriminatory state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment under the
precedent of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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bility of reverter in B, which possibility of reverter did not
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The holding in Case 32 that the possibility of reverter in B does not
violate the Rule is difficult to explain except on historical grounds. Ob-
viously, the property may cease to be used for a park long after any
lives in being plus twenty-one years; and to label the interest as pres-
ently vested seems to ignore its fundamental nature.4 15 Nevertheless,
-the holding in Case 32 follows the guiding (and probably misguided)
precedent of First Universalist Society v. Boland,4 16 the leading Ameri-
can case exempting possibilities of reverter from the Rule. Powers of
termination (rights of entry)417 are similarly exempt in the United
States, 418 although there is no direct North Carolina precedent.419
In Case 32 the court treated the interest in C as a fee simple deter-
minable, despite plausible arguments (apparently unraised by counsel)
that C's interest was a fee simple absolute subject only to a covenant420
or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent42' (because B was
required to pay $3500 to C to effect a reverter). In any event, B's inter-
est was held to be good. If, instead of preserving the reverter in him-
self, B had given the property, in the event of breach of the condition,
over to a third person (D), the interest in D would have been an execu-
tory interest violating the Rule.422
415. Eg., 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, §§ 1238-1239; 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.62; 5
R. POWELL, supra note 22, 769.
416. 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892). Indeed, the opinion in Case 32 cited First Universalist
Society v. Boland See Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n, 242 N.C. 311, 317, 88 S.E.2d 114,
120 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
417. For example, 0 conveys Blackacre to A and his heirs on condition that the property be
used for a farm, and if the property ceases to be used for a farm, 0 or his heirs may reenter and
repossess as of O's former estate. A would have a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent,
and 0 would have a power of termination. The difference from the fee simple determinable is
that the property does not automatically revert upon breach of the condition-C must reenter.
See generally J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 35-38 (1971).
418. Powers of termination are exempt even though the requirement of a reentry makes the
interest even less vested than a possibility of reverter. E.g., 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5,§ 1238.
419. Any North Carolina case recognizing powers of termination unlimited in duration is,
indirectly, an affirmation that the interest is exempt from the Rule. For a collection of cases
recognizing fees simple subject to a condition subsequent, see J. WEBSTER, supra note 417, §§ 37-
38.
420. It is said that defeasible estates are not favored, as the law abhors forfeitures. The deed
did not use the classic determinable fee language of "to C so long as the property is used for a
park for whites only" but merely tacked the racial provision onto the deed in the habendum
clause. See 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.62 n.8a (Supp. 1977); 34 N.C.L. REv. 113, 115 n.8 (1955).
421. The property could not automatically revert to B (the hallmark of a fee simple determi-
nable) if, "as a condition precedent to the reversion," B was required to pay $3500 to C. This
looks like a power of termination. See 34 N.C.L. REv. 113, 115 n.18 (1955).
422. For example, B conveys to C for use as a park; provided that should the park fail to be
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What result in Case 32 if, instead of creating a possibility of re-
verter in himself, B had retained an option to repurchase the land? For
example, suppose that in Case 32 B had conveyed the land to C in fee
simple absolute, and C had covenanted that if the property should
cease to be used for a park for whites only, upon payment of $3500 C
would reconvey the property to B. No case exactly like this has arisen
in North Carolina, but cases in other jurisdictions have invalidated B's
interest.423 Case 33 represents the closest North Carolina precedent:
Case 33.424 G and his wife sold a lot to E,
retaining for themselves and their heirs and assigns the right to
repurchase said land when sold, the said [E] conveying a title
for said lands, either by deed or mortgage, to any person without
first giving [G and his wife], and their heirs and assigns, the priv-
ilege of repurchasing the same, renders this deed null and
used by white persons only, upon the payment of $3500 by D or his heirs the property shall go to
D and his heirs. C would have a fee simple subject to an executory interest, and D would have a
shifting executory interest. See generallyJ. WEBSTER, supra note 417, § 39. The executory interest
in D would be remote because the event might not occur within the period of the Rule. Eg., 6
ALP, supra note 22, § 24.62. It is difficult to distinguish this remote executory interest in D from
the valid possibility of reverter in B. Id.
The grantor who wishes to create a fee simple in A subject to a remote executory interest in B
may, if he is cleverly advised, accomplish his desires indirectly by first creating a defeasible fee in
A, leaving a possibility of reverter or power of termination in the grantor. He then conveys or
devises that possibility of reverter or power of termination to B, who is regarded as owning the
grantor's valid reverter interest, not a remote executory interest. This device is made possible by
statutes allowing the conveyance or devise of possibilities of reverter and powers of termination,
and was even effective in Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922
(1950), in which the testatrix created the determinable fee in one will clause and devised the
possibility of reverter in another, residuary clause. By statute in North Carolina, possibilities of
reverter and powers of termination are alienable, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3 (1976), devisable, id.
§ 31-40, and descendible, id. § 29-2(2). For some time, it was held in North Carolina that powers
of termination were not alienable or devisable if the condition was unbroken. The statutes now
state that powers of termination are transferable, "whether any such condition has or has not been
broken" at the time of transfer. Id. § 31-40; see id. § 39-6.3. There is no such statement in the
statute on descendibility, § 29-2(2), but the omission should not be a problem because rights of
entry were inheritable at common law even when the condition was unbroken. See generally
McCall, supra note 1; Webster, The Questfor Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter
and Rights of Entry?, 42 N.C.L. REV. 807 (1964).
Because the alienability and devisability of possibilities of reverter and powers of termination
allow grantors to evade the check of the Rule Against Perpetuities on remote executory interests,
an occasional statute forbids the conveyance or devise of these interests. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
30, § 37b (Smith-Hurd 1969). These statutes seem to treat the symptoms, not the disease, and
have some deleterious side effects: the grantor's reverter interest remains enforceable but it must
pass by intestacy, fractionating it to the point where no one can buy a release of the possibility of
reverter or power of termination. Other approaches have been more fruitful (for example, so-
called reverter acts limiting the duration of possibilities of reverter and powers of termination to a
fixed period, say 30 or 40 years). E.g., id. § 37e. The only current North Carolina stricture is the
requirement of the Marketable Title Act that the interest be rerecorded once each 30 years to
preserve its vitality. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 47B (1976).
423. 3 L. SiMes & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1245.
424. Hardy Bros. v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 15 S.E. 890 (1892).
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void.42 5
E mortgaged the land without giving G a chance to repur-
chase. Held, the right to repurchase was void.
If G's right to repurchase had been cast in the form of a possibility
of reverter, undoubtedly it would have been held good; but in the form
of a right to repurchase it was held bad. The fault, if there be one, may
lie in the exemption of the possibility of reverter rather than the invali-
dation of the right to repurchase.426
From a broader perspective, it is questionable whether the right to
repurchase (or any other commercial interest) ought to be measured
against the Rule Against Perpetuities. The period of the Rule-lives in
being plus twenty-one years-is a fairly appropriate yardstick for fam-
ily settlements (wills and trusts giving away the owner's property with
future interests to his remote descendants), but is not an appropriate
unit of measure for most commercial interests.417 Often no lives in be-
ing can be related to the commercial interest, leaving only the twenty-
one-year period in gross for measurement of validity, an arbitrary pe-
riod unrelated to any commercial property consideration.
The true objection to the option to repurchase in Case 33, if any,
rests in the rule against restraints on alienation. Indeed, the language
of the deed in Case 33 virtually forbade alienation to anyone save the
grantor. The court's opinion in Case 33 did not clearly indicate the
basis for the decision,4 28 although it has been read as relying on the
425. Id. at 520, 15 S.E. at 890.
426. E.g., 6 ALP, .rpra note 22, § 24.56.
427. In some cases, the perpetuities period might be too short, in others it might be too long.
An option to purchase exercisable, if at all, within the perpetuities period ought not to be automat-
ically valid. Id.
428. The court stated:
Considered either as a conditional sale or a contract to reconvey, his Honor was
entirely correct in holding as void for uncertainty the provision in the deed respecting the
right of the grantor to repurchase the land when sold. No time is fixed for performance,
nor is there any stipulation whatever as to the price to be paid.
The provision, not being a limitation, can therefore only take effect, if at all, as a
condition subsequent, and viewed in this light we cannot hesitate in deciding that the
restriction upon alienation attempted to be imposed after the grant of the fee, is repug-
nant to the nature of the estate granted, contrary to the policy of the law, and therefore
inoperative. Ever since the statute of Quia Emptores, the right of alienation has been
considered as an inseparable incident to an estate in fee.. . and, except in some cases
where the restriction is only partial, the law does not recognize or enforce any condition
which would directly or indirectly limit or destroy such a privilege-iniquum est ingenuis
hominibus non esse rerum suarum alienationem. Accordingly, it has been held by this
Court that a condition that a devisee in fee shall not sell or encumber his land before
attaining the age of thirty-five is void, "because it is inconsistent with the full and free
enjoyment which the ownership of such an estate implies.". . . To the same effect has it
been ruled as to a condition that a devisee in fee shall make oath "that he will not make
any change during his life" in the testator's will respecting his property. . . , or that he
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Rule Against Perpetuities. 429 The court may have been wise in leaving
open the question of options to repurchase and perpetuities, and it may
be significant that the only other North Carolina case on options to
repurchase does not invalidate the option in question:
Case 34.430 As part of the sale of an oil distributorship, P
deeded a bulk station and plant to B, who gave back to P an
option to purchase the property at any time within one year,
with automatic renewal from year to year, subject to cancella-
tion on 60-days' written notice. About a year later, B agreed
to allow P to exercise the option but B reneged and refused to
execute a deed to P, contending the option violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Held, for P for two reasons. First, B
agreed to exercise of the option. Second,
the option is an integral part of the transaction, and it would be
inequitable to allow [B] to claim the property under a deed from
[P] and at the same time annul the essential terms of its acquisi-
tion. If the option is to go out, so must the deed which induced
it .... The result, therefore, would be the same whether upheld
or rejected.43'
Under traditional doctrine, the first reason for the decision (that B
agreed to the repurchase) would seem inadequate-the question is
what might have happened, judged from the creation of the interest,
shall not offer to mortgage or suffer a fine or recovery. . . , or that he shall contract in
writing not to alienate before the proceeds of certain realty are paid to him. or that
land devised to a number of persons shall not be divided ...
Such conditions are not sustained where they "infringe upon the essential enjoy-
ment and independent rights of property, and tend manifestly to public inconvenience."
"A condition annexed to an estate given is a divided clause from the grant, and
therefore cannot frustrate the grant precedent, neither in anything expressed nor any-
thing implied, which is of its nature incident and inseparable from the thing granted."
While unable to find any decision exactly in point, we feel assured that our case falls
within the principle stated and illustrated by the foregoing authorities. The restriction is
certainly inconsistent with the ownership of the fee as well, it would seem, as against
public policy. The right to repurchase is of indefinite extent as to time (it being reserved
to the grantors, their heirs or assigns), and may be exercised whenever the property is
sold, although no amount is fixed upon as purchase-money. In other words, we have an
estate in fee without the power to dispose of or encumber it, unless first offering it for no
definite price to the grantors, their heirs or assigns. The condition is repugnant to the
grant, and therefore void. Even if the right to repurchase could be sustained, the defend-
ant has no cause of complaint, inasmuch as the Court in decreeing foreclosure has or-
dered that thirty days notice of the sale shall be personally served on him.
Hardy Bros. v. Galloway, 111 N.C. 519, 522-24, 15 S.E. 890 (1892)(citations omitted).
429. See Christopher, Options to PurchaseReal Property in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 63,
78 n.67 (1965).
430. Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N.C. 612, 31 S.E.2d 854 (1944).
431. Id. at 615, 31 S.E.2d at 856.
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not what in fact happened. The other reason, that the option was an
432integral part of the transaction, seems to confuse the secondary ques-
tion of effect of invalidity with the primary question of validity or inva-
lidity. To contend that invalidity of the option voids the initial transfer
is to assume the conclusion; Case 33 simply stripped away the invalid
option, leaving the grantee with a fee simple absolute. Furthermore, it
would seem that in most cases the option would be an integral part of
the transaction: the grantor in Case 33 was unlikely to have conveyed if
the grantee had been unwilling to assent to the option to repurchase.
For the advocate, as well as the analyst, the significance of Cases
33 and 34 is that they leave open the question of validity of options to
repurchase under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Case 33 may have been
based on restraints on alienation, and Case 34, wherein the option in
question was validated, is not a square holding that options are subject
to the Rule. Although options to repurchase generally are subject to
the Rule in other jurisdictions, 433 there is still time for critical scrutiny
of this application in North Carolina. It may well be that a more ap-
propriate check for validity would be the rule against restraints on
alienation. If, for example, the option to repurchase were exercisable at
a price stated in the option (such as the $3500 stated for exercise of the
so-called possibility of reverter in Case 32), in times of constantly in-
flating land values the option would almost certainly restrain alienation
because the option price quickly would become archaically low. Even
if the price were high enough, the owner would be discouraged from
placing improvements on the land.434 In Cases 33 and 34 no purchase
price was stated; it would seem that uncertainty about the option price
would discourage the owner from attempting to sell his property, lest
he become involved in a lengthy haggle over the option price with the
risk that the optionee ultimately would prevail. Even if the price were
assumed to be current fair market value, the option might fail because
in the difficult case of the preemptive right to repurchase, the option
sometimes is held bad.435 The preemptive right to repurchase gives the
vendor the right to repurchase the property at the same price at which
the vendee is willing to sell to any third person. Because the preemp-
432. The Restatement adopts this idea, with citation only of Pure Oil v. Baars, 244 N.C. 612,
31 S.E.2d 854 (1954), as supporting authority. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 394, Comment f
(Supp. 1948).
433. See, e.g., 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.56.
434. Strictly speaking, this is not a perpetuities or restraint on alienation factor, but it is often
used as a rationale. Compare Case 36 infra.
435. E.g., Atchison v. City of Englewood, 463 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1969), notedin 47 DENVER L.J.
78 (1970).
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tive right discourages marketability, but not greatly so, the cases and
commentators on validity of the preemptive right have yet to reach a
consensus.
436
The options in Cases 33 and 34 were options to repurchase re-
served by the original vendors. If these options, very much akin to the
valid possibility of reverter in Case 32, are in jeopardy, clearly options
in gross granted to third parties are in greater jeopardy, although the
issue has not arisen in North Carolina. The option in gross reserved by
the grantor or given to a third party is conventionally distinguished
from the following two cases:
Case 35.437 L leased a parcel to T for a period of ten
years. Upon the expiration of the ten-year period, if the prop-
erty had been kept in a good state of repair, and if T so de-
sired, the lease was renewable for an additional ten years, and
thereafter renewable every ten years so long as T desired.
The lease inured to the benefit of and was binding on the
heirs and assigns of L and T. Held, the lease created a lease
for a term of ten years, with a covenant for perpetual re-
newal.438 The covenant for perpetual renewal was a presently
vested interest and did not violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
Case 36.439 L leased a tract to T for a period of twenty
years, with an option to renew for four periods of five years.
A few months later L granted T a preemptive right to
purchase a second tract adjoining the leased tract. In another
few months, L sold the second tract without giving T a
chance to purchase and T sued for specific performance of the
option. L invoked the Rule Against Perpetuities. Held, the
option was not objectionable (semble).440
436. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22, 771[l].
437. Dixon v. Rivers, 37 N.C. App. 168, 245 S.E.2d 572 (1978) (2-1 decision).
438. Compare Case 35 with Duff-Norton Co. v. Hall, 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
The lessor argued for a tenancy at will under the doctrine that a tenancy at the will of the tenant is
ipsofacto at the will of the landlord. Other constructions were possible. See, e.g., McLean v.
United States, 316 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Va. 1970).
439. Duff-Norton Co. v. Hall, 268 N.C. 275, 150 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
440. The court's opinion is cryptic:
The defendants invoke the rule against perpetuities, since the option of the plaintiff
could extend for a total period of 40 years. However, at this stage of the proceedings we
are of opinion that this position is premature. Mercer v. Mercer. . . .Weber v. Texas
Co.. . . , where it is said: "* * * This is not an exclusive option to the lessee to buy at a
fixed price which may be exercised at some remote time beyond the limit of the rule
against perpetuities, meanwhile forestalling alienation. The option simply gives the
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Under Case 35 a covenant for perpetual renewal is presently
vested and therefore free from the Rule. Although this rationale is a
common one," it begs the question: if an option to renew a lease (at
some future time) is presently vested, why is not an option to repur-
chase (at some future time) (Case 33) also vested? The true explanation
for Case 35 seems to be not that the option to renew is vested (else most
options would seem vested), but rather that for various reasons unre-
lated to vesting the interest serves a desirable purpose, viz. encouraging
the lessee to make full utilization of the land44 or (for long-term leases)
furthering alienability, since it is an accepted commercial device for
disposing of land.4 3 In other words, because in these commercial in-
terest cases the concept of vesting is a difficult fit, the cases seem rather
to be retreating to Lord Nottingham's view of a perpetuity: "wherever
any visible inconvenience doth appear."' t " While it is well to consider
such policies, it is unfortunate that the cases must be argued in terms of
vesting, because the court may be forced to sustain an interest that,
measured by all relevant factors, might not be desirable. A perpetual
covenant to renew by definition may last forever, which is altogether
too long a time.
Case 35 is significant on the specific score of covenants for perpet-
ual renewal and on the general score of illustrating the more or less
omnipresent possibility of labeling a commercial interest good because
it is presently vested." 5
lessee the prior right to take the lessor's royalty interest at the same price the lessor could
secure from another purchaser whenever the lessor desires to sell. It amounts to no more
than a continuing and preferred right to buy at the market price whenever the lessor
desires to sell. This does not restrain free alienation by the lessor. He may sell at any
time, but must afford the lessee the prior right to buy. The lessee cannot prevent a sale.
His sole right is to accept or reject as a preferred purchaser when the lessor is ready to
sell. The option is therefore not objectionable as a perpetuity."
Id. at 277, 150 S.E.2d at 427-28 (quoting Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1936)).
The purpose of citing Mercer v. Mercer, a trust duration case, is not clear.
In Duff-Norton it did not appear that the lessor challenged the validity of the covenant to
renew (as distinguished from the option), but Case 35 appears to settle the validity of the cove-
nant. Alternatively, the court could have simply decided that at most the covenant could only
have resulted in a 40-year term, and an estate for a term is good.
441. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 230.
442. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 395, Comment a (1944).
443. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1244.
444. Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 946, 960 (Ch. 1682).
445. Another plausible theory, apparently not recognized in any cases, would start from the
premise that so long as a person has the power to make himself the full owner of property at will
(as by revoking a revocable trust), the property is not tied up, and the perpetuity period begins to
run only when the power is terminated. E.g., 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.59. It is arguable that the
optionee's power to exercise the option is analogous to the settlor's power of revocation, so the
perpetuities clock does not start to run until the exercise of the option. This bizarre twisting of
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Case 36 appears to sustain another interest in the lessee, an option
to purchase (as distinguished from the option perpetually to renew in
Case 35). On the face of it, an option to purchase in a lessee is just as
likely to be exercised remotely as the option to repurchase in Case 33,
yet the lessee's option is sustained. The conventional explanations are
two: (1) it would be anomalous to validate the perpetual option to
renew in Case 35 but to invalidate the similar option to purchase in
Case 36;4 16 and (2) the option to purchase furthers alienability be-
cause it encourages the tenant to improve the land." 7 This second ra-
tionale is strained in Case 36 because the option in the tenant was not
to purchase the leased land but rather to purchase an adjoining par-
cel.448 The court's announced rationale was a preemptive option one-
the option price was the price at which the lessor was willing to sell to
any third party.449 So, Case 36 may shed some light on the status of
preemptive rights to repurchase in North Carolina.45° Its result is
typical.45 '
In Case 36, the court may have overlooked a convenient rationale
for finding the option valid. The facts stated that the lessor granted the
option to the lessee (with no mention of the lessee's heirs or assigns). If
the option was personal to the lessee, under conventional dogma the
option had to be good-it was exercisable, if at all, only by the lessee,
who was the measuring life. This theory was not available in Cases 32,
33 and 35, in which the challenged interest ran to heirs and assigns, but
might have been available in Case 34 (the facts were unclear).452 The
advocate in commercial interest cases should always check his case to
see whether the commercial interest is limited to the life of one of the
parties.
In addition to the theories that the challenged interest is presently
vested or that the interest is personal to the optionee, some other excul-
patory theories may be available:
conventional perpetuities concepts again illustrates the poor fit of the Rule to commercial
interests.
446. E.g., 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMiTH, supra note 5, § 1244.
447. Id.
448. The facts do not detail the relationship between the parcels. It may have been that the
existence of the option to purchase the adjoining tract encouraged development of the leased tract.
449. The case quoted by the court, Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936), did
involve a tenant's option to purchase the leased interest.
450. See text accompanying notes 423-26 supra.
451. 3 L. SiMs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1244.
452. If the option runs to the optionee's heirs but is not enforceable against the optionor's
heirs, it is good, the optionor becoming the measuring life.
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Case 37.453 In return for $200, H conveyed to G all the
timber cut on fifty acres of H's land. G was allowed "the full
term of five years within which to cut and remove the timber
hereby conveyed, said term to commence from the time [G]
begins to manufacture said timber into wood or lumber." '454
Thirteen years had elapsed without action by G. Held, the
contract created a lease for a term of years, which was void
for uncertainty as to when it would commence.
This is a classic "administration contingency" case; although the opin-
ion nowhere mentions the Rule Against Perpetuities, the decision is
consistent with usual principles invalidating interests to take effect on a
condition precedent that might not occur within the period of the Rule
(G's commencing to cut the timber). The case belies any contention
that contracts always are exempt from the Rule.455 It raises anew the
question whether the period of the Rule is appropriate (either too short
or too long) for commercial transactions. G attempted to save the deal
by arguing that he was to commence cutting within a reasonable time.
This argument is a useful one to keep in mind in this kind of case, since
in most cases a reasonable time would be less than twenty-one years.456
Nevertheless, G's argument failed here since the court said that thir-
teen years was beyond a reasonable time, so G's rights under the con-
tract were lost. Apparently, then, the court was not quite applying a
perpetuities yardstick to invalidate the contract, since the interest
would have vested, if at all, within less than thirteen years.457 On an ad
453. Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. 46,38 S.E. 26 (1901). Compare Case 37 with 3 L. SIMES
& A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1242.
454. Id. at 47, 38 S.E. at 26.
455. The court does not state whether the contract was personal to G or whether it also ran to
G's successors. Even if the contract had been limited to Gthe interest would not have been saved,
since G was a corporation and not a human being.
456. See 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1244.
457. Case 37 has been read as a perpetuities case. See 39 N.C.L. REv. 93, 97 & n.31 (1960).
The opinion in Case 37 may waive a perpetuities flag, but it does not expressly defend it:
We are of the opinion that there is on the face of the pleadings an insuperable
obstacle to a recovery on the part of the plaintiff, and that we ought. . . to affirm the
judgment of the Court below. ... The matter to which we refer is that provision of the
contract by which is granted the full term of five years within which to cut the timber, the
term to commence from the time the plaintiff (party of the second part) begins to manu-
facture the timber into wood or lumber. We think that that feature of the contract ren-
ders the whole void. The contract may be treated as a lease, or a term for years, for a
lease can be made of the right to cut trees or dig minerals. An indispensable legal re-
quirement to the creation of a lease for a term of years is that it shall have a certain
beginning and a certain end. Blackstone says that such an estate is frequently called a
term, terminus, because its duration or continuance is bounded, limited and determined.
If no time at which a lease is to commence has been mentioned, the law would fix that
time as of the date of the contract. . . .But there is an attempt to fix the beginning of the
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hoc policy basis the decision seems good: G should not have been al-
lowed to tie up H's timberland indefinitely, speculating on when tim-
ber prices would rise.
From the perspective of the Rule Against Perpetuities, without
looking at underlying policies, the decision in Case 37 is difficult to
justify. G's interest seemed vested, with only his enjoyment postponed.
His power to make himself the owner of the timber seemed no less
contingent than the possibility of reverter in Case 32 or the option to
renew the lease in Case 35; yet it was invalidated, again illustrating the
necessity of an interest-by-interest analysis of underlying policies. 458
Easements and profits 2zprendre usually are excepted from the op-
eration of the Rule:
Case 38. C conveyed a tract of land to S, reserving to
himself and his heirs and assigns the right to hunt on the tract
and to protect the game on the tract from all persons except S
and his successors. Held, the reservation retained a profit &
prendre in C, which interest was present, not future, and did
not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Case 38 thus employs the present interest rationale appropriately to
lease in the contract before us. It is when the plaintiff shall begin to manufacture the
timber into lumber. That act on the part of the plaintiff may never take place; it is
entirely uncertain. The plaintiff can not be made to commence to manufacture the tim-
ber into wood or lumber, and no rule can be thought of by which the commencement of
the term can be fixed. It is evident from the reading of the contract that the fee in the
land was not to pass, and yet no one can tell how long the land and the other timber
upon it may remain useless to the defendants and to the Commonwealth under the in-
definite and uncertain time at which the lease is to begin.
If the doctrine of reasonable time could be invoked in this case, the plaintiff would
be in no better condition than he now occupies. The price was $200 for the timber, 14
inches on the stump when cut, and the defendants to pay all taxes, and the contract made
13 years ago, and not a stick of timber yet cut by the plaintiff. Under these circumstances
it would certainly be held as matter of law that the plaintiff had been allowed a reason-
able time to cut the timber to elapse, and not having done so, its rights under the contract
had been lost. The judgment below is Affirmed.
Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. 46, 47-48, 38 S.E. 26, 26 (1901)(citations omitted).
458. Case 37 is not unlike Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957
(1958), which held a lease that was to commence on the completion of a building to be void ab
inilto. Haggerty was roundly criticized for importing the Rule Against Perpetuities into a foreign
context and for ignoring the parties' likely intention that the building be constructed within a
reasonable time less than 21 years. E.g., 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.21 (Supp. 1977). Contra, 39
N.C.L. REv. 93 (1960). Haggery was overruled in Wong v. Di Grazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d
817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963). In view of the short-term interest in Case 37, and the fixed price
(Haggerty involved a 10-year term in a large building at a rental keyed to gross income, which
would increase with inflation), Case 37 appears to be reasonably decided, while Haggerty clearly
was not.
459. Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N.C. 253, 111 S.E. 365 (1922).
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sustain a profit.4 6° Any other decision would invalidate most ease-
ments, profits, covenants and incorporeal hereditaments.461 These in-
terests have escaped the Rule even when closer to the option in gross
line:
Case 39.462 F conveyed to T a "right of way and ease-
ment" to lay and maintain a gas pipe line, together with the
right from time to time to lay one or more additional pipe
lines approximately parallel to the original line; provided that
T should pay C $1.00 per lineal rod of the additional line.
Held, the right to lay the additional lines was presently vested
and did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.
In this case of an expansible easement, the interest was analogous to an
option to purchase: by paying an additional sum of money, T could
acquire additional rights in F's property.463 Nevertheless, in contrast
to options to purchase in gross, the expansible easement was sustained.
Both interests seem equally vested or equally contingent, so the reasons
for validity of one (the expansible easement) and invalidity of the other
(the option in gross) must lie in subliminal policy factors. These factors
have not been adequately explained,464 and the advocate might find a
useful line of attack in questioning whether the utility of a given expan-
sible easement outweighs its fettering.465
One final example deserves mention:
460. The profit was reserved to the grantor, as in Case 32, but even if conveyed to a third
party, it would be good. See 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1248. The profit was not
restricted to C's lifetime, so C could not be used as the measuring life.
461. Simes and Smith point out that generally these interests make the land more readily
salable, although that would not seem to be true in Case 38. Id. § 1248.
462. Feldman v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 9 N.C. App. 162, 175 S.E.2d 713
(1970).
463. Powell places Case 38 also in the expansible easement category. 5 R. POWELL, supra note
22, 771[2] n.21. In a sense, the owner of the profit had a right dependent on his future action
(hunting), but it was not expansible (for example, to include fishing) and did not require any
future payments.
464. The Restatement retreats into a "present interest" conceptualization, RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 399, Comment a (1944), as does Gray, J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, § 279. The treatises
move to the edge of policy but do not plunge into the thicket. 5 R. POWELL, supra note 22,
771[2]; 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1248.
465. Case 39 (the valid expansible easement) is an interesting comparison to Case 37 (the
invalid timber lease to commence upon cutting). Compare these cases with RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 399, Illustration 3 (1944). Both cases involved rights to make use of the land of
another, which were to commence upon action and the payment of money by the holder of the
right. Yet one was held good and the other bad, suggesting that the advocate carefully categorize
his interest. Perhaps the difference between the cases lies in precedent or perhaps it lies in a kind
of option appendant theory-4he expansible easement in Case 39 was attached to a basic ease-
ment, something like a valid option to purchase attached to a lease, but the timber lease in Case 37
was not attached to any other, valid interest, and thus was not justifiable as encouraging full
utilization of the base interest.
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Case 40.466 A company establishes a pension, profit shar-
ing, stock bonus or other employee trust for the purpose of
distributing the income and principal thereof to some or all of
its employees, or the beneficiaries of such employees. The
trust may last beyond the period of the Rule, may benefit per-
sons not in being at the creation of the trust, and may vest
interests beyond the period of the Rule. By statute the trust
would not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities (nor the rules
against restraints on alienation or against accumulation of
income).
Pension trusts for employees should not be subject to the Rule,46 7 and
apparently no court has held them bad.468 Nevertheless, because they
probably are not exempt from the Rule as charitable trusts (since there
is no direct benefit to the public), and because they resemble the kinds
of dispositions in private express trusts that would run afoul of the
Rule, several states, including North Carolina, have enacted salutary
statutes to protect the validity of pension trusts.
In what kinds of commercial arrangements then should counsel be
wary of perpetuities violations? By way of summary, there seem to be
three categories: (1) any transaction involving land or an interest in
land (for example an estate for years);469 (2) any arrangement provid-
ing death benefits or payments often associated with estate planning;470
and (3) any contract involving unique chattels.47 1 The North Carolina
cases illustrated in this section pretty well run the gauntlet of problem
areas, but counsel should always be wary of perpetuities risks in new
kinds of property arrangements.
If a court wishes to validate a commercial interest without any
466. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-6 (Supp. 1977).
467. E.g., 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1247.
468. Id.
469. For example, the profits and easements in Cases 38 and 39 and the timber lease in Case
37, as well as the perhaps more expectable challenges to possibilities of reverter in Case 32 and the
options to purchase, repurchase and renew in Cases 33-36. Questions have also been raised for
restrictive covenants, id. § 1246, and for certain condominium provisions (1) determining owner-
ship of the airspace in the event of destruction of the building and (2) providing for the control of
ownership of the condominium, see Seeber, Condominiums in North Carolina: Impro ving the Statu-
tory Rase, 7 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 355, 359, 361-65 (1971). Anytime land is involved, look out!
470. For example, pension trusts for employees (Case 40). Similar questions have arisen for
contracts (often with a life insurer) providing for future payments to unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries, because of the similarity of such arrangements to trusts used in estate planning. So
far such contracts have escaped the Rule (on the facile theory that the relationship is purely con-
tractual), but Leach opines that if abused, such contracts would be in jeopardy. 6 ALP, supra note
22, § 24.58.
471. Id. § 24.56 & n.7.
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penetrating analysis of policy considerations, it may simply declare that
the case involves a contract or a present interest, or it may find that the
Rule does not apply (outside of gratuitous dispositions) to interests in
personal property. Assuming that the Rule is found generally to apply
to the interest in question, the interest may nevertheless be validated in
a particular case if it is personal to a person such as an optionee (who
then becomes the measuring life) or if the parties contemplated per-
formance of the agreement within a reasonable time not exceeding the
period of the Rule. As discussed, the cases tend to be decided by label
or precedent, without inquiry into the policies served by a holding of
validity or invalidity. It would be better not to apply the Rule to com-
mercial interests, for the reasons that the concept of vesting is not a
good fit and the period of the Rule is not appropriate. Nevertheless, for
the foreseeable future it appears that the debate will be limited to Rule
Against Perpetuities terms. Counsel in these cases might profit by ar-
guing the underlying policies, such as free alienability or full use,
which seem to control the decisions.
VII. DRAFTING
The treatises contain several excellent prescriptions for avoiding
violation of the Rule.472 The caveats will be summarized here.
(1) Examine every instrument for possible violations of the Rule.
Wills and trusts are obvious candidates for scrutiny, but the commer-
cial interest cases show that the Rule may pop up in unexpected places.
(2) State the duration of options to purchase land. Limit them to
the life of the optionee or, if not personal, state a definite period not
greater than twenty-one years.
(3) Avoid agreements or gifts on conditions unconnected with any
life. Beware of administration contingencies such as completion of a
building, probate of a will, distribution of an estate, or payment of
debts. If the condition cannot be avoided, add a proviso that the event
must take place within the period of the Rule.
(4) Beware of gfts contingent upon the taker attaining an age over
twen y-one. Indeed, whenever one sees a number greater than twenty-
one, he should be on his guard.
(5) Beware ofgfits to grandchildren. While gifts to grandchildren
of the testator must perforce be good, gifts to another's grandchildren
472. 6 ALP, supra note 22, § 24.7; 3 L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1293; Leach, supra
note 29, at 669-71; Leach, supra note 334, at 985-86; Phillips, supra note 130, at VII-17 to -19.
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may be bad. Indeed gifts to grandchildren of the settlor of an irrevoca-
ble trust may be bad, because more children may be born to the settlor.
(6) When possible, describe benefciaries by name rather than by
class designation. This will eliminate many of the fertile octogenarian
casualties.
(7) When possible, avoid gifts conditioned on the survival of the
"widow" of a namedperson. This will eliminate any "unborn widow"
problems. Identifying the wife by name will avoid the problem but
would exclude a second spouse; several better alternatives are
available.473
(8) Limit the duration of trusts to the period of the Rule. Even
though the Rule may not apply to the duration of trusts, it is better not
to run the risk. Furthermore, the trustee of a trust lasting beyond the
perpetuities period may find his powers stripped away on the theory
that they constitute remotely exercisable powers of appointment.
(9) Examine every exercise of apower of appointment for possible
violations of the Rule. For special powers and general powers exercisa-
ble by will, the period is computed from the creation of the power.
Beware of provisions that are in substance, but not in form, powers of
appointment, such as powers to consume or revoke.
(10) Consider the insertion of a saving clause. Feelings run high
on this question. Leach recommends a boilerplate saving clause to pro-
tect against errors.47 4 Simes and Smith eschew the practice on the the-
ory that it may produce unanticipated results.475 If the attorney does
not know whether the instrument he has drawn is valid, he probably
has no business drawing it.
VIII. REFORM
It is useful initially to separate questions of application of the Rule
from the principle and purpose of the Rule. The nonsense applications
473. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMITH, supra note 5, § 1293, at 233-34.
474. Leach, supra note 334, at 985-86. The Wachovia Form is as follows:
Anything in this will to the contrary notwithstanding, no trust (other than a trust of
a vested interest) created hereunder shall continue beyond 21 years after the death of the
last to die of those beneficiaries who were living at the time of my death; and upon the
expiration of such period all trusts shall terminate and the assets thereof shall be distrib-
uted outright to such persons as are then entitled to the income therefrom and in the
same proportions; but if no person is then entitled to a specific portion of income, then to
the then living income beneficiaries, per stirpes.
WACHOVIA BANK & TRUST, supra note 352, at XVI-32.
475. 3 L. SIMEs & A. SMiTH, supra note 5, § 1295.
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of the Rule are well know, 4 7 6 and the North Carolina cases embody
some, but not all, of them. Here the Rule has sporadically been applied
to some commercial interests (for example, rights to repurchase), al-
though a Rule designed to regulate family settlements has no rational
bearing on the commercial world. Anomalously, the land use restric-
tions most deserving of perpetuities measurement, possibilies of re-
verter and powers of termination, are free from the check of the Rule.
The duration of trusts, while generally exempt from the Rule else-
where, may or may not be regarded as a question of perpetuities in this
State. Authority is too sparse on powers of appointment to draw many
conclusions. For class gifts, the much-maligned all-or-nothing rule of
Leake v. Robinson prevails. Often the opinions seem not to grasp ante-
cedent constructional questions of maximum membership (class clos-
ing) and minimum membership (vesting). Apparently, the testator or
grantor may choose measuring lives unrelated to the disposition, and
all gifts qualify for a twenty-one year period in gross unrelated to any
minority, removing the logical nexus between the Rule and family
settlements.
Some applications of the Rule are not bad. There is some support
for choosing that construction which avoids invalidity, although the
presumption is applied randomly. While North Carolina has not em-
braced judicial cy pres or the wait-and-see doctrine to preseve validity,
a leading case indicates that, if adopted, cy pres might be applied gen-
erously.477 There is no clear-cut administration contingency case, and
medical evidence might be admissible to avoid a fertile octogenarian
problem. No charitable gift has been invalidated for perpetuities
reasons.
Perpetuities reform statutes are nearly as numerous as the several
states.478 Most reforms tinker with the period of the Rule (for example,
the California allowance of an alternative sixty year period in gross),479
attempt to cure some of the nonsense applications (for example the
476. See Schuyler, supra note 38.
477. Stellings v. Autry, 257 N.C. 303, 126 S.E.2d 140 (1962) (Case 14).
478. The literature includes: Committee on Rules Against Perpetuities, Perpetuity Legislation
Handbook, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 176 (1967); Dukeminier, Perpetuities Legislation in Cali-
forna: Per.petual Trusts Permitted, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 678 (1967); Eckhardt, Perpetuities Reform by
Legislation, 31 Mo. L. REv. 56 (1966); Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts and Practi-
tioners Can Do About the Follies of the Rule, 13 KAN. L. REv. 351 (1965); Lynn, The Ohio Perpetu-
ities Reform Statute, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1968); Lynn, Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of
Developments in England and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 508 (1965); Schuyler, supra
note 38; Note, The Rule Against Perpetuities-Statutory Reform, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 295
(1968).
479. CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
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fertile octogenarian rule),48° or promulgate a statutory cy pres or wait-
and-see doctrine.48 ' In view of the constant problems caused by the
Rule, it may be time to ask whether these statutes merely treat the
symptoms and not the disease.482 In this era of sunset laws and deregu-
lation, could it not be that the Rule itself ought to be abolished?
Some beneficial aspects of abolition are readily apparent. Com-
mercial interests would be free from jeopardy, and the courts would be
forced to concentrate on relevant commercial policies, such as re-
straints on alienation, instead of trying to apply the ill-fitting Rule
Against Perpetuities. Trust duration, which supposedly is not a matter
of perpetuities, would be free at last. The charitable exemption of G.S.
36A-49 would be given its literal meaning, which the cases have hereto-
fore equivocally sanctioned. And all those delightful doctrines of in-
fectious invalidity, administration contingencies and "if at all" would
be reduced to a footnote (albeit a long one) in the legal history books.
A large benefit of abolition would be removal of a substantial mal-
practice risk. The leading malpractice case stating that privity is no bar
to suit by a disappointed beneficiary against the draftsman of an inva-
lid will was (you guessed it!) a perpetuities case.483 While the court in
that case exonerated the draftsman by seizing the question of negli-
gence from the jury and declaring, in effect, that nobody understood
the Rule, it is doubtful that future cases will treat perpetuities errors so
kindly.484 The Leach recommendation that a saving clause be inserted
480. The Illinois statute would be unintelligible without a preceding indoctrination into com-
mon law perpetuities doctrines. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, §§ 191-196 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp.
1978).
481. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 381.216 (1970).
482. Cf. J.C. GRAY, supra note 22, at xi ("There is something in the subject which seems to
facilitate error. Perhaps it is because the mode of reasoning is unlike that with which lawyers are
most familiar.").
483. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1962).
484. The leading English property law scholar, R.E. Megarry, commented on Lucas v. Hamm
as follows:
An Englishman's comment on the decision must perforce observe a proper restraint.
Doubtless the Supreme Court of California is the best judge of the standard of compe-
tence which is to be expected of California lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity. Let it
be accepted that it is highly unlikely that it would take longer than the perpetuity period
for the estate to be distributed. The question then becomes whether an ordinary lawyer
who undertakes to draft a will should be expected to know that a gift will be void for
perpetuity if there is any possibility, however unlikely, that the perpetuity period will be
exceeded. This part of the rule is so fundamental, and so highly stressed by all the books
and teachers, that he who does not know it must be expected to know little or nothing of
the rest of the rule. The standard of competence in California thus seems to be that it is
not negligent for lawyers to draft wills knowing little or nothing of the rule against per-
petuities, and without consulting anyone skilled in the rule (a point mentioned by the
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in most wills and trusts48 5 is testimony that perpetuities mistakes are
inevitable.
Also, it might be noted that at least one state, Wisconsin, in effect
has no Rule Against Perpetuities, and that state seems not to have been
sunk into Lake Michigan by any dynastic impulses of its citizens. Wis-
consin has no rule against remote vesting, although it does have a rule
against suspension of the power of alienation measured by lives in be-
ing plus thirty (not twenty-one) years.486 Wisconsin cases have held
that there is no suspension of the power of alienation for a trust if the
trustee has a power of sale.487 Although this view was criticized,488 the
Wisconsin legislature even reduced it to statutory writing in 1969.489
This large gap in perpetuities coverage seems not to have had an ad-
verse effect. Further, the monstrous accumulations anticipated by the
Thellusson Acts never materialized; Americans seem not inclined to-
ward entailments of one kind or another.490
The benefits of repeal in eliminating the nonsense applications of
the Rule are obvious. But what are the detriments? Here one must
look at the underlying purposes of the Rule, and Simes has stated them
admirably.49' Briefly, they are: (1) promoting alienability of property;
Court of Appeal but ignored in the judgment of the Supreme Court). If the rule against
perpetuities is in this category, what other fundamentals of the law are there of which the
California attorney may be ignorant without culpability? How does California translate
and apply spondelperitlam artis? However bright the future of Lucas v. Hamm may be
in England on the score of privity, it is to be hoped that on the standard of professional
competence it will prove to be a slur on the profession which, like the mule, will display
neither pride of ancestry nor hope of prosperity.
81 Law Q. REv. 478, 481 (1965).
Seegenerally Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (failure
to research community property rights in retirement benefits; attorney liable); Heyer v. Flaig, 70
Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (failure to consider effect of contemplated
marriage on will; attorney liable); Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514
(1976) (failure to recognize that power to revoke constituted a taxable general power of appoint-
ment; attorney liable); Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1966) (failure to secure
sufficient number of witnesses to will; attorney liable); McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (erroneous advice that it was unnecessary to change will after marriage;
attorney liable). But see Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 227 S.E.2d 802 (1976) (alleged
negligent misrepresentation of child support agreement; attorney not liable; if law is not well set-
tled, clear and widely recognized, attorney acting in good faith is insulated from liability).
485. See note 474 supra.
486. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(1), (5) (West 1969).
487. Becker v. Chester, 115 Wis. 90, 91 N.W. 87 (1902); In re Butter's Will, 239 Wis. 249, 1
N.W.2d 87 (1941); In re Walker's Will, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W.2d 94 (1950), notedin 49 MICH. L.
REv. 1239 (1951); 35 MINN. L. REv. 617 (1951).
488. Dede, Perfpetuities in Private Trusts in Wisconsin, 42 MARQ. L. REv. 514 (1959).
489. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(3) (West 1969).
490. See note 162 supra.
491. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955).
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(2) preventing undue concentrations of wealth; (3) furthering the com-
petitive struggle; and (4) limiting dead-hand control. In view of a
number of North Carolina statutes and one federal statute, and weigh-
ing the nuisance aspects of the Rule, it may be that these purposes are
no longer so strongly served that retention of the Rule is justified.
First, note that G.S. 39-6492 tends to reduce by one generation the
period during which property transferred inter vivos is tied up. This
statute generally allows the grantor of a future interest in real estate to
a person not in being to revoke the interest at any time before the re-
mainderman comes into being. It also allows the settlor of a trust creat-
ing a future interest in real or personal property to a person not in
being or not determined until the happening of a future event to revoke
the interest at any time before the birth of the remainderman or hap-
pening of the contingency. While there are gaps in the coverage of the
statute,493 in general it makes every contingent future interest revocable
during the creator's lifetime; in essence the creator has a power analo-
gous to the power of revocation reserved in an ordinary inter vivos
trust, for which the perpetuities clock does not start until the settlor's
death.494 While the creator has the power to revoke, the property has
not been tied up. The full import of this statute does not seem to have
been recognized, nor has it been argued to postpone the starting of the
period in any perpetuities case.
Second, the Rule does not substantially affect marketability. Most
substantial dispositions of property are trusts of corporate stock, in
which the trustee customarily is given a power to sell the trust
corpus.495 Even in the absence of an express provision, a power of sale
may be implied, at least when the trustee has an express duty to invest
and reinvest or to invest and manage.496 Although the proceeds of sale
will remain impressed with the trust, that is not a question of marketa-
bility but of other policies such as dead-hand control. Legal interests
are similarly alienable. North Carolina generally takes a strict view
492. N.C. GEN. STAr. § 39-6 (1976).
493. For trusts, the statute applies to real or personal property and to future interests (appar-
ently both remainders and executory interests) contingent upon birth or the happening of an
event. For nontrust interests, the statute seemingly applies only to real estate (not personalty) and
to future interests contingent upon birth (not the happening of an event).
494. E.g., Cook v. Horn, 214 Ga. 289, 104 S.E.2d 461 (1958).
495. L. SiMEs, supra note 491, at 40-54. The statutory list of powers that may be incorporated
by reference includes a power of sale. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(2) (1976).
496. E.g., Hall v. Wardwell, 228 N.C. 562, 46 S.E.2d 556 (1948); f. First Union Nat'l Bank v.
Broyhill, 263 N.C. 189, 139 S.E.2d 214 (1964) (power of sale will not be implied merely for greater
convenience in administration).
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toward restraints on alienation of legal estates. Also, G.S. 41-11 pro-
vides for sale and reinvestment of the proceeds when there is a vested
interest in real estate and a contingent remainder over to unborn or
unascertained remaindermen.497 Most of the gaps in the coverage of
this statute (does it apply to personalty? to executory interests?) would
seem to be filled by G.S. 41-11.1, 491 which provides for sale and rein-
vestment of real or personal property when there is a vested interest
followed by a gift over to a class, and one or more members of the class
are in esse but the membership may be increased by persons not in esse.
Any instrument attempting to keep property in the family for a long
time would be forced to use class designations for future generations,
exposing it to G.S. 41-11.1.
Third, the policies of preventing future concentrations of wealth
and, correlatively, of furthering the competitive struggle were dismissed
by Simes as matters of tax policy, not property law.499 Certainly there
is no suggestion in the cases that these are the purposes of the North
Carolina Rule.
Thus, the modem justification for the Rule lies in the injunction
against dead-hand control: there should be a fair balance between the
desires of present and succeeding generations to do what they wish with
the property that they enjoy, and it is socially desirable that the wealth
of the world be controlled by its living members.5° This proposition
seems implicit in North Carolina judicial references to the fettering of
property. Some North Carolina doctrines, however, do cut against this
rationale. For equitable interests, it appears that beneficiaries may
convey their interests, except under spendthrift trusts.50 1 Furthermore,
spendthrift restraints are virtually unenforceable in this State, since the
statutory maximum amount of $500 annual income has been rendered
trivial by inflation.5 0 2 It is not clear whether North Carolina would
follow the Claflin doctrine, which refuses to terminate a trust when a
material purpose of the settlor remains, even though all beneficiaries
are ascertained and competent, and request termination.50 3
497. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (1976).
498. Id. § 41-11.1.
499. L. SIMES, supra note 491, at 57-58.
500. Id. at 58-59.
501. Mizell v. Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453 (1927); Bank of Union v. Heath, 187 N.C.
54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924).
502. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-9 (1976); see Mizell v. Bazemore, 194 N.C. 324, 139 S.E. 453
(1927).
503. See Turnage v. Greene, 55 N.C. (2 Jones) 63 (1854); Fowler v. Webster, 173 N.C. 442, 92
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For legal interests, the statutes make alienable all future interests
in real or personal property, including executory interests and vested
and contingent remainders."° The doctrine of destructibility of contin-
gent remainders, which furthers alienability, may still exist.505
It may be objected that these doctrines do not eliminate the need
for the Rule Against Perpetuities, since the holder of a contingent inter-
est is unlikely to sell a speculative interest for which he will not receive
full value. But is this not a matter of his free choice? And might not a
market develop in such interests? 50 6
A stronger objection is that sale of one of these interests normally
does not defeat any other contingent interests created by the dead
hand; each generation may sell, but the next generation will take an-
other remainder for life, impressed with the whim of the original testa-
tor or grantor. The spectre of a new millenium of entailments
appears.5 07 This is the fundamental question, and the answer to it lies,
mirabile dictu, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and its new tax on gener-
ation-skipping transfers. 08 Under the Act, when a trust provides for
income or corpus to two or more generations younger than the settlor,
there is a tax substantially equivalent to the estate or gift tax that would
have been imposed if the property had been transferred outright to the
first generation then outright to the second generation.5 0 9 The tax is
also imposed on generation-skipping equivalents, such as legal life es-
tates and remainders. ° With limited exceptions, a person is a benefi-
ciary if he has a "right to receive income or corpus," which includes
beneficiaries of discretionary trusts51' and donees of general or special
S.E. 157 (1917). Since North Carolina scarcely recognizes spendthrift trusts, it might not follow
Claflin.
504. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3 (1976). See also id. § 31-40 (what property passes by will).
505. See note 7 supra.
506. Apparently a market in inheritances is made in London. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1971, at
66.
507. Committee on Rules Against Perpetuities, Further Trends in Peretuities, 5 REAL PROP.,
PROD. & TR. J. 333, 337 (1970):
If. . . tax-avoiding schemes are resorted to in Wisconsin for periods which are in
flagrant disregard of the limits of traditional perpetuity law, it is not likely that the
guardians of the Internal Revenue Code will allow the matter to pass without notice.
Amendments of that Code, couched in terms of general applicability, but designed to
plug gaps produced by peculiar local laws, are difficult to frame without creating traps
for unwary draftsmen in other states. It would be a formidable undertaking to frame a
federal estate tax so as to take into account a variety of local laws on perpetuities.
508. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622.
509. Id. § 2611.
510. Id.§2611(d).
511. Id. § 2613(d)(1).
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powers of appointment." 2 There is a "grandchild's exclusion" for
"transfer[s] to a grandchild of the grantor," calculated at the rate of
$250,000 per "deemed transferor," that is, child of the grantor,-1 3 and
this grandchild's exclusion is the key to the perpetuities analysis.
Suppose for example a grantor who, freed from the Rule Against
Perpetuities, contemplates a trust of $1,000,000 creating a series of life
estates to his children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, remain-
der to his great-great-grandchildren. The Code would permit the ar-
rangement, but there would be a tax disincentive: no grandchild's
exclusion would be allowed because the life estate in the grandchildren
would not be exposed to estate tax on the grandchildren's death.514
Furthermore, even if a grandchild's exclusion were allowed, the grantor
would be entitled only to a one-time exclusion, (because it is limited to
transfers to the grandchildren of the grantor), whereas if the property
were transferred to the children for life, remainder in fee to the
grandchildren, and the grandchildren then transferred the property to
their children for life, remainder in fee to their grandchildren, there
would be two rounds of exclusions, with the number of exclusions mea-
sured by the number of children and great-grandchildren of the origi-
nal grantor. Those to whom the exclusion is important will be in fairly
high tax brackets, so they can be expected to terminate the trust at the
level of grandchildren to secure maximum tax benefits, roughly at the
outside limit of the existing Rule Against Perpetuities. They will have
no tax incentive to create dynastic trusts, as they did before 1976 when
only the Rule served to check these impulses.
There are, of course, limits to this line of argument. The new tax
does not apply to trusts with only one generation younger than the
grantor (for example, "to my wife for life, remainder to my grandchil-
dren"),5 5 but this arrangement seems justifiable in light of the benefits
of abolition. Nor do the tax disincentives concern those persons with
small estates, but given the pace of inflation, the federal estate and gift
512. Id. § 2613(d)(2).
513. Id. §§ 2613(b)(5)(6), 2612.
514. J. MCCORD, 1976 ESTATE & GIFT TAX REFORM: ANALYSIS, EXPLANATION AND COM-
MENTARY 151 (1977).
515. See I.R.C. § 2613.
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taxes will increasingly affect the middle class.516 The benefits of aboli-
tion of the Rule Against Perpetuities may now be worth the price.'
1 7
516. Professor Haskins advances the provocative thesis that the Rule originally was designed
not so much as a check on perpetuities as it was a means of telling the new landed class how far it
could safely go in tying up property. Haskins, supra note 50.
517. It should be stressed that this is only a preliminary analysis. As recently as 1958, the
master future interests scholar Daniel Schuyler wrote, "no one has yet suggested that no rule
against perpetuities should be retained." Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuiies Discard Its
Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REv. 683, 689 (1958). It is with no small trepidation that the author challenges
300 years of property law and generations of scholars. But the current justifications for the Rule
seem hindsight rationalizations.
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